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SECRET—GUARD

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 12

January to December 1958

SECRET—GUARD

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SECRET—GUARD

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING IRAQ—PART 12

VQ 1051/3

No. 1

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND NURI PASHA AT HER MAJESTY'S EMBASSY, ANKARA, ON JANUARY 26, 1958

Baghdad Pact

Nuri said that the main reason for Mr. Menderes' visit to Baghdad had been his anxiety about the steadfastness of the Iraqi Cabinet. He had had a long meeting with the King, the Crown Prince, Abdullah Bakr and Muktar Baban at which it was agreed that the following points should be put to the Americans and ourselves during the Pact meeting:

- (i) the need to take some action towards a settlement in Palestine and not to allow matters to drift;
- (ii) the need for the United States and the United Kingdom to declare their readiness to supply the Arab countries (other than Egypt and Syria) with arms for defensive purposes. Israel was getting arms from France and it was important that the other Arab countries should have no excuse for turning to Russia;
- (iii) the need for further economic and military aid for the Pact (though this point was less important than the first two).

Economic Development in the Middle East

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Hammarskjöld had recently talked to him about his ideas for economic development in the Middle East and had agreed that these ideas should be explained in confidence to Nuri. Mr. Hammarskjöld thought that there might be a Council of Ministers from the Arab States formed to work out a development plan for the Middle East. There would be a small secretariat drawn from the International Bank or the United Nations but the decisions would rest with the Council. The money would come from outside the area, presumably from the United States and perhaps Germany, and possibly, at a later stage, from the oil companies.

The Secretary of State had told the Secretary-General that the idea of economic help for the Middle East was of course sound but that in his view a Council of Ministers on the lines proposed might play into the hands of the Egyptians. They would say that Iraq and Saudi Arabia already had enough money and that anything available should go to Egypt, Syria and perhaps a little to Jordan. The Secretary-General had in fact mentioned five possible development areas—the Tigris Valley, the Syrian Plain, the Suez Canal, the Nile Valley and the Jordan Valley. Of these he thought that the last would have to be excluded because of the Israeli complication while Iraq should have enough money of her own to develop the Tigris Valley. There were obvious objections to the remaining three projects and the Secretary of State had in fact told Mr. Hammarskjöld that in his view the whole scheme bristled with difficulties. It was, however, certain that Mr. Hammarskjöld had discussed the matter at some length with the Egyptians and although he was unlikely to put it forward as a firm plan, he might well ask Mr. McCloy to raise it in Baghdad. The Secretary of State therefore wanted Nuri to be warned.

Nuri said that this was an old idea which had originally been put forward by Mr. Bustani and had been firmly rejected by Iraq. The idea had always been to lay hands on the oil revenues and since neither Saudi Arabia nor Iraq would ever agree to this, pressure would fall on Kuwait. Nuri said that there was no question of Iraq accepting such a scheme even if it were to be managed by the International Bank and not by a Council of Ministers from the Arab States. If a Middle East country such as Egypt wanted help from the International Bank she should apply to the Bank herself for it.

Libya

Nuri said that the Libyan Ambassador in Ankara had asked him to raise with us the question of our subsidy and of the withdrawal of British troops. The Secretary of State said that we were reducing the number of our troops but would leave two major units in Libya. He did not think this should cause any real difficulty. As regards the subsidy, we were giving £4½ million this year but would have to reduce the amount next year. We were, however, in consultation with the Americans and were satisfied that with increased aid from them, Libya would get as much as before. The Americans might, for instance, take over the £1 million which we were giving for development and the assistance for the Libyan Army which came to about another £1 million. The Secretary of State suggested that Nuri might assure the Libyans that they would be taken care of but that they should not seek to play off the United Kingdom against the United States. They should accept the need for a joint operation such as was being conducted in Jordan. Nuri undertook to speak in this sense. He also suggested that as the President of Turkey was shortly visiting Libya the Secretary of State might speak to him. The Secretary of State confirmed that he had every intention of doing this.

Algeria

The Secretary of State asked Nuri why Iraq was giving money to the F.L.N. in Algeria since this was under Communist and Egyptian influence. The Iraqi budget provided for £½ million to be contributed this year. Nuri said that the representatives of the Algerian Nationalists in Iraq were certainly not Communist but he was surprised at the budget provision to which the Secretary of State had referred. It was agreed that he would discuss the matter further with Sir Michael Wright.

Palestine

The Secretary of State suggested that Nuri would no doubt wish to discuss Palestine with him and Mr. Dulles. Nuri agreed and said that while he was in Washington he had recommended to Mr. Dulles the plan drawn up by the Conciliation Committee in 1949. Mr. Dulles had been doubtful whether the French would still support this plan because of their present close relations with Israel. President Eisenhower had, however, been much interested in what Nuri had told him and had spoken of the need to "press on" with a solution after discussions with the countries in the area. Nuri argued strongly for the Conciliation Committee's plan which, he said, had been frustrated only by Ben Gurion. He was convinced that once the main policy was settled solutions would be found to subsidiary questions. For instance, it should be quite possible to arrange for Jews living in areas which would come under Arab control either to be exchanged with Arabs in Palestine or to remain as protected minorities in the Arab countries like the Jewish minority of 10,000 which was still in Baghdad. Nuri agreed that this question should not be raised in the Pact meeting but hoped that it might be discussed at a separate meeting with the Americans, ourselves and perhaps the Turks.

Iraq

Nuri said that while Mr. Menderes was in Baghdad the Crown Prince had told him that it was hoped to get the budget voted in March and then to dissolve Parliament in preparation for fresh elections in May. The present Government would remain in power to conduct the elections, a stronger Government might be formed thereafter. He thought the formation of political parties would probably not be authorised.

VJ 10393/64

No. 2

FORMATION OF THE ARAB UNION

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 27)

(No. 34. Confidential) Baghdad,
Sir, February 25, 1958.

In his most interesting despatch No. 13 of the 19th of February reporting on the negotiations for the formation of the Arab Union and the surrounding circumstances in Jordan, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Amman said that this Union resulted from an initiative of King Hussain. I would agree with this assessment and with the indications in the same despatch that the main impetus which resulted in the rapid conclusion of an agreement came from the Jordanian side. On the other hand, there is no question that a Union of this kind was what was desired by King Faisal and Prince Abdul Illah and by the members of the Iraq Government.

2. The dream of Arab unity is as strong in Iraq as in the other Arab countries and it has long been an article of faith of Iraqi Governments that if conditions were right they would take immediate steps to realise it. On various occasions in the past, it seemed that conditions might be propitious for uniting Iraq at least with Syria, and Senator Nuri as Said's name is closely associated with the objective of the Fertile Crescent, to include also Jordan. On the other hand, the urge to achieve this union has never been strong enough to cause any Iraqi Government to overcome the difficulties or even to make special efforts to woo the other partners. This has been partly caused by the magnitude of the genuine difficulties, whether geographical or political, and partly by more local considerations, such as rivalries between the two branches of the Hashemite House and mutual suspicions between the monarchy in Iraq and the republican régime of Syria. It must also be said that Iraq's interests are far from exclusively dominated by questions of Arab politics. Although, as I have said above, Iraqis share the Arab dream of unity and although they feel as strongly as other Arabs about what they consider to be the crimes against the Arab people of the formation of the State of Israel and of French imperialist policy in North Africa, responsible Governments here have also had to think closely of their relations with

their Northern and Eastern neighbours. Moreover, the possession of substantial revenues from the export of oil and the determination to carry out a long-term development programme have made the Iraqis more inward-looking and perhaps more self-centred than their Western neighbours. Finally, the thought that the most natural first step would be union with Syria, which has been negated by the growing ties between Syria and Egypt and Soviet Russia, produced a certain feeling of helplessness.

3. Since King Hussain of Jordan dismissed the Nabulsi Government in March 1957, and could be seen to be determined to fight for the survival of his country against Egyptian and Syrian infiltration and propaganda attack, he has been the object of a considerable amount of admiration here from the Palace, the Government and some of the officials. This has been accompanied by a growing understanding of how important it was for Iraq that Jordan should not be swallowed up by Colonel Nasser. But this admiration and this understanding were markedly tempered by a measure of distrust of what they consider King Hussain's unstable judgment, by uncertainty whether King Hussain and his Government had in them sufficient seeds of stability to make them worth backing and by a universal lack of confidence in Samir Rifai, the Jordanian Foreign Minister. For these reasons Jordanian feelers for closer co-operation between the two countries did not meet with a very warm response and Jordanian suggestions that Iraq might step into the breach in the Jordanian Treasury caused by the refusal of Egypt and Syria to fulfil their earlier undertakings to pay an annual subsidy, fell on stony ground. In considering these approaches, to which Farhan Shubailat, the new Jordanian Ambassador who arrived in Baghdad six months ago, added a new note of urgency, the Iraqis kept also looking towards King Saud, as they have done on all international questions which have arisen during the last year or more. If they had thought that King Saud would be so much distressed by events in Syria and Egypt that he would throw in

his lot with the Hashemite monarchies, then it is probable that the Iraqi response to Jordanian representations would have been much quicker. As it was, the King and the Crown Prince urged upon successive Iraqi Governments during 1957 the importance of finding more money to help Jordan. But neither Nuri's Government, nor Ali Jaudat's Government nor Abdul Wahab Murjan's Government were prepared to do much. The last-named, even under heavy pressure from Jordan supplemented by the urging of my United States colleague and myself, would go no further than the payment of three quarters of the total sum promised as an advance for development as long ago as 1955.

4. The decision of Egypt and Syria to form a United Arab Republic changed the whole atmosphere and there is no question at all that the decision of the Iraqi Government to go forward into union with Jordan should be seen as almost wholly a response to that decision. Moreover, the response should be seen as one primarily by the Palace and by the Government in which the part of public opinion was negative rather than positive. For Colonel Nasser is still the hero of the broad masses of the population and if it had been possible to hold a plebiscite on whether Iraq should join the United Arab Republic there is little doubt that there would have been a large majority in favour of the republic. On the other hand, the Palace and the Government did not have any doubt that the right thing to do was to reach an early agreement to form a union at least with Jordan, but if possible with Saudi Arabia also. Exactly what this would mean in practice was certainly very unclear to them. The formation of the United Arab Republic took them as much as anybody else by surprise, and it was some time before their ideas could crystallise. Nevertheless, the need for a positive reaction towards union was clear to them at once and the Prime Minister and others immediately said that they wished this to be as close as they could persuade their other partners to agree to.

5. The reason why the reaction was so immediate and so positive was that the formation of the United Arab Republic brought to a point all the fears of Colonel Nasser and of Russian infiltration which the Palace and leading politicians had had in their minds for some time but which had not until then confronted them directly in a concrete form. They had always been aware that one of Colonel Nasser's objec-

tives was probably the control of the oil resources of the Mesopotamian plain and the Persian Gulf. These fears had been sharpened by the demonstration of his ability to nationalise the Suez Canal and to operate it without foreign assistance. They had been sharpened also by the four months' breach of the pipeline across Syria from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean which ended in March 1957, which had shown how dependent Iraq was on the goodwill of the rulers of Syria. The formation of the United Arab Republic combined all these anxieties in their minds and revealed how much Iraq might now be at the mercy of Colonel Nasser and his Russian helpers. It suggested to them that if Jordan should be lost to the republic Colonel Nasser would have advanced one more step towards the Gulf and they concluded that, if they could not prevent this step, the possibility that they might ever woo Syria away from the republic might be gone for ever. On the other hand, it seemed to them that to unite with Jordan, whatever the difficulties, would not only help to hold the situation by providing King Hussain with moral and material support, but might also, if the Union with the help of its friends could be made to operate as an efficient and progressive concern, ultimately exercise an attraction on many Syrians who would dislike government from Cairo. But the Government knew perfectly well that Jordan would financially be an incubus and that Iraq would probably (I do not say certainly) have to make some sacrifices in the interests of supporting her. But the determination of those who put the policy through and authorised Iraqi agreement to the Union was such that this difficulty was brushed aside. I am told that when the question was considered in the Cabinet before King Faisal set forth on his visit to Amman, the Cabinet were unanimous in thinking that he should agree to a union as close as King Hussain would accept. The only voice which was, I believe, raised in favour of caution was that of Dr. Nadim al Pachachi, the Minister of Finance. Dr. al Pachachi is probably the ablest member of the Cabinet, but he is essentially a political trimmer. He was undoubtedly aware, not only that the Union might prove expensive for Iraq, but also that it would not be generally popular in the country. However, his scruples were overcome and he himself formed a member of the delegation to Amman. By the time that they left it was clear that King Saud would not be

a party to negotiations, but the likelihood of this had already been reckoned with and did not deter the Iraqi Government.

6. With regard to the negotiations themselves, I cannot add much of substance to the account given by Mr. Johnston. It may be worth recording two details not mentioned in his despatch. The first is that, according to the Iraqi Foreign Minister, a suggestion which was made by the Iraqis that King Hussain should be Deputy Head of the Union was rejected by King Hussain as apparently derogatory to him. He insisted on being head, even if only when King Faisal was away. (There might be a good deal to be said for this idea being revived possibly with a different name for the deputy, in order to get over the difficulty that when the seat of the Union Government is Baghdad there will be nobody representing the Union in Amman.) The second point was that the Iraqis appear to have accepted equality in the Union legislature only in order to obtain King Hussain's acceptance of King Faisal as Head of the Union; it was not their original idea, which was for an Iraqi majority.

7. In general, official opinion considers that the terms of the agreement are satisfactory; they are pleased with Article 3, which leaves the way clear for their continued membership of the Baghdad Pact, for so far as I can discover the Government never entertained the thought of leaving the pact in response to Jordanian pressure. The Iraqis had evidently reached the same conclusion as Mr. Johnston, that this was a Jordanian "try-on." They are aware that this article and other parts of the document are in some respects self-contradictory and that its amplification into a constitution will test the ingenuity of the lawyers and politicians of the two countries. On the other hand, they consider that it provides the right degree of unification, as a first step. Indeed, this emphasis on the fact that it is a first step is in the mouths of all who defend the Union. They see its terms as to some extent at least tailored to permit the accession of other countries, whether Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or ultimately perhaps Syria. These terms provide for the members of the Union to retain in theory different international obligations (however impossible this may prove to be in practice); they leave open the question of monarchy or republic and of who might be the head of the Union in the event of fresh accession and they do not contain any provisions (apart from the headship accorded for the

time being to King Faisal) which would mean inequality between the partners. That at least one further step is looked for is clear. Everybody to whom I have spoken at once brings up the question of Kuwait and looks to us to find some way of associating the Ruler of Kuwait with the Union, whether fully or partially.

8. When the decision to unite was taken, an immediate feeling of relief that agreement had been reached, and, to some extent, of satisfaction that a step was being taken towards the dream of Arab unity, was fairly general. Since then there has been time for second thoughts, and I would now say that the feelings about the Union are much more mixed. I will send a separate despatch on the theme of public reactions to the Union when I have been able to form a more complete assessment. The Government know that the Union has not yet the support of the country as a whole and that the decision to go ahead with it faces them with a challenge to make it popular with the people. They realise that this will be difficult in view of the added financial burden which may fall upon Iraq and they are looking to America and Britain to help them meet this challenge. I will only specify, but not examine here, the various ways in which they think we can help them: assistance to bring Kuwait into the Union, measures to speed up the expansion of the export of oil, and political help over Algeria and Palestine. I have dealt with these subjects in separate telegrams, as well as with related matters such as the help needed in the modernisation of Iraq's fighter defences and I have urged that we should show our own support of Iraq's act of faith by assisting her in some or all of these ways.

9. It is too early to assess how the Union will work and what internal strains may develop between its two parts. I would only say that it provides a challenge not only for the two Kings and their Governments to do all within their power to make the Union popular with their people by concentrating on social reform and development, but also a challenge and an opportunity for Britain and America to provide the help that the Union will need and the advice and encouragement (behind the scenes) which it will surely continue to ask for, so that the Union may prove durable. If through lack of means or nerve, through unwise policies, or through lack of help from friends, it should collapse, then the situation for Britain and America in the

Middle East would be worse in the short term than it would have been if Iraq and Jordan had not come together. In taking this step the two countries knew that it had our full support, and if we are lukewarm in backing it now the inherent difficulties of the Union may cause them to lose heart. If that were to happen I fear that the future of our relationship with all the oil-bearing States would be in jeopardy, for not only Iraq but also Kuwait and the rest of the Persian Gulf would, I suspect, be at the mercy of Colonel Nasser. Whether such a situation could ever be turned to advantage

is too large a subject for the present despatch, but it is safe to say that it would not be welcome to the present régime and Government of Iraq. We owe it to them to do all we can to avert this possibility.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Ankara, Bahrain, Kuwait, Tehran, Washington and the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VJ 10393/72

No. 3

OPINION IN IRAQ ON THE ARAB UNION

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 6)

(No. 38. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *March 4, 1958.*

In my despatch No. 34 of the 25th of February, I said that I would report separately on the public reaction in Iraq to the decision to form the Arab Union. In my telegram No. 230, I reported that the immediate reception of the decision was broadly favourable. This was a natural consequence of enthusiasm for Arab unity which the formation of the United Arab Republic had created and of satisfaction that Iraq also was going to play its part in the movement for unity. There has now been time for second thoughts and also for the opening of Egyptian and Syrian propaganda against the Union. Although public opinion has not yet crystallised, it is apparent that there is now less positive support for the Union and considerably more opposition to it than was the case at the beginning.

2. It should be said first that those in the Government and in official circles who supported the original decision do not appear to have retracted. They are encouraged by the fact that Iraq was able to respond to the opportunity which was presented and they are conscious of the value to Jordan, and so ultimately to Iraq, of the Union. They are fully aware of the magnitude of the problems, especially financial, which confront them but they are determined to solve them. On the other hand, most of them are undoubtedly alarmed by the severity of Colonel Nasser's attack and his ability now to come to the borders of Iraq to deliver it. I would expect Egyptian propaganda to be increasingly effective with the broad mass of the population unless the Union can show some positive and early progress either in the internal or external fields.

3. There is no question that there is already, among the politically active part of the population, a considerable number who are either hostile to the Union or at least prepared to spread criticisms of it. It is easy for those who follow Colonel Nasser's line to represent that the Union will be an economic and military burden on Iraq without any corresponding compensation and,

because Governments in Iraq are never popular, to exploit the fact that there are many who think the worse of the Union simply because it was carried through by the Government. Another argument which is used against it is that the Union will mean freedom of movement between the two countries and that the arrival of Palestinian artisans and semi-skilled workers will be the cause of unemployment among Iraqis.

4. These are the arguments used by the Arab opposition, but there is also a good deal of adverse criticism in the Kurdish area. Many of the Kurds, particularly the younger people who do not realise how much Kurdistan has benefited by government from Baghdad, by comparison with the past, and who are afraid that they will now be neglected because they will form an even smaller minority in a larger Arab State, have been expressing their doubts to the authorities in the Kurdish liwas.

5. The first social group to express dissatisfaction with the Government in any political crisis are the students and older boys in the secondary schools. Immediately after the proclamation of United Arab Republic there was some effervescence in some of the colleges in Baghdad, and this spread to a few of the secondary schools after the plebiscite on the 21st of February. In the ordinary course this might have been expected to come to an end, but Colonel Nasser's speeches in Damascus are probably responsible for the fact that the effervescence is continuing. The Minister of Education has spoken to a large number of the Baghdad school-teachers and explained the Government's policy to them in the hope that they will be able to maintain discipline in the schools, but this does not yet seem to have been sufficient. On the other hand, it has been made abundantly clear that the school-boys will get into trouble if they start demonstrating in the streets and nothing of this kind has yet happened, with the exception of one minor incident yesterday in which some secondary-school boys were quickly and painlessly dispersed by the police. Outwardly Baghdad is calm and the threat of disorder is not considered to be imminent.

6. When the agreement of the Union was submitted to the Iraq Parliament, it was unanimously approved in the meeting of both Houses. This did not signify that every Deputy and Senator approved of it, but sentiment in favour of Arab unity was so compelling that none felt able to oppose it. It is still the case that no political figure of importance and no member of either Chamber has come out publicly against the Union; indeed the visit of a fairly representative group of forty Deputies to Jordan which took place last week has probably strengthened the feeling in the Chamber in favour of the Union. Criticisms of it are therefore still somewhat muted. Too much importance should not, however, be given to this. An overt attack on the Union at the present time would be tantamount to an attack on the régime and only the irreconcilable pan-Arab Nationalists are prepared for this. The moderate Nationalists, although some of them may retail arguments against the Union, do not appear yet to have adopted opposition to it as an article of faith.

7. My conclusion is that the present situation is potentially dangerous but not yet critical. People's minds are not yet really made up and a great deal will depend on the success with which the two countries tackle the problems confronting them in forming the Union. Important factors in encouraging the Iraq Government to fuse them resourcefully will be the answers to the questions whether the Union will continue

to receive reasonable support from King Saud, whether some way can be found for associating Kuwait with it, and whether the Western countries can find effective ways of helping it without opening the way to further criticisms that the Union is Western-inspired and designed to divide rather than further the ultimate union of all the Arabs. Even if the answers to these questions are satisfactory, it is at least an open question whether the Union will ever be popular; indeed, it is improbable that it will command much more popularity than does Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact, for the pull of the United Arab Republic will be even stronger than has been Colonel Nasser's Egypt. In resisting this pull, a critical question is whether the new Iraq Government under Senator Nuri as Said will show the ability both to explain the reasons for its policy to the people more effectively than has been done in the past and to put through effectively an internal programme of reform and development. For the Union and the policies followed by its component parts must be shown to be of advantage to the people of Iraq if they are to win sufficient support to make the Union a genuine one.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Amman, Beirut, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Tehran, Ankara, Washington and POMEF.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

SECRET-GUARD

VQ 1015/28

No. 4

NURI'S NEW GOVERNMENT

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 13)

(No. 42. Confidential) *Baghdad, March 11, 1958.*
Sir,

In confirmation of my telegrams Nos. 364 and 365, I have the honour to report that, on the resignation on the 2nd of March of Sayid Abdul Wahab Murjan and his Government, Senator Nuri as Said was asked by the King to form a new Government. This request was accepted and the composition of Nuri's fourteenth Government was announced on the evening of the 3rd of March. I enclose a list of the Ministers.

2. Nuri had been out of office since June of the previous year. By then the Suez crisis had been surmounted and the Palace felt that it was safe to revert to the normal Iraqi system of allowing the fruits of office to be enjoyed from time to time by different groups of politicians. Although during the autumn the menace represented by the growing rapprochement between Syria and Soviet Russia had alarmed the Palace they did not feel the risk to be so close as to warrant bringing Nuri himself back. Instead, on the demise of the Ali Jaudat Government, a Government of Nuri supporters under the inexperienced leadership of Abdul Wahab Murjan had been adopted as a compromise. However, President Nasser, who for a year had been subdued as an aftermath of the Suez crisis, had already begun to erupt again by moving Egyptian troops to Syria in October and he now followed this move by forming the United Arab Republic and by using his visit to Damascus to deliver a direct attack on the Arab Union. This final development made the Palace feel that the threat was immediate and grave and that the response had to be as strong as they could make it. Only Nuri could give the country the resolute leadership needed to deal with a situation in which there would, at the least, be an all-out propaganda attack on the Iraqi régime from just across the border, and at the worst an attempt to bring the country to its knees by blocking the oil transport routes to the West.

3. Apart from Nuri himself the key figures in the new Government are Dr.

Fadhil Jamali, the Foreign Minister, Abdul Karim al Uzri, the Minister of Finance, Said Qazzaz, Minister of the Interior, and Dr. Dhia Ja'far, Minister of Economics. The rest of the team are, however, quite strong with one or two exceptions. Thus, Taufiq as Suwaidi, Deputy Prime Minister, though notorious for corruption, is able, intelligent and courageous. Sami Fattah was a firm Minister of the Interior and formerly a forceful and effective administrator as Director-General of Ports. Burhanuddin Bashayan, former Foreign Minister, who will deal with Information and Arab Union matters in the immediate formative period, is a sound supporter of Nuri and a useful member of the Government despite his slow and ponderous manner. Abdul Hamid Kadhim and Dr. Abdul Amir Allawi are experienced and competent though politically unimportant. Mahmud Baban is intelligent and open-minded but did not have time to make his mark as Minister of Health in the last Government. Muhammad Mishhin al Hardan did not prove a success in the Ministry of Economics and has few qualifications for agriculture, but he is a young man of character and some determination and, when he has found his feet as a Minister, may prove an asset. The weakest members are Salih Saib al Jubburi at Development and Rushdi al Chalabi at Communications and Works.

4. But it is on the Prime Minister and his four principal Ministers, referred to at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, that the main burden of policy-making will lie. The selection of Dr. Jamali has left no doubt in anyone's mind that the formation of this new Government was a direct answer to President Nasser's challenge. Since the establishment of the United Arab Republic, he had attacked it vigorously in signed articles in his newspaper *Al Amal* and he is a firm believer in the dangers of Communist penetration in the area through Soviet co-operation with Nasser. In his response to Nasser, as in many other things, Dr. Jamali's words tend to be intemperate and he has yet to show himself a capable Minister. His appointment has therefore been received with very mixed feelings in

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Iraq, for many fear that his presence in the Government will only exacerbate the rivalry between the two unions. Nevertheless, he brings to the Government two most valuable qualities, courage in standing up for his convictions, however unpopular, a rare quality among Arab politicians, and a sincere belief in social reform; the latter will lead him to stand with Abdul Karim al Uzri in the Cabinet and support the latter in pressing for an active internal policy. Abdul Karim al Uzri has not, since his former leader Saleh Jabr broke with Nuri, been able previously to find a basis for working with Nuri, and the fact that he has come into the Government now is a measure of the seriousness with which the situation is regarded. He is a somewhat doctrinaire economist and land owner with progressive views and many ideas, some practical, some probably impractical, for carrying out social and economic reforms and for spreading the benefits of the oil revenues among all classes of the population. As Minister of Finance he is likely to press for reform of the tax structure and the introduction of land taxation, coupled with limitations on the size of estates, which will be popular with the ordinary people but may be strongly opposed by the tribal shaikhs and large landed proprietors who will see their interests threatened. Abdul Karim al Uzri's objectives are undoubtedly sound since, with the formation of the Arab Union, there is an even greater need than previously for the Iraq Government to be seen to concern itself with measures to improve the lot of the ordinary people, particularly in the rural areas and in the slums of mud huts which have grown up round the towns to house those who are flocking from the countryside into the towns. It is to be hoped, but I cannot say that I feel great confidence, that he will also show a measure of tactical skill in putting his ideas over to the landed interest, for the Palace and Nuri will not wish to deliver too strong a frontal attack on one of the main groups to which the Government will look for support.

5. Said Qazzaz is already well known as a firm and experienced Minister of the Interior. He is also one of the wisest and most far-sighted of contemporary Iraqi politicians, and one of the two leading Kurds in political life. In the latter capacity he will have an important role to play, because the formation of the Arab Union and the possibility of further moves towards Arab unity are already causing some anxiety

among Iraq's Kurdish population. The Kurds, after many troubled years, have accepted their place in the Iraqi State and, indeed, have begun to play an increasingly important role in it (my despatch No. 291 of the 6th of December, 1957). But they do not relish the thought of being a minority in an increasingly large Arab population and they may consequently become more vulnerable to propaganda from Turkey, from Iran or still more from Soviet Russia based on the dream of a united Kurdish nation. The Iraq Government will have to pay particular attention to this problem, to ensure that the Kurds have a fair share of appointments in the Arab Union, as they have done in Iraq; fortunately, Said Qazzaz is the best possible interpreter of their views.

6. Finally, Dhia Ja'far is an experienced Minister, having been in office on ten previous occasions, five of them at the Ministry of Economics. He is not a popular figure, being quarrelsome and self-assertive, but he is able and he knows oil problems well.

7. The policy of the Government is essentially the same as that of Nuri's last Government, with the introduction of Dr. Jamali and Abdul Karim al Uzri. The presence of these two gives promise that more attention will be directed to internal matters and to steps to increase the popularity of the Government among the people than was the case during Nuri's last term of office. Their presence, however, by the same token, could make this a less homogeneous Government and one more liable to internal division. It is possible that it will in any case need reconstruction when the Arab Union Government is formed, probably in May, but apart from this its cohesion is bound to depend to a large extent on the immediacy of the threat to Iraq represented by President Nasser. We are confronted with the paradox that although we cannot wish for the continued sharpening of inter-Arab relations which President Nasser's present policy appears to involve, and although we may fear that in the long run the Iraqi régime will have the greatest difficulty in maintaining itself against the danger to it which President Nasser, working on a discontented population largely favourable to his aims, represents, yet by bringing together into one Government these disparate elements he has perhaps produced the one combination which, given time, could carry through some of the internal reforms which are needed to give Iraq stability. Nevertheless,

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it is probable that, as in the past, events outside Iraq will decide to a great extent how long the Government will last.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Bahrain, Karachi, Kuwait, Tehran, POMEF and Washington.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

Composition of Iraq Government formed on the 3rd of March, 1958

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence: Nuri as Said.

Deputy Prime Minister: Taufiq as Suwaidi (138).

Foreign Affairs: Dr. Fadhil al Jamali (53).

Finance: Abdul Karim al Uzri (16).

Interior: Said Qazzaz (124).

Development: Salih Saib al Jubburi (126) (Unchanged).

Agriculture: Muhammad Mishhin al Hardan (formerly Economics).

Communications and Works: Rushdi al Chalabi (120).

Justice: Jamil Abdul Wahhab (76).

Education: Abdul Hamid Kadhim (10) (Unchanged).

Social Affairs: Sami Fattah (128) (formerly Interior).

Economy: Dhia Ja'far (52).

Health: Dr. Abdul Amir Allawi (3) (formerly Communications).

Without Portfolio:

Burhanuddin Bashayan (49) (formerly Foreign Affairs).

Rayih Atiya (119).

Mahmud Baban (85) (formerly Health).

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VQ 1015/36

No. 5

THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE OPPOSITION IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 25)

(No. 74. Confidential)

Baghdad,

Sir,

April 22, 1958.

I have read with great interest Sir Roger Stevens' despatch No. 20 of the 17th of February about the internal situation in Iran and the nature of the Opposition to the Shah's Government. There are striking similarities between the situation in Iraq and Iran, such as the potentially explosive element of political frustration under an authoritarian régime, especially among the growing middle class, as well as the belief in Britain's dominant and, to some, sinister role; but there are also marked differences due primarily to Iraq's membership of the Arab world. I think that it may be useful to make a similar analysis of the situation in Iraq.

2. First of all, I should like to set the political scene against which the existence of an Opposition has to be considered. It is unlikely that this will be substantially altered by the formation of the Arab Union with Jordan, for the structure of Government under the new Constitution will not be very different from what it has been in the constituent parts. The Constitutional position in Iraq is very like what it was in the United Kingdom at the accession of George III. Political power resides in the palace (I use this word to cover the King and the Crown Prince, between whom there is no sign of any divergence); the palace has to work through the professional politicians who are not organised in political parties but rather revolve round a small number of leaders or potential leaders, among whom Nuri as Said is outstanding. The loyalties which bind the groups together are those of personal friendship and family connexion rather than common adherence to political doctrine, except of a very general kind, and all depend on the favour of the palace for office. The King appoints and dismisses Prime Ministers and need not pay much attention to the two Houses of Parliament, for the Senators are appointed by him and the Deputies, although elected by a wider suffrage than was the unreformed House of Commons in Britain, are selected as candidates by a process in which the influence of the régime plays such a large part that in the countryside few elections are contested and in the towns the opponents of the régime stand very little chance of election. The choice by the palace of a Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues is determined, therefore, neither directly by events in the Chamber of Deputies (for instance, no Government has ever fallen as a result of an adverse vote in the Chamber), nor by considerations of party strengths. It is determined rather in response to the broadest political considerations, including the safety of the régime itself, in which the views of the articulate part of the population necessarily play only a small part. In practice, what has occurred in recent years has been a succession of Governments drawn from the professional politicians, who belong largely to the landed upper class but include a certain number of self-made men, especially from the more vigorous northern part of the country, where the Kurds predominate. In quiet periods, the leaders have been more or less respected but ineffective personalities like Jamil al Madfai, Ali Jaudat or, most recently, Abdul Wahab Murjan, whose views are basically Conservative and who can be trusted to continue existing policies. On occasion, and as a concession to more liberal sentiments, there has been resort to a figure such as Dr. Jamali, who is robustly anti-Communist and in internal affairs a well-meaning but somewhat impractical reformer. In times of stress or when long-term policy decisions have to be made, or carried through against opposition, Nuri has been called to provide firm leadership or, if need be, to restore order.

3. It is the policies worked out or launched during Nuri's Governments which have set the course which Iraq has followed in recent years. They have provided the setting for the development programme, for Iraqi membership of the Baghdad Pact, and for a firm paternalistic internal policy based on the belief that it is only when the exploitation of Iraq's oil has transformed the living conditions and economic opportunities of the people that it will be possible to grant greater political liberties and evolve a more modern political structure to replace the present feudal order based largely on the tribes, the army and a strong monarchy.

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This fundamental concept is one which is shared by the palace, by Nuri, by a majority of the active politicians and senior officials, and probably by a fair proportion of the educated people of the older generation. Yet, Nuri's periods of office are normally not long (the Government lasting nearly three years which ended in June 1957 was an exception), for the Crown Prince has not believed in keeping any one man longer in office than a particular situation requires. The political objective of the palace is in fact to preserve the position and influence of the Hashemite dynasty and to ensure that Governments depend on its favour rather than on Parliament or on political parties; changes are therefore made with regularity so as to ensure that no group has a monopoly of power and can build up a position in which it can challenge the prerogatives of the palace itself. This situation is more or less resented by most of the professional politicians. Those who accept the position and co-operate with the palace, *i.e.*, the majority, form the groups from which Governments are drawn; those who do not, form the Opposition.

4. The Opposition is like an iceberg and that part of it which appears above the surface of political life is not large. It contains a few leading personalities, rather than effective leaders; the main ones are Mohammad Siddiq Shanshal (Leading Personalities No. 98), Faiq Samarra (L.P. 54) and Mohammad Mahdi Kubba (L.P. 95), plus Kamil al Chaderchi (L.P. 81) who is still in prison. These men and their associates do not make up a "ragged band", for their material prosperity is marked. They belong to the urban middle class and are largely lawyers, business men, professors and teachers. They were formerly members of the now dissolved Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties but although they do not now have a party mechanism for putting forward their views and normally, as on the present occasion, boycott elections to the Chamber of Deputies, they are neither silent nor submerged. They may not hold public meetings or express opposition to the régime itself in the Press, but they talk freely in private gatherings and, on any particular matter, they have hitherto usually found Deputies with views fairly close to their own to speak up in Parliament, where there are not many restrictions on freedom of speech short of sedition. (This is less likely to be the case in the Parliament to be elected on the 5th of May because, with the initiation of the Arab Union immediately in prospect, the Government have decided that there must be no risk of dissenting voices being heard and they are consequently being even more selective than normal in giving support to candidates.) The fact that on a great many issues the Opposition are voicing views which many people, particularly of the younger generation, support and which for most people have an emotional attraction, gives them a certain confidence and strength even though they cannot make themselves politically effective. For they can capitalise on the various strains which go to make up radical Arab nationalism, passion for unity, strong opposition to Israel, revolutionary ardour against Conservative régimes and xenophobia. I attach a translation of a protest they recently sent to the Prime Minister which gives a fairly good digest of their views. This protest has neither been answered nor published in Iraq, although its existence is widely known for it was broadcast from Radio Cairo. No action has been taken against the signatories.

5. The main points put forward by the Opposition are liberalism and reform at home and neutralism abroad. On the former, they press for full freedom of speech, of association and of elections, and argue that Iraq should have the same form of democracy as we have in the United Kingdom. They maintain that if greater political freedom were permitted, there would be an initial effervescence but this would quickly settle down; they claim (probably not in all cases sincerely) that they are not opposed to the monarchy but only to its retention of excessive power; they say they wish to retain a constitutional monarchy; but in the same breath express doubts whether the palace will ever agree to such a reduction in its influence. The more sensible among them are prepared to admit that a sudden removal of all controls would be unwise and that the approach to the British pattern of democracy must be gradual; as immediate steps, they advocate that parties should be allowed to form and an Opposition permitted to function in the Chamber of Deputies. Otherwise, they press for a swifter modernisation of the feudal system of land ownership in the tribal areas and of the tax structure, and the reform of the Administration. On such questions they do not differ in essentials from some of the more progressive Government politicians such as the present Minister of Finance, Abdul Karim al Uzri, but they express their views with more violence. They claim that their main aim is to spread the profits

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from the extraction of oil more broadly among the people but they tend to ignore the inherent difficulties of doing this quickly. In general, they exaggerate the defects of the Government and ascribe many things to wickedness which are in fact the result of inexperience or inefficiency or of the lack of an adequate number of trained men to speed up the existing programme. None of them seems interested in the application of Communist methods in internal affairs.

6. In foreign affairs, and this is the main point of difference from Iran, they look to Egypt and Jamal Abdul Nasser as their leader. They would like Iraq to join the United Arab Republic but seem far from clear in their own minds on the extent to which they would wish Iraq to submerge her individuality in the cause of Arab unity or to forego oil revenues for the benefit of the have-nots. Their ideal appears to be a Greater Arabia which would occupy a somewhat similar position in the world to that of India. They claim that it is possible to make use of the Soviet Union and its friendship without laying open the Arab world to eventual Communist domination; they point to the suppression of Communism in Egypt and Syria as an indication of this. They claim to be not anti-Western; indeed they maintain with apparent sincerity that they wish to have friendly relations with the West, with which they will continue to trade and to which they will sell their oil. They explain Egypt's rapprochement with the Soviet Union by the mistakes which they think the West has made over Israel, Suez and Algeria. They believe that they would be able, if in power, to maintain good relations with all the Great Powers and they demand that Iraq should not be tied by treaties to any of them. The Baghdad Pact is, of course, one of their main targets. They regard it as having been imposed upon the country by the palace and Nuri, in order to divide the Arab world and to reduce Nasser's importance. Their attitude towards the United Kingdom is intrinsically not unfriendly but they claim to see the hand of Britain in most of the decisions they disapprove of and particularly in the continued power and influence of the Crown Prince and Nuri; their political attitude therefore tends to be hostile to Britain. Essentially, of course, they follow President Nasser's pan-Arab, anti-Western, strongly anti-Israeli line.

7. If Iraq could be left largely uninfluenced by the outside world, I should have little fear that the régime could not maintain its stability against the pressure of the Opposition reinforced by that of the frustrated middle class, and I would expect the country to continue on its present course more or less indefinitely. It is true that it has not yet had time in its short life to produce a united community. There is always latent feeling between the Shias and the Sunnis, and although the Kurds are settling down well, their fears of Arab domination are not far below the surface. Moreover, the vast gulf between the Government and the people which results from the centuries of Ottoman occupation and which is only slowly being bridged, is actively exploited by Egyptian propaganda so that measures are often opposed by the younger and more radical members of the middle class as well as by the ordinary people, simply because they are taken by the Government. Nevertheless, there are strong factors for stability in the country. The tribal system although dying is not yet dead and the tribal leaders strongly support the Hashemite monarchy; the Kurds, although nervous about their position, are entirely resistant to pan-Arab nationalist propaganda and, since they supply a disproportionately large share of the "Establishment", act as a valuable moderator; the army, although it has in the past erupted into politics, is at present showing no signs of doing so, and if it continues to receive good leadership and if the interests of the career officers and N.C.Os. continue to be watched, it is likely to go on supporting the régime; the mercantile community is on the whole Conservative and this shows itself particularly in the city of Basra which rarely allows itself to be carried away by Arab nationalism. The monarchy has not had time to strike deep roots but most thinking people realise that without it Iraq would probably fall apart and they therefore support it as the only possible form of government; republicanism in Iraq is now a facet of Nasserism rather than an indigenous movement. Finally, and in the long run probably most important, there is the general stabilising effect of the Development Programme resulting from the expenditure of 70 per cent of the revenue derived from oil profits, and the fact that there is no shortage of employment for those who have had secondary or higher education. The programme has only been effective on any scale for some five years and has as yet hardly touched the rural areas, but it has already had certain valuable consequences. The fact is that Iraq enjoys full employment in most areas and an increasing number of people have some stake in the country and

in the uninterrupted continuance of development. It is estimated that between 1950 and 1956 the total national income increased from I.D.168 million to I.D.303 million while *per capita* income increased from I.D.32 to I.D.51 in the same period. Had this improvement not occurred, it is inconceivable that the Suez crisis could have been surmounted without much more serious disturbances. With the gradual improvement of communications in Iraq, the country is becoming increasingly closely integrated economically and also increasingly easy to govern and control from the centre. It remains to be seen whether the establishment of the Union with Jordan which will introduce many difficulties, owing to the lack of knowledge of the two peoples, relatively poor communications between the two countries and larger claims on Iraq's financial resources, will materially alter this picture.

8. In any case, however, Iraq will not be left alone by President Nasser and it will have to reckon with the two inescapable facts: that, at least for several years to come, Iraq's economy will depend on the continued flow of oil to the Mediterranean through Syria; and that President Nasser, having formed the United Arab Republic and having come out publicly against the Arab Union, is in a strong position both to interrupt the pipeline and to whip up strong feeling among the great bulk of Iraqis against the régime and in favour of his own leadership. This is not the place to examine the measures by which the effects of an interruption of the pipeline might be mitigated. But if the flow of oil were interrupted for a lengthy period the political task of holding the country together would be one of the first magnitude even if the Western Powers and the Iraq Petroleum Company were able together to keep it financially afloat. The Iraqis may be somewhat more resolute than other Arabs in facing adversity but there are probably fairly strict limits to the time they could endure with their backs to the wall and with no way out in sight. In these circumstances, the danger to be faced would be that Nasser's appeal to pan-Arab sentiment in Iraq would then prove strong enough so to increase the dissatisfaction of Iraqis with the régime that the latter would be brought down. It is principally in this context or in some other critical situation of equal magnitude that the opposition is significant. But as in the case of most potential fifth columns, the opposition leaders are more important as spokesmen than as leaders in their own right. Indeed, if for one reason or another a revolutionary situation developed in Iraq, it is extremely unlikely that any of the rich radicals on the top of the iceberg would play any significant part. It is much more likely that a leader would be thrown up from among the younger, probably lower middle class, intellectuals or army officers. Because, in the nature of things, such leaders tend to emerge only in a revolutionary situation, it is impossible to say whether a potential revolutionary leader already exists.

9. For it is quite certain that to-day a revolutionary situation does not exist. Although Nasser, after a year spent in recovering from Suez, started once again to move forward in October last by transferring troops to Syria and has now brought his threat closer by his ability to appear dramatically on the Upper Euphrates, thus giving his propaganda a far greater force in Iraq, yet the internal security situation is at present fairly securely in hand. This is not simply the result of repressive measures. Apart from the intermittent jamming of Radio Cairo and Damascus in the three main cities, no new security measure of any importance has had to be taken. The effervescence witnessed in a few of the colleges and schools after the proclamation of the United Arab Republic never took an ugly turn, and there has as yet been none of the deep feeling which was apparent during the Suez crisis (and which there would at once be again if Israel should make a forward move against any of the Arab countries). Moreover, the efficiency of the Iraqi security service has increased materially in the last year, thanks largely to British assistance with training and equipment, whereas the organisational basis for effective opposition to the régime has been greatly weakened through crippling blows dealt to the underground Communist Party and increased watchfulness upon the clandestine Baathist organisation and the United Arab Republic mission in Baghdad. Yet the calm is somewhat deceptive. By forming the United Arab Republic Nasser has set Arab nationalism on the move and has sharpened the appetites of nearly all Iraqis for more. The riposte of the Arab Union has met the immediate need of the situation, but the appeal of Nasser's glamour and dynamism remains, whereas the Arab Union Constitution like all such documents has only workaday virtues, and most Iraqis see only the burdens and none of the advantages of union. If it proves impossible to expand the union by some association with Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, then by, say, the

autumn, it is possible that the internal situation might begin to become somewhat difficult. On the other hand, a success in securing the association of one or other of these would transform the situation politically as well as, possibly, financially.

10. Since the real threat to the régime, represented symbolically by the present Opposition, comes from outside the country, there are limits to what any Iraq Government can do by positive measures within the country to reduce it. They recognise that economic development has already contributed to stability and that they must press on with it and extend it more widely among the population as a whole. Many of them see that there is also much scope for progressive social and economic measures and are ready to embark on them; given time it should be possible to look forward to a steady reduction in the amount of extreme poverty both in the countryside, especially in the south, and in the sarifa quarters surrounding the big towns. Yet there are not many signs that this will happen as quickly as the situation requires. For the social policy of the palace and Nuri is essentially a long-term one. It is based on the fact that the tribal leaders and other landed proprietors, with the influence that they can exert over their tribesmen and tenants, are the most important stabilising force in the country, and one which it will be dangerous to alienate until the economy and society of Iraq have become more diversified and more modernised than they are now. Yet, since the strain on the Iraq national budget is so great and will become greater when the Arab Union budget has to be supported too, most progressive measures can only be carried out by interference with landowners' rights or raising taxation from them. The failure of successive Governments to grasp this nettle feeds the general conviction that they have no intention of taking decisive action to relieve poverty but instead wish only to give the rich the opportunity to become richer, and this conviction undoubtedly produces an attitude among the poorer people which Nasser and the Opposition can exploit. Nevertheless, I do not believe that poverty or lack of economic opportunities by themselves will, so long as the oil flows, produce an explosive situation. The greater danger lies in the political field and in Nasser playing on the frustrations caused by the lack of outlets for free expression and for political activity. Resentment at the denial of political liberties undoubtedly counts for much in the unpopularity of the régime and the popularity of Nasser. An important question is therefore whether some of the pressure against the régime could be relieved by the giving of more political freedom, *i.e.*, by responding to the principal demand of the Opposition.

11. A complete relaxation of present controls on freedom of expression coupled with completely free elections would in a very short space of time produce chaos and possibly a revolution. Yet each small step in this direction would only increase the pressure towards it, and it is understandable that the palace and successive Governments have hesitated. The step which is most likely to provide immediate satisfaction and which, if it were successful, might lead to a progressive relaxation, is the formation of political parties. For the reason given in paragraph 2 above, this is not a development which would be very welcome to the palace. It must be admitted that the latter would have good grounds for believing that its practical results would not be helpful, for it is doubtful if it would be any more likely to produce greater political stability than when parties have been permitted in the past. Not only are the Iraqis, like most Arabs, more interested in power than in policies and therefore find it difficult to generate the cohesion which loyalty to ideas as distinct from persons can give, but also the present situation in Iraq is bound to produce what in effect would only be two parties, those who are for the régime and present policies and those who support President Nasser. Since the latter would tend to drift into sedition or at least seditious utterances, their party might very soon have to be suppressed and nothing whatever would have been gained except an increase in bitterness against the Government. But again many moderate Iraqis argue that some letting off of steam is both possible and desirable and that it would be possible to keep the Opposition within bounds. I am inclined to the view that this might be worth trying. Although the dangers are clear I think they are less than those of a continuation of complete political suppression. It is true that if one or more Right-wing parties could develop leaders with an appeal to the politically articulate part of the population, they might draw off some of the poison in the system and relieve the palace of the odium of maintaining repressive measures. Nuri has tried this course in the past but failed under what were probably less difficult political circumstances, for President Nasser was not then standing on the Upper Euphrates. It is not out of the question that a younger man with the same strength of character and broadness of view but with more

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direct appeal to the crowd might succeed in the future; all that one can say is that no such paragon has yet arisen. There are a few men in political life who perhaps have some of the desired qualities such as Khalil Kenna, the former President of the Chamber, and Said Qazzaz, the Minister of the Interior, but the former, though determined and strong, is considered too pro-Sunni to have any appeal to the Shias and antagonises people by his too obvious ambition to succeed Nuri, while the latter, though relatively popular and farsighted, is a Kurd who cannot respond to the emotions of Arabism and give them a lead in Iraq. As for Dr. Fadhil Jamali, for all his admirable qualities of courage and integrity, he is not a big enough nor a capable enough man to lead this potentially turbulent country without Nuri's experience behind him.

12. The fact is that there is no apparent successor to Nuri and little chance of his position being put, as it were, in commission and being assumed by a political party. The outlook for the political system in Iraq as a system is indeed somewhat bleak for it is difficult to see how it can be transformed into something with greater flexibility and durability. Indeed, when the time comes for Nuri to leave the political scene, there may be no alternative to a more authoritarian régime based on the army with a soldier as the strong man behind a civilian figurehead. This is not an attractive prospect in view of the danger of instability through the emergence of an Iraqi Nasser or through competition among army officers for power. It would, of course, provide an easy target for the attacks of the Opposition and of Nasser, and it would be distasteful to those who remember the 1936-41 period which was dominated by the army. But it may be the best we can hope for. Provided it was based on the Hashemite monarchy it would probably retain the Western connection and it might hold the fort for a time.

13. Is there anything which we and the Americans can do to help the Iraqis move smoothly into the new situation which will face them when Nuri is no longer present and to keep the pressure from the Opposition at a bearable level? In internal politics our scope is limited. It is true that by advice and encouragement we can help them to build sound modern institutions. Examples of this are the Development Board, the Public Service Board, set up last year under British inspiration, and Baghdad University for whose Foundation Board several Western members are being sought including one from Britain; another possibility is the plan at present under consideration for an Arab Union Development Bank for encouraging projects suitable for loan finance in Iraq and Jordan. By keeping up the supply of technical assistance and the loan of experts and by occasional pieces of direct assistance where special difficulties occur, we can help the Government in its policy of providing a broader economic and technical base for the future. We must of course stand by Iraq should anything happen to interrupt the flow of oil to the Mediterranean. But there is a limit to the influence we can effectively exercise to secure the adoption of more liberal tendencies in political life and this, as I have suggested above, is the field in which discontent is most widespread. On the other hand, we can help them to make a success of the Arab Union which, if successful, will for a time at any rate satisfy the emotional demand for unity. We can avoid antagonising the country over Israel by following the policy described in your despatch No. 9 to Sir Bernard Burrows on the 14th of January, 1958, which you sum up by saying that "the only policy open to us is to stick to the Guildhall speech, to restrain Israel, to avoid taking up positions on the Palestine problem which are bound to be provocative to one set or the other. . . . I agree that in individual disputes it is generally in our interest to show ourselves as favourable as possible to the Arab viewpoint." We can continue the good work of our predecessors in maintaining and extending the relations of confidence which exist between so many Iraqis and British in all walks of life, especially through our contacts with the younger generation in which the British Council and so many British educational institutions play a valuable part. These contacts, which are growing even more quickly with the United States, probably in the long run have a stabilising effect. With the Opposition itself we can do little directly. Our social contacts are friendly but would count for nothing in a crisis; in this field it is Her Majesty's Government's relations with President Nasser and with the more radical manifestations of Arab nationalism outside the country which would be significant. If President Nasser were the man to co-operate wholeheartedly with the West and with Iraq, eschewing all ambition to lay his hands on Iraqi oil, to upset the régime in Iraq and to be a fellow traveller or a neutralist, that would be another matter. In the absence of this possibility, Iraq must conduct a prolonged holding operation and Britain and the United States must be prepared to stand by and help her in it.

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I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Beirut, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, Tel Aviv, Washington, and to the Political Officers with the Middle East Forces and the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

(Translation)

To: His Excellency the Prime Minister,

You have returned to power at a time when Iraq is standing at several crossroads and the fate of the coming generations depends on whether the right path is followed.

Previously you chose a certain policy which led to the diversion of the course of Iraq from the Arab nation in order to link it to the Baghdad Pact and the Special Agreement with Britain. In keeping with that policy, all the constitutional rights of the people were suspended and, in such a suffocating atmosphere which prevailed in Iraq, it became impossible for the people to express their viewpoint without fear. We the undersigned have, therefore, considered it right to express with frankness to your Excellency the true facts, in the hope that these will persuade the Government to follow the only path which is in accordance with the interests of the people and its national demands and aspirations.

Your Excellency. Iraq cannot be separated from the Arab nation, since it is an integral part of it. You have seen the Arab nation's response to Iraq's dislike of the Baghdad Pact. You have also seen that it is impossible to extend this pact to any other Arab country. In the first place Iraq must quit this pact and be freed from the Special Agreement with Britain, so that Iraq may feel that it has become independent of foreign obligations, which have been and will continue to be the source of all its internal difficulties and its problems with the various Arab States and countries.

If these initial steps are carried out the most important factors which have led to the suspension of the rights and freedoms of the people will disappear. Iraq has not been through such a period, in which rights were denied and freedoms were lost, as during the time when the Baghdad Pact and the Special Agreement with Britain were concluded. We are confident that when the people are freed from the chains of these artificial bonds which have fettered them and the shackles which have restricted their freedom, they will lend all their strength towards the achievement of a complete union with all the Arab countries and, in so doing, they will not accept as their leaders a few people who openly support the splitting of Arab ranks when they express complete hostility to the attainment of a step which the Arabs used to consider a hardly attainable dream, namely the unification of Egypt and Syria in one Arab State. No sincere Arab could have wished for anything dearer than that Egypt should assume the responsibility of building up of Arab unity. Those who were responsible for this unity declared that it was open to any Arab State, in any form it wished. Negotiations for a union between the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Yemen started immediately. We are pleased to see that through the achievement of unity between Egypt and Syria, each of them is exercising complete sovereign rights free from any obligations towards any foreign State. No wise man would say that a union between Egypt and Syria is considered to be a challenge to Iraq, because the unity of the Arabs is strength for all the Arabs against all their enemies. It is a challenge to the policy of splitting the Arabs, which no person or foreign State is able any longer to impose on the citizens of any Arab State.

It is strange that some people should show their wish to establish a union between Syria and Iraq but reject the establishment of a union between Iraq, on the one hand, and Syria and Egypt combined, on the other hand. The same condition applies with regard to Jordan. Jordan's participation with Iraq in a union with the United Arab Republic would serve to strengthen the Arab ranks.

SECRET—GUARD

Your Excellency. The Iraqis are tired of the conditions which permit a few people to profess that they can express the will of the people at a time when the people do not have any channel for the expression of their own views. Such views cannot be expressed either through a free Press or through public meetings or free elections, since the provisions of the Constitution which is an indivisible entity have been suspended.

We, therefore, consider it our duty to appeal to your Excellency to give consideration to the wishes of the people which are perfectly clear and desire unification of the Arab ranks, liberation from the Baghdad Pact and the Special Agreement with Britain, restoration of constitutional freedoms which include the freedom to organise political parties and unions, the freedom of the Press and of public meetings, and the release of persons convicted for political matters, in order that the people may be able to express openly their will which aims at achieving the desired union between all Arabs.

Please accept, your Excellency, an expression of our highest respects.

Baghdad, March 15, 1958.

Signatories

Muhammad Mahdi Kubba	Dr. Faisal al Waili
Muzahim al Amin al Pachachi	Fuad al Rikabi
Tahsin Ali	Muhammad al Turaihi
Husain Jamil	Dr. Mustafa Kamil Yasin
Sami Bash 'Alim	Dr. Abbas al Sarraf
Hasan Abdul Rahman	Naji Shaukat
Jamil Kubba	Muhammad Ridha al Shabibi
Najib al Sayigh	Saad Umar al Alwan
Siddiq Shanshal	Muhammad Hadid
Muhammad Baban	Jamar Umar Nadhmi
Ahmad Zaki al Khaiyat	Ali al Safi
Naji Yusuf	Muhammad Ahmad al 'Umar
Zaki Jamil Hafidh	Faiq al Samurrai
Kamil al Shalji	Salih al Shalji
Ibrahim Attar Bashi	Faisal Habib al Khaizaran
Abdul Hamid al Yasiri	Ramzi al Umari
Abdul Shahid al Yasiri	Awwad Ali al Najim
Mahmud al Durra	Madhhar al Azzawi
Hudaib al Haj Humud	Mahmud Ramiz
Na'man al 'Ani	Abdul Rahman al Bazzaz
Jamil Amin	Dr. Abdullah Ismail al Bustani

Copy to: The Rais of the Royal Diwan.

SECRET—GUARD

VQ 1011/1

No. 6

IRAQ: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1957

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 2)

(No. 78. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *April 24, 1958.*

I have the honour to send you in this despatch my annual report on Iraq for 1957. I enclose as an annex the calendar of events for the year. I regret that owing to the severe pressure of work since the New Year this report has been delayed.

2. When 1957 opened the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri, supported by a number of younger politicians among whom Said Qazzaz, Khalil Kenna and Dhia Jafar were prominent, by the senior officers of the army, and by the tribal leaders, not least among them the Kurds, were fighting with their backs to the wall, as a result of the Suez crisis, to preserve the pro-Western policy of Iraq, Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact, and the régime itself. The oil pipeline through Syria had been cut, and the economic as well as political future of the country was in jeopardy. The first five months of the year saw the success, which many had considered impossible, of their efforts.

3. In the middle of January the schools were reopened; control of the Press was gradually relaxed; the number of persons under preventive detention were steadily reduced; and at the end of May Martial Law was ended. April saw the full resumption of the participation of Iraq in Baghdad Pact activities.

4. Among the principal determining factors in the steady improvement of the situation had been successive signs by Her Majesty's Government that they were not, as appeared during the Suez crisis, working with or supporting Israel, and the Israeli evacuation of Gaza, mainly under American pressure, in early March. Had the West permitted Israel to remain outside the Armistice Lines the continuation of a pro-Western policy by Iraq might have proved impossible.

5. During this period the most difficult internal problem was that of finance for the budget. This depends on the receipt of 30 per cent. of the oil revenues, a sum assessed at £24 million in 1957-58 at the

planned rate of oil output. As a result of the blowing up of three pumping stations on the Kirkuk pipeline to the Mediterranean seaboard in the previous October, all oil exports from the northern field had stopped and only a marginal increase could be expected from the much smaller Basra field. The Government saw itself confronted with a budgetary deficit in the financial year to March 1957 of £8½ million and they knew that there would be a much larger deficit in the financial year 1957-58; the size of this would depend upon the date when the pumping of oil could be resumed and the time which it would take for the full flow to be restored. (In the event, oil production in 1957 was 21 million tons as against 26 million in 1956 and it will be May 1958 before the pre-Suez rate of output is restored in the Northern field.) In this situation Nuri pressed for an advance of oil royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company and, with the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, this request was met. £5 million were provided in the first quarter of the year and a drawing right available until the end of the year was provided, to a maximum of £20 million, to enable the Government to make up its share of the revenue from oil to £6 million a quarter. In the event this latter was used to the extent of only £6 million, making £11 million in all. The effect was to leave the Iraqi budgetary position little impaired by the interruption in the flow of oil, although owing to constantly increasing commitments the Exchequer was under pressure throughout the year.

6. The position of the Development Board, who receive the remaining 70 per cent. of the oil revenues, was more fortunate in that they had about one year's revenue in hand and were able to go forward with the programme without interruption. Iraq's second Development Week was held in the second half of March, when many projects in and near Baghdad and in the north were opened, and the enthusiasm with which these successes were greeted marked the real end of the period of strain following Suez. The flow of oil had just been resumed, international contacts with the Western world

were being taken up again and it was possible to look further ahead.

7. In June the Palace decided that a change of Government under a more non-committal elder statesman was desirable in order to give some outlet to the normal pressures of Iraqi political life and practice, under which supporters of the régime expect to be given their turn in office. Nuri had now been Prime Minister for the unprecedented period of two years and ten months. It was felt to be timely to show that Nuri had not been a dictator imposing a personal policy, particularly in foreign affairs, upon a reluctant country, but a constitutional Prime Minister carrying out a national policy. The choice fell upon Ali Jaudat. But he proved to be too indecisive and too anxious to please everyone, and within a few months the Palace were regretting their decision. Murjan, a Shia aged 48 and the President of the Chamber, was given a chance in December to try a Government of younger men, but he proved unequal to the circumstances. It was clear when the year ended that the renewed challenge of Nasser, who had remained quiet in the twelve months after Suez, except in the propaganda field, was likely to result in the early recall of Nuri.

8. Meanwhile a number of significant changes, some of them unobtrusive, had been taking place in the scene. The group of politicians of the generation of Nuri and with their roots in the 1920s, who had continued to be consulted on all major issues, was thinning away. Saleh Jabr, the leading Shia on whom reliance was placed as the strongest possible alternative Prime Minister to Nuri, died in June. The health of Jamil Madfai failed beyond hope of political recovery. Ali Jaudat lost the confidence of the Palace. Others faded quietly out of the scene. There remained Taufiq Suwaidi and, of a somewhat later vintage, Fadhil Jamali. Younger personalities began to play a clearer part.

9. During this time the King, who had shown vigour, poise and determination throughout the Suez crisis, was slowly emerging as a more dominant figure. The announcement in September of his engagement to Princess Fadhila was on the whole popular. The Crown Prince, with his unwavering affection for and unselfishness towards his nephew, was encouraging the King to take increasing responsibility into his hands.

10. There were of course strong undercurrents only partially visible on the surface. The Government of Ali Jaudat had to some extent a more Arab nationalist tendency than that of Nuri. The short-lived Government of Abdul Wahhab Murjan represented a more Iraqi nationalist point of view. The latter was anti-Nasser, the former more inclined towards an accommodation with Nasser without wishing to see Iraq dominated by Egypt. At other levels the spell of Nasser had stronger appeal. The extreme Nationalists, whose visible leaders were confined to fifteen or twenty lawyers and politicians grouped around or associated with Muzahim al Pachachi, Sadiq Shenshal and Faiq Samarraï, were naturally pro-Nasser. Among intellectuals, students and a number of younger army officers these feelings were shared to a greater or lesser degree. The appeal was partly emotional, but partly founded also on a belief that the Government of Iraq was too much in the hands of conservatives, elder politicians and landowners who, even if it was admitted on the whole that the oil revenues were being wisely spent for the benefit of the people, were too slow in matching economic progress with social and political reform. Against this had to be set the growing prosperity of the country which was reflecting itself not only in major projects but in housing, health, employment, social legislation, and rising wages. Further, most responsible politicians and officials, as well as senior officers in the army, tribal leaders and the Kurds, appreciated that the monarchy was the cementing factor in the national life of Iraq, that if Nasser succeeded in destroying the régime the result might be national chaos, and that Nasser's aim was to lay his hands on the oil revenues of Iraq for the benefit of Egypt. The fact must constantly be reckoned with that if the monarchy were to disappear the Kurds might wish to break away from the rest of Iraq.

11. The basic policy of the régime has consistently been and remains to weld the Sunni and Shia Moslems, the Kurds and the lesser minorities in Iraq into a stable and united nation, using the oil revenues largely through the instrument of the Development Board to revive the ancient prosperity of the land of the Two Rivers and to raise the standards of living and production to that of a self-supporting modern State. An indication of the remarkable progress already made in the economic field is provided by a recent statistical analysis which showed that

Iraq's national income had virtually doubled between 1950 and 1956. In spite of hostile pressures from without, which had their effect inside the country and necessitated the firm control of the Press and public meetings, appreciable advance was made in 1957, not only in development in most fields but also in increasing the equipment and standard of efficiency of the army and the air force, in reorganising and strengthening the police the foundation of Baghdad University, the reform of the civil service, the development of social insurance, and the preparation of a new Labour Law drafted with the help of the International Labour Organisation. Iraq has in fact embarked on a programme of national development with some of the characteristics of a Welfare State. But for its continued success, two factors are required. First, there must be a succession of Governments sufficiently firm to prevent political strife from wrecking the national fabric, and second the oil revenues must not be interrupted. 1957 brought warnings in both of these respects. As regards the first, two attempts to find a leader other than Nuri to carry forward successfully the policy of the régime were relative failures. As regards the second, the cutting of the pipeline during the Suez crisis brought home the extreme vulnerability of the Iraqi economy and national life unless the pipeline through Syria is in friendly hands or alternative outlets for the oil of Iraq can be assured. The danger to Iraq of the domination of Syria by either Nasser or Communism was sharply underlined. To the Iraqi régime the policies of Nasser and of the Soviet Union appeared to be almost indistinguishable; indeed they were convinced that the two were working hand in hand. Iraq could not hope to meet the threat alone. The friendship and support of Britain and the United States, and of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact, appeared to be indispensable, and the friendship of other Arab countries in the struggle against Nasser and Communism, and in support of a pro-Western policy in the Arab world, to be no less necessary. In the latter context the problems of Palestine and Algeria presented formidable obstacles.

12. In her efforts to pursue this policy during 1957, Iraq achieved some success in cultivating better relations with Saud and inducing him to move away from Nasser and towards herself. She had success also in improving relations with Jordan although her attitude towards Jordan's appeal for

economic help continued to be evasive. With Turkey the contacts at the level of the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri continued to be close and cordial. But the Turkish Government was extremely dissatisfied with the weakness of Ali Jaudat and his Government over developments in Syria in the autumn, and was angered by the vote of the Iraqi representative at the United Nations on the Cyprus issue in opposition to Turkey. Iraqi-Iranian discussions over the demarcation of their common frontier and over the régime in the Shatt al Arab moved slowly in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. The continuance of the attempt to achieve Iraqi-Kuwait co-operation over a pipeline from the Shatt al Arab to Kuwait and an oil pipeline from the Basra field to Mina al Ahmadi failed because no solution could be found to the perennial difficulty of the demarcation of the common frontier. On the other hand friendly contacts were maintained and fostered with the Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. But the key problem of Syria became increasingly disturbing and indeed acute. When in September it appeared that the moderate leaders were losing all power to control the situation inside Syria there was deep concern behind the scenes, even though public opinion, weakly handled by Ali Jaudat, moved the other way. When therefore the year ended with a progressive drawing together of Egypt and Syria, which was to culminate early in the new year in the Union between Egypt and Syria, the alarm bells were ringing more and more loudly. It was clear that once again the policy of Nasser was going to deny Iraq the external quiet which she needed to enable her to concentrate on internal development and social and political reform; and was again actively challenging the policy of co-operation with the West and with the Baghdad Pact which the régime in Iraq wished to pursue. Failure during the year to make any progress towards solving the problem of Palestine left a powerful card in the hand of Nasser and of the Soviet Union.

Anglo-Iraqi Trade

13. In the field of private enterprise Iraq had a good year. The events of Suez had remarkably little effect on private trade in general and on trade with the United Kingdom in particular. During the first half of the year the value of United Kingdom exports to Iraq amounted to £17.9 million, a marked increase over those of the corresponding period of 1956. There was some

tailoring off in the second half of the year but nevertheless goods to the value of £34.4 million reached Iraq from the United Kingdom during 1957 and the year was the best ever experienced by British exporters. Britain, with about 29 per cent. of the market, remained firmly established as Iraq's main supplier, followed by the United States and West Germany. In dealing with capital development schemes there were signs that the Development Board were continuing to move away from their former policy of always accepting the lowest tender and this allowed a better chance to reputable contractors. Among the principal contracts obtained by British firms during the year were equipment for the new Basra power station (£1.5 million), a housing scheme at Basra (£2.7 million) and an electrical transmission system in Northern Iraq (£1.1 million). West Germany was the main competitor in contracting work and probably took the largest share of any foreign country during the year.

Relations with the West

14. Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with France in November 1956. Although French business concerns and individual Frenchmen were treated cordially and generously, animosity towards the policy of France over Israel and Algeria increased rather than diminished as the year went by. Towards the United States the attitude remained friendly, cordial and co-operative. The attitude of the United States Government during the Suez crisis, the enunciation of the Eisenhower doctrine with the granting of additional aid to Middle East countries, and the assiduous cultivation of American-Iraqi contacts all contributed to this. But replacement of British by American influence, prophesied in many quarters, did not take place, in spite of the fact that the apparent co-operation between Britain and Israel at the time of Suez placed a strain upon Anglo-Iraqi relations which nearly proved too strong for them to bear. That the traditional friendship and ties with Britain bore this strain, and by the end of the year were virtually as strong as ever, was due to a combination of factors. These included the progressive disengagement of Her Majesty's Government from their apparent co-operation with Israel, the fact that the Iraq Petroleum Company extended credit to Iraq when the pipeline was cut, a succession of small but sustained marks of friendship by the United Kingdom, and above all the steadfast loyalty to the British

connection of the King, the Crown Prince, Nuri and the army leaders. But it must be borne clearly and emphatically in mind that if Her Majesty's Government were again to take any course of action which gave the impression of collusion with Israel or of favouring Israel against Arab interests, the link forged over a period of nearly forty years, which held fast, but only just, when British and Israeli forces simultaneously attacked Egypt, would probably snap and be broken for ever.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Karachi, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington, the Political Officers to the Middle East Forces and British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula, and to Her Majesty's Consular Officers in Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Annex

Calendar of Events—1957

January

- 16 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince left for Beirut and Ankara *en route* for the United States (which he visited February 4-17).
- 19-20 Prime Minister and Foreign Minister attended meetings of the four Islamic States of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara, preparatory to Crown Prince's visit to United States.
- 22-25 Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak, Deputy Ruler of Kuwait, visited Baghdad.
- 31 Council of Ministers passed 1957-58 budget.

February

- 14 An Italian Trade Delegation arrived in Baghdad for talks on the expansion of Iraqi-Italian trade.
- 19 Prime Minister received a group of British M.P.s. visiting Iraq at the invitation of the Iraq Petroleum Company.
- 28 Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak revisited Baghdad.

March

- 6 I.P.C. agreed to a loan to the Iraq Government: I.D. 5 million before March 31 and a drawing right of up to I.D. 20 million in remainder of year.
- 11 Pumping of oil through Syrian pipeline resumed. His Royal Highness the Crown Prince returned to Baghdad.
- 17-26 A Turkish Cultural Delegation visited Baghdad.
- 21 Shaikh Sabah al Salim, Director of Police, Kuwait, passed through Baghdad.
- 22 Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Sudan arrived in Baghdad on official visit.

March

- 23-29 Second Development Week (including opening of two new Baghdad bridges, Sarchinar cement factory and Mosul cotton textile factory).
Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact met in Karachi.
26 President Chamoun passed through Baghdad, returning from Riyadh.
31 Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre opened by His Majesty the King.
First meeting of Scientific Council held with Sir John Cockcroft as chairman.

April

- 6 Ambassador Richards, President Eisenhower's Special Envoy to the Middle East, arrived in Baghdad.
15 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince left for Istanbul.
17-20 Mr. Aneurin Bevan visited Baghdad.
18 First meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact at Deputy level since Suez crisis.

May

- 5-8 Shaikh Fahad al Salim, brother of Ruler of Kuwait, visited Baghdad.
11-14 His Majesty King Saud paid a State Visit to Iraq.
16 Iraqi-Saudi Civil Air and Economic Agreement initialled.
Economic Committee of Baghdad Pact met in Karachi.
18 Abdul Khaliq Hassuna, Secretary-General of the Arab League, arrived in Baghdad on a visit.
27 Martial law abolished.
28 Minister of Economics left for Cairo to head Iraqi Delegation to Arab League Higher Economic Conference.

June

- 1 Prime Minister left for Karachi to lead Iraqi Delegation to Baghdad Pact meetings.
3 Ministerial Council and Military Committee of Baghdad Pact met in Karachi.
United States joined Military Committee.
His Royal Highness the Crown Prince re-visited Istanbul.
6 Saleh Jabr collapsed and died while speaking in a Senate debate.
6-7 Secretary of State visited Baghdad to meet Middle Eastern Heads of Missions.
9 Shaikh Sabah al Salim revisited Baghdad.
11 Purge Committee ended its activities.
17 Resignation of Nuri as Said accepted.
19 New Cabinet formed under Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi.
23 His Majesty King Hussain visited His Majesty King Faisal in Baghdad.
24 Nuri as Said left for Europe and Istanbul.

July

- 1 Parliament prorogued.
4 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince left for Istanbul.
15 Prime Minister ordered jamming of Cairo and Damascus Radios to be stopped.

August

- 7 Appointment of First President to Baghdad University announced.
10 Public Service Board appointed.
26 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince returned from Istanbul.

September

- 2 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince flew back to Istanbul.
3 Iraqi-Indian Civil Aviation Agreement signed.
7 Baghdad Pact Radio Conference opened in Baghdad.
14 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince returned to Baghdad.
15 His Majesty the King's engagement to Princess Fadhila announced.
23 Counter-Subversion Committee of Baghdad Pact met in London.
26 Ali Jaudat visited Damascus.

October

- 5 Minister of Interior suspended *Al Yaqdha* newspaper for one year.
8 Nuri as Said returned from Istanbul.
12 General census began.
13 His Majesty King Faisal and His Majesty King Hussain met at H.3.
18 Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak re-visited Baghdad.
18-21 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, accompanied by Prime Minister, paid a State Visit to Iran.
30 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince left for visit to Japan, Formosa, Hong Kong and Singapore.
31 Arab Oil Experts Conference began in Baghdad.
His Majesty the King inaugurated lubricating plant at Daura refinery.

November

- 7-11 Army manoeuvres held in North Iraq.
18 His Majesty the King opened the Third Arab Cultural Conference and Second Arab Antiquities Conference in Baghdad.
29 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince returned to Baghdad.

December

- 1 His Majesty the King opened Parliament.
Minister of Interior suspended *Al Bilad* newspaper for three months.
2-7 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, accompanied by Prime Minister, paid a State Visit to Saudi Arabia.
12 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince left for London.
13 Iraqi Representative in United Nations voted for Greek resolution in Cyprus debate.
14 Resignation of Ali Jaudat accepted.
15 New Cabinet formed under Abdul Wahab Murjan.
Daura housing scheme (for Assyrian resettlement) opened by Minister of Interior.

VQ 1015/46

No. 7

IRAQI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 19)

(No. 86. Confidential)
Sir,

Baghdad,

May 10, 1958.

Further to my telegrams Nos. 722, 723 and 730 and to Mr. Falle's letter to Mr. Hadow No. 1013/55/58 of the 21st of April, I have the honour to report that elections to the new Iraqi Chamber of Deputies took place on the 5th of May.

2. During the preparations for the election some 300 candidates nominated themselves, but as usual large numbers withdrew later and in the event only 27 out of the 145 seats in the Chamber were contested; in the remainder the candidates were returned unopposed. The proportion of the latter in the total membership is about normal for Iraq in recent years. The new Chamber contains 39 new Deputies and the breakdown of the Chamber by occupations is as follows:

- 47 Law College Graduates
- 10 University Graduates
- 3 Journalists
- 6 Retired Army Officers
- 46 Tribal Chieftains (Shaikhs)
- 26 Landlords
- 1 Engineer
- 3 Doctors
- 3 Merchants

The Minister of the Interior, in commenting on this to a member of my staff, claimed that it represented some broadening of the base. He felt, however, there were still far too many lawyers. The average age of the new House will be somewhat less than that of its predecessor. This is caused more by the younger relatives of previous members succeeding to the old men's seats than the introduction of completely new blood. Nevertheless, this represents an improvement as some of the new members are likely to have more progressive ideas, and many of them will at least be better educated than their predecessors.

3. The main feature of these elections has been that they were governed from the start by the determination of the régime to have a Parliament that would ratify without argument or delay the Constitution of the Arab Union. The authorities considered that it might well be fatal to the Union's chances of survival if the passage of the Constitution were held up and they decided they could afford to take no risks. They were also concerned that the election itself should not be an occasion for major disturbances or other evidence of deep division in the country. As a result the elections were more completely managed than ever and no Deputy was elected who did not have the blessing of the Government. The extreme Opposition foresaw this situation and decided to boycott the elections and probably thereby made the Government's task easier. But most of the moderate Opposition, who did not have the benefit of Government support, withdrew before election day. Even if they had not done so, the result would probably not have been very different, for at least three-quarters of the present Deputies would have secured election through the strength of their tribal or other connexions, and Government support would have secured the election of the rest. The composition of the new Chamber is therefore such that it can be expected to be completely obedient to the wishes of the Government and régime and there will not even be the opportunities for the expression of dissent which existed in the previous Parliament.

4. The statement by the Minister of the Interior reported in my telegram No. 723 to the effect that the Government did not exercise any pressure in favour of one candidate against another was solely for the record and was not taken seriously either by the Minister himself or by anyone else. Everyone knows that the elections are managed and Ministers and officials talk frankly about this in private. The Government feel that political opinion in Iraq has crystallised into

two opposing and irreconcilable camps. The Palace, Government and their supporters believe in the continuation of Iraq's present foreign policy. They are convinced that President Nasser is out to destroy them and subject Iraq to Egyptian hegemony. The Opposition, in their views, are in agreement with Nasser's policy and has as its main aim the abolition of the monarchy and the close association of Iraq with the United Arab Republic. The authorities regard this as a war situation and consider that this is not the time to carry out exercises in democracy. In the words of the Minister of the Interior, the Government cannot allow the enemy to penetrate their heart by having Opposition Members in Parliament. In deciding to keep them out, the Government are aware that the great mass of the articulate population are rather for Nasser than against him, whether because they approve of him or disapprove of the Iraq Government, and consider that a very firm grip on this situation is needed, if it is to be kept in hand.

5. The Government's point of view is understandable. There are, however, many moderate and loyal Iraqis who think that the Government, in their anxiety to eliminate opposition, have overdone things. Such people feel that it would have been possible at least to give the electors more choice of candidates and to allow competition between candidates who were known to be Government supporters, particularly as the extreme Opposition were not standing. Many elected Deputies, including some Ministers, have expressed such views. Other moderate Iraqis feel that there would have been no harm in allowing an Opposition to be elected, as this would infuse life into Parliament and keep the various Ministries on their toes, on the British analogy. The objections to this are clearly stronger since, in the present political situation in the Arab world, it is difficult to imagine anything constructive coming out of acrimonious debates between Government supporters and those whom they regard as no better than traitors.

6. In any event consideration of the possibility of the introduction of free democratic processes is academic at the present time. Iraq will continue to be governed by authoritarian methods and at present the Government are in complete control. This was proved by the fact that the elections passed off almost without incident, in spite of the considerable underlying dissatisfaction throughout the country about the way they were being conducted and of the strong emotional inclination towards President Nasser and his policies on the part of the urban middle class, the students and the thinking proletariat. The demonstration by Ba'athist students of the Medical College reported in my telegram No. 730 was the only one in Iraq and never assumed dangerous proportions. The police were complete masters of the situation, did not have to use brutal methods of any kind and are simply keeping the students under arrest for a few days. The active Opposition politicians were silent for they realised that the Government were too strong for demonstrations or protests to be worthwhile.

7. It will be recalled that under the Arab Union Constitution, the Iraqi Chamber will elect to the Union Parliament at least one member for each liwa, i.e., a minimum of 14. This will cause an equivalent number of bye-elections to the Iraqi Chamber. One of the early acts of the new Iraq Government will be to hold these bye-elections: it is unlikely that they will then relax in any degree the firm control they have maintained on this occasion.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Tehran, Khartoum, Washington, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Political Office with the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula, Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

SECRET—GUARD

VJ 10393/168

No. 8

FORMATION OF NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND OF FIRST ARAB UNION GOVERNMENT

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 30)

(No. 95. Confidential)
Sir,

Baghdad,

May 24, 1958.

Further to my telegrams Nos. 831 and 839, I have the honour to report that on the resignation of Nuri as Said's Government on the 14th of May, Nuri as Said and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban were entrusted with the formation of the Arab Union and the Iraqi Governments respectively. The new Governments were sworn in on the 19th of May. Lists are attached as an annex to this despatch.

2. The former Government which took office on the 2nd of March, was formed with the purpose of holding elections and passing the amendment to the Iraqi Constitution and the new Arab Union Constitution through Parliament. It had always been the intention that as soon as this task was completed the Government would resign to make way for the first Government of the Union and a new Iraqi Government. The previous Government carried out its appointed task in accordance with its timetable and with commendable efficiency. As already reported in my despatch No. 86 of the 10th of May, the elections were conducted with considerable firmness and no opposition elements were allowed to be elected to the new Chamber of Deputies. The régime and the Government had felt that this was no time to allow political freedoms and that it was essential to have an obedient Parliament. Both the amendment to the Iraqi Constitution and the Arab Union Constitution had to be passed with the minimum of time wasting and argument. In the event, as reported in Mr. Falle's letter No. 1078/13/57/58 of the 13th of May to Mr. Hadow, the Chamber of Deputies acted as an obedient rubber stamp and the dissenting voices in the Senate, Shaikh Ridha as Shabibi and Nosrat al Farisi, only had the effect of holding the proceedings up for a couple of hours.

3. The resigning Government had little time or inclination to initiate any internal measures. The Minister of Finance, Abdul Karim al Uzri, did, however, take the opportunity to clarify the Law for the Distribution of Lands in the Amara Liwa and to put up two proposals to the Council of Ministers concerning land reform. The clarification of the Amara Law was necessary to remedy the non-application of this law, which lays down that 50 per cent of the lands in the Liwa should be distributed to the peasants. The law as passed had a loophole whereby landlords were able to keep most of their lands by registering them in the names of members of their families. Abdul Karim al Uzri claims that he has now closed this loophole but it remains to be seen how the law as clarified will work in practice. The Government did not have time to act on the other two proposals and I will therefore not comment on them until they are nearer realisation.

4. I have the following observations on the Iraqi personalities of the Union Government. Taufiq Suwaidi's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs has caused some comment and surprise. He was the favourite for Prime Minister of Iraq while Fadhil Jamali was expected to be Foreign Minister of the Union. There are a number of possible reasons for Jamali's omission, of which that given in my telegram No. 839 is one.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, it is likely that if the Palace and Nuri had been convinced that Jamali was the best man for Foreign Minister of the Union he would have been appointed to it. If the Union Government were to wish at any time to try and lower tension between themselves and the United Arab Republic this would not be possible with Jamali as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has been bitterly and outspokenly opposed to the United Arab Republic from the time of its formation and his articles in *Al Amal* were the spearhead of the robust line which the Iraqi Government have now adopted

⁽¹⁾ i.e., that Nuri wanted only one Shia in the Union Government, and that this place was filled by Taufiq Suwaidi who was not chosen as Prime Minister of Iraq owing to his business activities.

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as their official policy towards the United Arab Republic. I see no immediate likelihood of their changing this, but the absence of Jamali will give them more flexibility and room for manoeuvre. The fact that Taufiq Suwaidi is regarded by the Iraqi people as one of the worst examples of a politician who has used his position for personal profit doubtless militated against his appointment as Prime Minister of Iraq. In spite of this failing he is able, robust and clear headed. He is less verbose and probably more efficient than Jamali. Sami Fattah is well placed as Minister of State for Defence. As a former head of the Iraqi Air Force he should have some understanding of the technical problems involved and he is stouthearted and loyal. He is a capable administrator and the fact that he is somewhat unimaginative will not matter in this post. Abdul Karim al Uzri is imaginative and energetic with many ideas on the subject of reform, some of them a little theoretical. Doctor Nadim Pachachi, the Minister of Finance in the new Iraqi Government, would have been a better appointment. I understand that he was considered for the post but did not want it. He is clear headed and capable and would probably have done the technical work required for Union Finance Minister better than Abdul Karim al Uzri. The latter on the other hand, with his dynamism would have made a good Iraqi Minister of Finance and given impulse to reforms.

5. The appointment of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban as Prime Minister of Iraq is a clear indication that the Palace intend to keep close control over Iraqi internal policy. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban is a Palace man and has in the past tended to prefer working behind the scenes, but he told me when I paid my first courtesy call on him that he felt like a horse that had been kept in the paddock too long and was eager to show his paces. In his first public statement, as reported in my telegram No. 24 Saving of the 20th of May, he stressed that his Government's policy was one of development and reform, and he confirmed this when I called on him. I know that the Palace are conscious of the present need to carry out effective internal reforms and to accelerate development so that the benefit of the oil revenues may be felt by all sections of the community. At present these benefits have not filtered down sufficiently and until they do so discontent among the people, encouraged by propaganda from outside, is likely to increase to a dangerous pitch. It is to be hoped that Ahmad Mukhtar, with a constant impulse from the Palace, will be able to achieve something in this field, although the composition of his team leaves a great deal to be desired.

6. Of individual members of the Iraqi Government, Said Qazzaz was the obvious choice for the Interior and he has carried out his task, since assuming office in the previous Government, with resolution and efficiency. The security services have confidence in him and if anyone is able to control the internal situation, he is the man. I have already commented on Nadim Pachachi and Dhia Ja'far is a good choice for Development. Unfortunately, the posts of Economy and Agriculture, both extremely important if the Government intends to carry out a reformist programme, are filled by two useless Ministers. Rushdi Chelabi's only qualification for the post is that he is the son of the wealthy and influential Abdul Hadi Chelabi, the Deputy President of the Senate. He is an idle and blasé young man. Jamil Urfali is a lawyer with little knowledge of agriculture. He is a close friend of the Prime Minister to whom he owes his post. I have heard him described as an obedient ox, but he has at least goodwill and I think friendly sentiments towards the West. Saleh Saib al Jibburi has been moved from Development to Communications and Works. He did nothing in his previous post and is unlikely to improve in his new one, but he is presumably retained as he is loyal and reliable. Burhanuddin Bashayan, who is well known to you, is at present Minister of Information in the Iraqi Government, but it is possible this will become a Union subject later. He is steady but lacks much of the quickness of mind and touch that is needed for this very difficult job. The Minister of Health, Abdul Amir Allawi, owes his post to the fact that he is married to a daughter of Abdul Hadi Chelabi. The appointment of Sadiq Kammuna to Social Affairs would appear to be sensible. As I mentioned in my telegram No. 839, he has worked well on the Development Board and Mr. Ionides found him co-operative and had respect for his ability. Education and Justice remain unchanged and no comment is needed on the Ministers of State who are unlikely to play an important role. It does, however, seem unfortunate that it was considered necessary to bring back Ali Sharqi, whose only function is to maintain the Sunni-Shia balance.

7. In conclusion, this is not a Government to inspire great confidence among the Iraqi people and will have to work hard to establish a reputation. In informal talks with the Palace and leading politicians, I have repeatedly stressed the need for reforms and will continue to do so. Most members of the new Government will, I think, be ready to listen to advice, but their ability to turn good intentions into effective action is open to question.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Washington, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul, to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces and to the Political Officer with the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

ARAB UNION GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister	...	Nuri as Said
Deputy Prime Minister	...	Ibrahim Hashem
Foreign Affairs	...	Taufiq Suwaidi
Defence	...	Suleiman Tuqan
Minister of State, Foreign Affairs	...	Khulusi Khairi
Minister of State, Defence	...	Sami Fattah
Treasury	...	Abdul Karim al Uzri

IRAQI GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister	...	Ahmad Mukhtar Baban
Interior	...	Said Qazzaz (unchanged)
Finance	...	Nadim Pachachi
Development	...	Dhia Ja'far
Justice	...	Jamil Abdul Wahab (unchanged)
Education	...	Abdul Hamid Kadhim (unchanged)
Communications and Works	...	Saleh Saib al Jibburi
Economy	...	Rushdi Chelabi
Health	...	Abdul Amir Allawi (unchanged)
Social Affairs	...	Sadiq Kammuna (at present member of Development Board)
Agriculture	...	Jamil al Urfali
Information and Guidance	...	Burhanuddin Bashayan
Ministers of State	...	1. Senator Abdul Jabbar al Takarli
		2. Mahmud Baban (unchanged)
		3. Ali Sharqi

VQ 1103/2

No. 9

IRAQ DEVELOPMENT WEEK—APRIL 26—MAY 1, 1958

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 24)

(No. 105 E. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *June 13, 1958.*

Iraq's third Development Week was inaugurated by His Majesty King Faisal II on the 26th of April and continued with a series of ceremonies held throughout the country until the 1st of May. Because of local preoccupation with political questions, including the impending formation of the Arab Union Government and the elections which were held throughout the country shortly after Development Week concluded, the week's events had perhaps less impact on the population than in previous years. Even the dates of the ceremonies had at the last moment to be advanced from the beginning of May to the end of April and this decision put more strain than usual on the organisation of detailed arrangements; but the Iraqi genius for last minute improvisation ensured that a complex programme was carried through without any noticeable hitch. Because of the last minute changes in the date of Development Week the foreign Press was not as fully represented as it was last year but among the distinguished visitors who accompanied His Majesty to the various ceremonies were the Prime Minister of Jordan who attended with a delegation of Jordanian officials and Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak as Sabah, the cousin of the Ruler of Kuwait.

2. As can be observed from the attached programme⁽¹⁾, the events ranged more widely over the country than hitherto and although less spectacular perhaps than in previous years they did serve to bring home to the population in rural areas that progress is now being made in spreading the benefit of the oil revenues over a wider area instead of concentrating it in and around the largest and politically most influential areas of population. It is estimated that projects to the value of more than £45 millions were completed or begun during the week and at the end of a year of considerable political disturbance in the Middle East and uncertainty in Iraq about the future of her oil revenues this represents a considerable achievement. Of this total Baghdad and

district had a comparatively small share this year and the attention was concentrated more on areas in the north and south of the country.

3. The chief event in Baghdad was the opening on the first day of the woollen textile factory which adjoins the military camp at Muasker Rashid near Baghdad and which has been built for the benefit of the Military Martyr's Fund at a cost of more than £1 million. The factory, which was designed and built by a German firm, Philip Holzmann A.G., and which is equipped with German machinery, will produce blankets and clothing intended for the Iraqi police and armed forces. With an output of 500,000 metres of material annually as well as 100,000 blankets and 80,000 metres of jersey material, it will obviously have to seek a wider outlet for its products. Six hundred workers will be employed and the factory will operate using local wool for its coarser products and imported Australian wool for its better quality goods. I can see little economic justification for the erection of this factory and I do not think it could survive if operated on normal commercial lines but the Iraqis will doubtless take steps to ensure that its products find a market either by subsidising its prices or by reducing the import of competing materials. It will, however, help to give employment to a number of deserving people, many of them women.

4. On the second day the King travelled to Basra and there laid foundation stones for the southern area electric power station and the new grain silo. Both these projects are of major importance to the Basra region and together will cost more than £12 millions. British interests are well represented in the power station work since the consultants are the British firm of Ewbank and Partners and the main contracts including those for boilers, generating sets and switchgear have all been awarded to United Kingdom firms. His Majesty also inspected the Basra housing scheme which comprises 1,776 houses at present being constructed by the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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British firm of George Wimpey and Company in a new suburb of the town. Her Majesty's Consul-General at Basra has reported that the proceedings in Basra during the King's visit were excellently organised by the local authorities and reflect great credit on the Mutasarrif and the Chief of Police. As was the case last year His Majesty was warmly received by the crowds in Basra and was obviously pleased with his reception.

5. On the following day activity was centred on Mosul where His Majesty opened the sugar refinery, the cement plant and the new bridge over the Tigris. German firms have taken the leading part in the refinery and bridge contracts while the cement plant was mainly a French venture for which English Electric supplied five diesel generators each of 1,000 kW. for the plant's power supply. Mr. Vice-Consul Burgess has reported that in Mosul the arrangements for the King's visit were smooth and efficient and that His Majesty's smile and quiet dignity cannot but have enhanced his already great popularity with the inhabitants of the town. The programme also included a visit to the new housing estate which is being built for the employees of the Government textile factory. This scheme which includes 700 houses and amenities will cost over one and a half million pounds.

6. The next two days were occupied with the inauguration of lesser projects throughout the country and these ceremonies were attended by Cabinet Ministers. Members of my staff also attended all these functions and the general opinion is that they were successful but did not arouse any very marked enthusiasm among the local population. The bridges at Samawa and Baquba were both all British affairs designed by British consulting engineers and built by British contractors. Especial credit is, I think, due to Sir William Arrol and Company Limited who built the Samawa Bridge. This company had not previously worked in Iraq and Samawa is situated in one of the less healthy and attractive areas of the country. In its early stages the contract ran into serious difficulties for which the contractors were in no way to

blame but they doggedly stuck to the task and I am informed that the company's employees maintained a high standard of morale in very difficult conditions. On the occasion of the opening ceremony the Qaimaqam of Samawa told my Commercial Counsellor how sorry he was to see the departure of Arrol's staff from the town because he and the local population had had most cordial relations with them.

7. On the final day of Development Week, His Majesty opened the Development Exhibition in a specially constructed pavilion on the new municipal trade fair site. This Exhibition is planned as a permanent feature and by means of working models and diagrams it gives a remarkable picture of what is being done throughout the country by the Development Board. The exhibition has already attracted many visitors, among them parties of students and schoolchildren.

8. Development Week is now a regular feature of the year in Iraq and it serves to bring to the notice of the population the steady progress which is being made. The first wonder is perhaps gone but for anyone who cared to look at this year's celebrations there was an impressive record of the past year's achievement. Lesser projects in the remoter districts are not so dramatic as the great schemes such as the Wadi Tharthar barrage which was the feature of the first Development Week and the official opening in a country town of a bridge which has already been in use for some months or of a factory which is not yet quite ready to go into production do not give rise to such enthusiasm, but they are there just the same as steps on the way of Iraq's progress out of the status of an under-developed country.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Tehran and Beirut (for the Development Division), the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Political Agent at Kuwait and the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

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VQ 1051/14

No. 10

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE CROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ ON JUNE 6, 1958

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Michael Wright (Baghdad)

(No. 126. Confidential)

Foreign Office,

Sir,

June 6, 1958.

I asked the Crown Prince of Iraq to luncheon to-day. It was a small party of members of the Foreign Office and Mr. Herridge of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

2. Prince Abdulillah did not appear to have anything on his mind which he particularly wanted to raise with me. In the course of our conversation—some of it in private—the following points emerged.

Iraqi Representation at the Baghdad Pact Meetings

3. I asked the Crown Prince who would represent Iraq at the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council to be held in London at the end of July, now that Nuri and Taufiq Suwaidi held posts in the Arab Union. The Crown Prince seemed to think that there was not much difficulty about this and his idea seemed to be that, if Nuri could not come, then Taufiq Suwaidi could represent Iraq "in his Iraqi capacity."

Absences of King Faisal and King Hussein

4. The Crown Prince said that King Faisal would be leaving Iraq on July 10 for a holiday in Europe of about two months. I did not pursue this point with him further, but we know from Amman telegram No. 604 that King Hussein was hoping to get in a holiday himself in the early part of July so that he could return to Amman in time to take over as Head of the Union when King Faisal is away. King Hussein cannot leave Amman before July 1 and I think we might suggest that King Faisal's departure might be timed so as to allow King Hussein a holiday of two or three weeks beforehand. It is clearly important to King Hussein that he should act as Head of the Union in King Faisal's absence.

Kuwait and the Arab Union

5. I told the Crown Prince that I was very disturbed at the current opinions in Iraq that Britain was preventing Kuwait from joining the Arab Union. I told him of Nuri's flare-up with Sir Michael Wright, and I referred also to the so-called censoring of the speech by Khalil Kenna. I asked the Crown Prince point blank whether he believed that we were preventing Kuwait from joining the Union. The Crown Prince said that he himself did not believe it, but there were many people in Iraq who did. I said it was absolutely untrue. We had put forward to the Ruler of Kuwait all the advantages for Kuwait in joining but the decision had to be the Ruler's. We did not make decisions for the Ruler any more than we made them for the Government of Iraq. We offered advice but the decision lay with the Ruler. The Iraqis really had to understand that that had been the basis of our dealings with Kuwait all the time I had been concerned with these affairs and we had no intention of changing it. But the idea that we were against Kuwait joining the Union was absurd. The fact that the Ruler was reluctant was very largely the fault of Nuri himself. Nuri at times claimed Kuwait as Iraqi territory and talked about taking it over by force. That kind of talk was bound to come to the ears of the Ruler and that was why although he had great respect for the Iraqi Royal Family he was a little bit doubtful about Iraqi politicians. I had told Nuri again and again in the past how important it was for Iraq to improve their relations with Kuwait. If that advice had been taken, there might now have been a very different reaction from the Ruler. Nevertheless, we would continue to try to influence him towards closer association with the Union. I understood that the Ruler was willing now to discuss with the Government of Iraq an agreement which would cover matters like the frontiers, investment in the Union, security measures and the like. The Crown Prince interrupted to say "Does that mean the present boundaries?" I said that I understood that the Ruler of Kuwait

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was willing to conclude an agreement which would include agreement on the boundaries. The Crown Prince said it was quite true that many Iraqis thought that Kuwait ought to belong to Iraq. Abu Nuwar had said to the Iraqi Chief of Staff that he could not understand why Iraq did not take Kuwait. If that was how Nasser's friends felt, it showed the danger to Kuwait from Egypt. I said that the Crown Prince could take it as a cardinal point of British policy that Kuwait should not fall into the hands of Egypt. Such a thing would be intolerable both from the point of view of Iraq and Britain. The Crown Prince went on to say that Kuwait was being used as a base for activities against Iraq. Messages were being passed to subversive elements in Iraq, and meetings were taking place between such elements and Egyptian agents in Kuwait. Nabulsi's Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had visited Kuwait, obviously for no good purpose. He was not a business man and could only have gone to stir up trouble. I asked that we should be given particulars of such activities. I said I was certain that we could prevail upon the Ruler to take action if evidence were produced. I thought that the Ruling Family in Kuwait were becoming more sensitive about Egyptian infiltration and would gladly co-operate.

6. To sum up my discussion about Kuwait, I used several times the phrase that we believed that the proper method was persuasion and not coercion. If persuasion was used, what I called the Stage I agreement along the lines indicated could be concluded and, if it proved a success, this might lead to a Stage II relationship which would be nearer what Iraq demanded.

Finances of the Union

7. The Crown Prince mentioned a figure of £17 million as the annual drain that would fall on Iraq as a result of the Union. I said that I thought that the proper course was for the Government of Iraq or the Government of the Union to work out a statement of their financial position as it was likely to be over, say, the next five years and then in the light of those figures go along to their allies and discuss how the burden could be met. I said that the bulk of any assistance would obviously have to come from the Americans, but the difficulty was in getting any kind of plan out of the Iraqi Government. I said that, for example, we had had no views from the Iraqi Government about a Development Plan for the Union, which might to some extent be supported by funds from outside Iraq. The Prince made no comment.

The Crown Prince's Role in Iraq

8. The Crown Prince said that at present he was devoting himself to problems of internal security in Iraq and was not occupied with questions of foreign affairs.

Jordan

9. I told the Crown Prince of Mr. Kermit Roosevelt's conversation with Colonel Nasser and in particular Nasser's view that before the end of the year Jordan would go over to the United Arab Republic. I said we would pass that warning on to Jordan. I had been a little surprised because our impression was that things were better in Jordan. The Crown Prince said that that also had been the impression of the King and himself when they had recently visited Jordan.

Saudi Arabia

10. I asked the Crown Prince whether he had any information about the present state of affairs in Saudi Arabia. He said that they were receiving conflicting reports. I said that the information at our disposal led us to believe that Faisal had taken the finances in Saudi Arabia under his own control and that the King was no longer in a position to veto the decisions of the Council of Ministers, which in effect meant Faisal's decisions, but that the King himself still retained the loyalty of the Army or at least of what was called the "White Army," i.e., the tribesmen. The Crown Prince said that he thought that probably was the position. I suggested that the Crown Prince should think seriously of means of influencing Faisal in the same way as King Saud himself had been influenced over the past two years.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bahrain and Washington, to the Political Agent Kuwait and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

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VQ 1051/21

No. 11

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
NURI PASHA ON JULY 2, 1958

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Michael Wright (Baghdad)

(No. 147. Secret)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
July 4, 1958.

I invited Nuri Pasha to call on me at Carlton Gardens on the 2nd of July. He said that he would be returning to Baghdad on the following day and might come back to London with the King on the 10th of July. But he was more inclined to give up and resign since he did not think the Union was receiving enough help and was convinced that the other side were winning.

2. I said that the position was surely much better since March 1957 when Jordan was virtually in Nasser's hands. King Saud at that time had also been on terms of close friendship with Nasser. Our own positions had been strengthened over the last year in Bahrain, Muscat and other parts of the Gulf. As regards the Union, we and the Americans had given tangible evidence of our support and had contributed nearly \$30 million to the Union budget. Nuri replied that the position might not be too bad on the surface but below the surface it was much less secure. The Union must get away from dependence on Anglo-American subsidies and this was why Kuwait was so important.

3. This led on to a long discussion about Kuwait, on which Nuri's views may be summarised as follows. Things had started well with Sir George Middleton's conversation with the Ruler in the Lebanon and the latter's agreement to come to Baghdad. When the Constitution of the Union was being worked out, Nuri had been so sure that Kuwait would join that he had not insisted on writing into the Constitution any provisions about Iraq's frontiers and territorial waters. When the Ruler came to Baghdad all the friends of the West, including Nuri himself, had been convinced that Kuwait would immediately join the Union, but the enemies of the West had argued that the British were not sincere and would not exert the necessary influence on the Ruler to join. Everyone, friends and critics alike, was convinced that if we used our influence with the Ruler he would follow our advice. When he was in Baghdad the Ruler's answer to all Nuri's arguments in favour of Kuwait joining the Union was that he must go and see Nasser in Cairo. Nuri was now convinced that the Ruler would not join and that this would be represented as such a victory for Nasser that the very existence of the Union would be threatened. Nuri, therefore, now thought it had been a mistake to encourage the Ruler to come to Baghdad at all.

4. In these circumstances, Nuri thought that there were only two courses open to Iraq. One would be to conclude a treaty or agreement with the Ruler covering certain subjects. This is what we had been advising, but it would be out of the question for Iraq to conclude such a treaty unless it took account of Iraq's claims, particularly as regards territorial waters. Since he was convinced that the Ruler would never willingly accept the Iraqi claims, Nuri thought this course was impractical. The only alternative was for Iraq to make her position quite plain on the lines of the note which they had given us on the 5th of June (your telegram No. 977). Kuwait would thus be offered a choice. If they joined the Union, Iraq would renounce all her claims as regards the frontiers and the territorial waters and Kuwait would also enjoy the guarantees provided for in the Union Constitution. These would guarantee to the Ruler and his family all their existing powers and privileges and would give him the power of veto on any action by the Union in Kuwait to which he objected. If the Ruler would not accept this, Iraq must insist on her full claims both on land and sea. They would not, however, insist on the immediate settlement of these claims and there was no question of using force. They were also prepared to give assurances that the existing arrangements for oil production in the areas claimed by Iraq would be maintained subject only to the defence deficit in the Union budget being met from the oil revenues. Nuri maintained that only in this way could the position be clarified. Kuwait would

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be faced with a clear choice; popular opinion in Iraq would be satisfied that Iraq's prestige was being maintained even if Kuwait did not choose to join the Union; the United Kingdom position both in Iraq and in the Gulf would be strengthened.

5. In answer to these arguments I said that we entirely agreed with Nuri about the need and the importance of Kuwait joining the Union. The difference between us was about the method of achieving this. We were convinced that persuasion not coercion must be used. We had used our influence with the Ruler by advising him of the advantages which we saw from the association of Kuwait with the Union. We had brought him a long way by persuading him to accept the idea of an agreement with Iraq which might well cover such subjects as security, customs and extradition and might also provide for substantial investment by Kuwait in the Union. We thought that this was the way to start and that, if a limited agreement of this kind were seen to work, it could lead quite soon to a more far-reaching agreement. We could not order the Ruler to join the Union and, in the conversation which I had had with Nuri in Baghdad in March, I had made it clear that we could not accept the suggestion which Nuri had then made, namely that we should declare Kuwait independent and then compel her to join the Union. Moreover, the Ruler was not an absolute monarch and had to take account of the views of his family and of popular opinion. There was no doubt that one of the factors influencing him was deep suspicion of Iraq. I had myself urged the Iraqi Government for years to improve their relations with Kuwait but little had been done and statements were still made that Kuwait should really be part of Iraq. I was sure that the Ruler was fundamentally pro-Western and hostile to Nasser. But he was a shrewd man and, above all, a cautious one. There had never been any reason to suppose that he would take a hasty decision to join the Union but the idea of a limited agreement was a considerable advance which I was sure we should take up. A gradual approach was the only way of achieving our joint aim of getting Kuwait into the Union. It was absurd for anyone to suppose that we were working against Iraq's interests, but we were also allied to the Ruler and must protect his interests. If Iraq now reasserted her claims I was sure that the reaction in Kuwait would be such as to rule out any possibility of her voluntarily joining the Union.

6. Subsidiary points made by Nuri during this part of the conversation were as follows:—

(a) He maintained that the 1932 agreement was not binding on Iraq because it had been represented at the time of signature as being based on an agreement of 1913 with Turkey. It was only some time after signature that the Iraqis found out that the 1913 agreement had never been ratified and was not therefore valid.

(b) Iraq had been badly treated over oil because production in Kuwait and in Saudi Arabia had been increased far more rapidly than in Iraq. I pointed out that this was due to technical reasons, particularly the relative difficulties of transporting and exporting the oil.

(c) If Nuri knew that the Ruler would join the Union in, say, three or four months' time, he would give up any idea of resigning and would make no further trouble for us; but, in fact, the Ruler was not a man of decision and would never make up his mind to join the Union. He thought the strongest personality in Kuwait was Sheikh Fahad, but he was openly anti-British and pro-Nasser.

7. On the Lebanon, Nuri said that he was very pessimistic about the situation there. He agreed that the army had not fought effectively because they were predominantly Christian and were reluctant to fight Moslems. He thought that if the United Nations observers could be stationed in sufficient numbers on the frontier, this might establish a form of corridor which would prevent infiltration from Syria and would encourage General Chehab to deal more resolutely with the revolt inside the Lebanon. As regards the future, Nuri thought that Chamoun might well continue in office after the 24th of July if only because there might be no alternative candidate for the Presidency who would get a majority in the Lebanese Parliament. He had suggested to Chamoun that the Lebanon might join the Union on any terms she chose and had pointed out that the position in Jordan had vastly improved since the Union had been formed. He himself was now cheered when he appeared in Amman. Looking further ahead, Nuri thought that the only solution for the Lebanon was either to join the Union, which would give the

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Moslems an assurance as regards their future, or for a greater degree of autonomy to be given to the Moslem areas in the Lebanon. I said that we also regarded the Lebanon situation as very serious. We had offered our support to Chamoun and I thought that if he had called on us and the Americans for help at the outset, we should have been able to act effectively. But the Lebanese army had not dealt vigorously with the revolt and in the eyes of the world the situation had increasingly taken on the appearance of a civil war. The difficulties of Anglo-American military intervention had greatly increased. I suggested, and Nuri did not dissent, that we should now try to secure a solution through the United Nations before considering military intervention. I said that we were doing all we could to get the United Nations to find an effective solution. If this could not be achieved by means of observers, we would urge the establishment of a United Nations force. If, after all, the United Nations manifestly could not bring about a settlement, it might still be necessary for the Americans and ourselves to intervene. Certainly the American position had changed considerably over the past year. They were now much readier to consider independent action in the Middle East if the United Nations failed.

8. I asked Nuri about Syria and he said that there was serious discontent with Nasser. The trouble was that Iraq could not act without adequate air cover. If they had had this, they would have taken action long ago. But as things were, the Egyptian air forces were too strong for them. They had no worry about the army and thought that the Iraqi ground forces could deal effectively with anything the Syrians or Egyptians could put against them. Given the lack of air cover they had not wanted to foment trouble in Syria though he was convinced that there would be a rising as soon as Iraq gave the word. He admitted that F.86's were beginning to arrive in Iraq, but claimed that, with the pilots they already had and with volunteers they could recruit from Pakistan and elsewhere, the number of 'planes could be greatly increased.

9. I took the opportunity of saying at this point how many tributes I had heard paid to the effectiveness of Baghdad Radio broadcasts. Nuri was obviously gratified and confirmed that Baghdad Radio was now having a considerable influence in Syria and, to some extent, in Egypt.

10. At the end of our conversation we again spoke of Kuwait and I pressed Nuri to withdraw the Iraqi note of the 5th of June. We had not shown this to the Ruler, but, if we had to regard it as a formal note, we could not delay showing it to him much longer. I had already pointed out the serious consequences which I foresaw if the note became public in Kuwait. Nuri said that he could not withdraw it since it had been approved by the Iraqi Cabinet. I said that in that case we should have to consider an answer, but I thought this might best be dealt with in Baghdad. I suggested that we should both think over what had been said and discuss the matter again. I thought it might be helpful if Nuri and the other members of the Iraqi Delegation to the Baghdad Pact meeting could come to London a few days in advance. If, for instance, they arrived on the 23rd of July, we could have talks on the 24th and 25th of July. Nuri was by this time less depressed and was talking less of resignation. He confirmed that he would attend the Baghdad Pact meeting and would be in London for some time before this. He readily agreed with my suggestion that the other members of the Iraqi Delegation should come to London in the preceding week.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Washington and Paris, and to the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York, Her Majesty's Political Representative in Bahrain, and to Her Majesty's Political Agent in Kuwait.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

VQ 1051/26

No. 12

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND Dr. FAHDIL JAMALI ON JULY 5, 1958

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Michael Wright (Baghdad)

(No. 150. Secret)

Foreign Office,

Sir,

July 5, 1958.

Dr. Fahdil Jamali came to see me on July 5 on his way through London on his return journey to Baghdad from New York where he has been representing Iraq at the Security Council discussions on the Lebanon.

2. I started the conversation by asking Jamali to do his best to persuade the Turkish Government how important it was that Mr. Menderes should come to the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in London at the end of this month. I hoped he would also advise them to play the Cyprus question slowly and not to reject our plan. It was a good plan. They could not expect anything better; and if they went on with their present tactics there would be serious danger that anti-Turkish feeling would grow in this country.

3. I then told Dr. Jamali that I had seen Nuri es Said on July 2 (my despatch No. 147). He had been very depressed and talked of resigning but had been more cheerful after our talk. I had proposed that we should hold private talks with the Iraqi delegation immediately before the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council. I had set aside for this purpose July 24 and 25. I assumed Dr. Jamali would be present as he had been at Ankara. I hoped the talks would cover all aspects of our relations and give us an opportunity of going into various questions such as propaganda which there was not otherwise time to discuss. You would be consulting the Iraqis about the organisation of this meeting. I thought the Prime Ministers might perhaps attend at the beginning and the end, but that the main talks might perhaps more conveniently be conducted between Taufiq Suwaidi and myself and our respective advisers.

4. I asked Dr. Jamali for his views on Dr. Malik's candidature for the Presidency of the United Nations Embassy. There had been a suggestion that we should at once come out in support of it. What did he think? Dr. Jamali said he thought we should wait for at least a month before declaring ourselves. It was still far from certain that Dr. Malik would still be in the Lebanese Cabinet or even that he would be a delegate to the Assembly.

5. Dr. Jamali went on to elaborate his ideas on the present crisis in the Lebanon on the lines which he had already mentioned to Sir Pierson Dixon (New York telegram No. 577). He said it was only one phase of the wider struggle of the free world with Nasserism and that Nasser must not be allowed to win. In his view the best way of preventing this was for the Lebanon either to join the Arab Union or to conclude a treaty with it, on the lines of the former treaty between Jordan and Iraq, and perhaps establish a common command. He had put this suggestion to President Chamoun who had now asked for the Iraqi Government's views. In reply to a question from me, Dr. Jamali said that any treaty between the Lebanon and the Arab Union would have to cover aggression from any source, not only Israel, and also internal disturbances.

6. In order to complete Lebanese membership of the Arab Union and establish a geographical link between them Dr. Jamali has in mind that Israel should, in return for concessions elsewhere, cede to the Union western and eastern Galilee, thus creating a corridor of Arab territory linking Jordan to the sea and cutting off Israel from the Lebanon. This would not only give the Arab Union access to the sea but would also enable the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean to by-pass Syria. He thought this might also become the basis of an eventual Palestine settlement and wondered whether, since things were quiet now, the time had not come to make a start in this direction. I said that this was an interesting idea and that we would certainly look at it. I was not sure how practical it was. As regards his suggestions for associating the Lebanon with the Arab Union, I said I doubted if the time had yet come for full Lebanese

membership of the Union. Dr. Jamali seemed to agree. As regards a treaty between the two, I asked whether there was not a danger of provoking Nasser and creating a situation within the Lebanon similar to the situation in Jordan in December 1955. At that time King, Government and Army had all been in favour of Jordan's joining the Baghdad Pact; but public opinion had been so inflamed by Nasser's propaganda and subversive activities that it had been quite impossible to carry the policy through.

7. Dr. Jamali said he had the impression that Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations were not taking the Lebanese situation as seriously as they should. I agreed and said we were extremely dissatisfied with the action of the United Nations so far. I thought the Americans were too. Mr. Dulles was seeing Mr. Hammarskjöld on July 7 and intended to impress on him the need for improving and strengthening the United Nations effort in the Lebanon. If there was no satisfactory response to these representations, it might be necessary to ventilate the question again in the Security Council. We would be glad to see a United Nations force sent to the Lebanon. But meanwhile it was important to despatch more observers.

8. In reply to a question from me Dr. Jamali agreed that in present circumstances Western military intervention in the Lebanon would be a great mistake except in the very last resort. His own view was that Arab Union intervention would be preferable. I said that the right policy seemed to be first to prod the United Nations into further action; then if that failed, for the Lebanon to go to the Security Council. Only if that too failed could we consider intervention and even then it would have to be an international operation and have some kind of United Nations cover. It was hard to say which was preferable—intervention by the Western Powers or by the Arab Union. It seemed clear, however, that intervention by the Arab Union would have to be supported by an air-lift and air cover provided by the Western Powers.

9. Dr. Jamali agreed with me that Chamoun's present intention was probably to hold on in the hope that no further election would be possible and he would therefore be able to continue in office. We had some discussion on a possible successor to President Chamoun. Dr. Jamali mentioned the names of Charles Malik and Alfred Naccache, but seemed to think that both the Eddes were too pro-French and too pro-Israel to be in the running. He thought the Lebanese would be wise to change their Constitution so as to provide for a four-year presidential term instead of the present six-year term. Two consecutive terms would then be tolerable.

10. The conversation then turned to Kuwait. Dr. Jamali made three points. First, Iraq had no territorial ambitions and wanted only to be equal partners with Kuwait in the Arab Union. Secondly, it was important to fight Nasserism not only in Kuwait but also in the rest of the Persian Gulf where Egyptian activities were endangering Iraq's security. Thirdly, the Ruler of Kuwait must be made to realise that his own security was vitally bound up with the security of Iraq. In reply I took the same line as I had already taken with Nuri. I emphasised that we wanted Kuwait to join the Union. We were enthusiastic for it and had pointed out the advantages to the Ruler. We had no commercial axe of our own to grind in this matter and entirely agreed with Iraq on the importance of improving the security situation in Kuwait so that it could not be a base for subversive activities against Iraq. The only difference between us was how all this could best be achieved. We believed it must be by persuasion and not coercion. We had never yet tried to coerce Kuwait or to order her to do anything; and we could not do so now. We had however made our views clear and would continue to do so. It was now for the Iraqis to do something to win Kuwait's confidence. If Iraq wanted a marriage with Kuwait, she must woo her and not take a stick to her. First of all there must be an engagement. This is what we had in mind in proposing, as a first step, an agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to cover questions of security, frontiers, investment, &c. The Ruler had agreed to this. But there was no use forcing the pace with him. He was not weak, nor a fool. He was shrewd. He was also slow and cautious; and had his own public opinion to cope with. If the Iraqis would only be content with an agreement on the lines proposed, I believed that it could be concluded within a month or so; that as a result the Ruler might be prepared to invest as much as £10 million a year in Iraq (I had no authority for mentioning any figure); and that

within two years or so the engagement might flower into a marriage and Kuwait join the Union. But none of this was possible so long as the Iraqis, and especially Nuri, persisted in brandishing their big stick in the background and threatening to claim half Kuwait's territory or even to invade her.

11. Dr. Jamali agreed that what I had said was sound. But it ignored the urgency of the situation. Public opinion in Iraq was becoming increasingly roused on the subject of Kuwait and there was a school which wanted to march straight in. He said that he himself was ready to do everything possible to improve relations with Kuwait and would gladly go there himself. I said I should favour this. We were doing all we could all the time discreetly to create the right atmosphere in Kuwait. As he might have seen, Egyptian newsreels had been stopped and Kuwait had now asked for Iraqi teachers. Anything the Iraqis could do to help in this direction would be welcome.

12. In conclusion I asked about Baghdad Radio. Dr. Jamali seemed to be only half satisfied with it. He said it could not be heard at all in North Africa, the Sudan or the Protectorate; and there was only one good announcer, who had been brought from Pakistan. He asked whether Iraq could not take on the former staff of Sharq el Adna. I said they had now been dispersed, but it might be possible to collect some of them together again. I would look into this question.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Paris, Tehran and Washington, to the Political Agent at Kuwait, the Political Office, Middle East Forces, the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi, the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations at New York and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Paris.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

VQ 1015/199

No. 13

THE PROSPECTS FOR OIL IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 15)

(No. 125. Confidential)

Baghdad,
August 12, 1958.

Sir,

The Iraq revolution is now nearly a month old and ordinary Iraqis, particularly the poorer town dwellers, can be expected, and according to some reports are beginning, to ask what benefits it is going to bring them. The problems are emotional, political and material. After some concessions to emotion, the new Government appear to be making a considered attempt to lower the emotional temperature. But it is too early to say where their desires, their sense of their own interest, and forces both inside and outside Iraq will lead them. This applies particularly to their future relationship with the United Arab Republic and to their relations with the West. But whatever direction they take, and not least if their political policy settles down, as they profess to wish, to one of moderation and of maintenance of friendship with the West side by side with other friendships, they will have to face the demand by the people for a progressively higher standard of living. They are pledged to satisfy this demand; to honour this pledge will tax this or any future Government to the utmost; and by their success or failure in doing so the new régime may stand or fall.

2. Although the previous Iraq Government's development programme was far from ideal in that it tended to sacrifice the short-term too much to the long-term, it was in general soundly conceived and its deficiencies were caused far more by lack of skill than lack of will. The problems of irrigation, intensification of agriculture, extension of communications and wise industrialisation are by no means easily solved in the material and human circumstances of Iraq, and the new régime will find the hard facts as intractable as ever. They will do their best to retain some of the Western experts and they will no doubt supplement them from the United Arab Republic and perhaps from the Eastern bloc. But, in the absence of any new source of revenue, the general improvement in the standard of life is bound to be slow. As immediate steps, the Government have introduced price and rent controls designed to help the poorer people, but they will have little impact on the sarifa dwellers in the encampments around the big towns. Moreover, ordinary business is at present largely at a standstill, new orders for imports from abroad have temporarily dried up, the grain harvest this year is poor due to the drought and a plague of locusts, and much disorganisation will be caused in all the Economic Ministries by dismissals and suspension of staff. The Government are already greatly concerned by the immediate budgetary position. It is clear that they will have to exert themselves to the utmost to prevent things getting worse before they get better.

3. This is a situation which is potentially dangerous and the Government are bound to look round for some dramatic measure with which to bring economic benefit to the country. There seem to be only two directions in which they may seek this. The first is to try to secure some contribution to Iraq's resources from those available to the Ruler of Kuwait. At present the Government appears to be lying low in regard to Kuwait, but they may decide to raise the question of its future. I consider, however, that they are unlikely to do so in the near future, not only because they are probably not ready to challenge Her Majesty's Government on this issue, but also perhaps because they may assess that the United Arab Republic will consider that it has first claim and a greater chance of achieving success; for it seems probable that popular feeling in Kuwait is more enthusiastic for Nasser than it could ever be for any Iraqi trader. For the present Kuwait must, I think, simply remain a question mark.

4. The other potential source of additional wealth is clearly the oil industry. The Government have so far confined themselves to giving assurances to the companies and the Western Governments. In a proclamation made by the Prime Minister on the 18th of July, he stated that the Government wished to continue the

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extraction, flow and processing of oil for its usual markets and that it respected its obligations towards the parties concerned. The army have taken energetic steps to protect the installations in the oil fields and individual Ministers have assured me that the last thing the Government wants is to create difficulties over the movement of oil. The most that they appear to have in mind, at present, is renegotiation in order to obtain a higher share of the profits for Iraq coupled with the maximisation of exports. As regards the immediate future, the Prime Minister has mentioned to me the ID.4 million outstanding from the 1953 settlement which under present arrangements will be set off against the repayments of the ID.11 million loan which the Iraq Petroleum Company made to the Government last year.

5. I imagine that the Iraq Petroleum Company and its shareholders are fully prepared for pressure on the division of profits, but I assume that the range within which they will wish to manoeuvre will not be very great having regard to the impact on other oil-producing countries. Two questions seem to arise:

- (a) Is it possible by negotiation for the Iraq Petroleum Company to satisfy what the Government will conceive to be its financial needs within a range that the oil companies could accept? If the maximum of this range is that which the Ruler of Kuwait and the King of Saudi Arabia conceded to a Japanese company for the extraction of oil in the neutral zone sea-bed, then I cannot help feeling considerable doubt whether the Iraqis will be satisfied. How far the readiness of the Iraq Petroleum Company to yield up part of the territory covered by the concession will prove helpful in this respect must remain uncertain until it is possible to see if any other oil interests are ready to operate here and if in fact there is any oil in the area given up.
- (b) Will the Iraq Government be content to leave their relations with the Iraq Petroleum Company on virtually their present footing, including the release by the Iraq Petroleum Company of part of their concessions which have not yet been developed, or will the Iraqis wish to go further?

6. This latter question is naturally a very difficult one to answer now. It will be affected by the size of the financial concessions which the Government may wish to extract and by the degree to which they can satisfy the pan-Arab aspirations of the people in co-operating with Colonel Nasser in other fields. I feel bound to say however that it seems likely that the Iraqis will, in the long run, not be satisfied, at any rate so far as appearances go, without a larger share of participation in or control of the oil industry, the greatest resource of their country. The Iraqi statements at present appear to exclude the nationalisation of the oil industry, but the emotional pressures let loose by the revolution, which may be reinforced by propaganda from Cairo and Moscow, may drive them to seek it.

7. The new Government appear to understand that Iraq needs the oil marketing facilities of the West at least as much as, if not more than, the West needs Iraq's oil. The Mosaddeq experience demonstrated that this was so for a neighbouring country at a time when Iranian oil was far more badly needed by the Western world than is Iraqi oil to-day. This fact will give the Iraq Petroleum Company a greater tactical strength in any negotiations than it would have had several years ago. Nevertheless, the popular demand for the exclusion of all so-called imperialist influences in the country may prove irresistible. In this situation, I believe that the Iraq Petroleum Company and its shareholders would be well advised to consider how, before the pressures have arisen, and in what direction they should be steered. It may well be that by some rearrangement of the Company-Iraq relations, it would be possible to give the Government the satisfaction of a new name-plate on the door and a degree of direct participation (perhaps including a capital stake) in the Company's activities which, coupled with financial concessions, would enable the Government to satisfy popular demands. The Persian solution is probably not directly applicable here and since it was negotiated with a pro-Western Government after a counter-revolution, the Government may well press the Iraq Petroleum Company to go further. However that may be, it would seem wise for the Company to think out in advance how far to go and to prepare proposals which would have a genuine attraction for the Iraqis, both on the material and emotional plane. I suggest that the political situation here is such that they should exclude from their thinking no solution, however radical, which would not irremediably destroy their interests and reduce

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the flow of oil. Meanwhile, I understand that they are already pressing ahead with "integration". This is important psychologically and they should be given every encouragement to move as fast as they can in this direction, without impairing their efficiency too much.

8. Her Majesty's Government have in the past, for very good reasons, tended largely to leave these extremely complex matters to the companies themselves, and it may be that the Iraq Petroleum Company and other shareholders will not need any pressing to examine these problems in the way I have suggested. If however they are reluctant, on the ground perhaps of the assurances given by the Government, then I consider that serious consideration should be given to encourage them strongly to do so, both in their own interest and in that of the preservation of the most important Western interest in Iraq, the one which, if it is wisely conducted, may be an important stabilising political factor just as it is the crucial economic one for the country.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Paris, Beirut, Tehran, Bahrain and to the Political Agent in Kuwait.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 1015/207

No. 14

THE LEADERS OF THE NEW REGIME IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 21)

(No. 134. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *August 19, 1958.*

I have the honour to report that a new Government, under the leadership of Staff Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, was formed on the morning of the 14th of July immediately on the successful *coup d'état* against the Hashemite régime. The names of the members of this Government were announced over Baghdad Radio from about 0600 on the 14th of July.

2. The new Government quickly let it be known that their policy was one of reform at home, the maintenance of existing international obligations pending re-negotiation, and strict neutrality abroad, coupled with close co-operation with other Arab countries. They expressed their intention to keep the oil flowing and to honour the existing agreement with I.P.C. They followed up with a mutual defence treaty with the United Arab Republic.

3. The Government consists of 13 members (list attached) of whom three only are military. The Prime Minister, Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, is soft-spoken and friendly to meet. He is said to be a devout Muslim and dedicated to the service of his country. He is unmarried and lives very simply. Apart from a few remarks in some of his speeches his conduct so far has been essentially moderate and restrained. He has made it clear that his Government wish to be friends with anyone who is prepared to be friends with them, on a basis of equality and mutual interests. He has a good reputation as a competent army officer and as far as it is possible to judge enjoys confidence in the army.

4. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Colonel Abdul Salim Mohammed Arif, is more violent in approach than his chief and has made a number of somewhat inflammatory speeches all over the country on the anti-imperialist theme. He is an effective demagogue and appears to be able to sway the crowd with his personality and the force of his speaking as much as, if not more than, by the content of his speeches. Arif's speeches seem at first sight to be in contradiction to the avowed moderate

policy of the Government and to indicate a more extreme anti-Western tendency. On the other hand it may be true, as it has been explained to me by the Minister of Guidance, that the Government consider that the people must be given some emotional outlet for their feelings, and that it is better for Government speakers to canalise and control these feelings than to appear to ignore them. It could also be that Arif has been carried away by the success of the revolution and the response of crowds into making wild statements which serve no useful purpose. That the former interpretation has at any rate a grain of truth is suggested by a stray rumour which I have heard from several sources that Qassim and some of his army colleagues recently urged Arif to be more moderate in his speeches; whether he has complied or not I do not know but the published versions of the more recent speeches have been less inflammatory. Reports of some of his speeches have been censored. It has been suggested that Arif might be a rival to the Prime Minister; as yet there is no concrete evidence to support this, though there may well be something in it. Arif is said to be a devout Muslim, a sincere and intense nationalist and an opponent of Communism. It has been said that he is the member of the Government most inclined towards closer links with the United Arab Republic, and this might be the issue on which disputes may have arisen.

5. The other soldier in the Cabinet is Brigadier Naji Talib, the Minister of Social Affairs. A former Military Attaché in London, he is a young, dynamic, outspoken nationalist, suspicious of the West. He appears to be fully conscious of the magnitude and importance of his task.

6. The civilian members of the Cabinet are essentially middle-class Liberal Socialist reformers and all act with some deference to the military. Mohammed Hadid (Leading Personalities 1957, No. 92), the Minister of Finance, has been a prominent member of the nationalist movement since the 1930's. He is a successful business man and indications are that he will make a

competent Finance Minister. He has always been personally friendly to Britain and believes in the importance of Iraq's links with the West. His behaviour since obtaining office is consistent with views he has expressed in the past and he should have a moderating influence.

7. Hadid and Siddiq Shanshal (Leading Personalities 1957, No. 98), the Minister of Information, are probably the most influential civilian members of the Cabinet. Shanshal has been busy trying to live down his reputation for extremism and has created a good impression on the Press. Members of my staff and I have found him reasonable in conversation and if he means what he says his influence should be in the direction of good sense and moderation; it is too early, however, to judge whether he is sincere. Like Hadid, the policy he appears to wish to pursue now is not inconsistent with ideas he expressed before he assumed office. He claims not to be anti-West and has two daughters being educated in England. Although described in Personalities as violently anti-British, this feeling was directed towards the close association of the British with the Hashemite régime and Nuri Said and what he considered the "semi-colonial status" of Iraq rather than against Britain as such. Like Hadid he gives the impression of realising that Iraq's cultural and economic interests lie towards the West and he would like his country to have a neutral status. My impression is that neither he nor Hadid favour the merger of Iraq with the United Arab Republic.

8. Dr. Abdul Jabbar Jommard (Leading Personalities No. 14), the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has so far been courteous and correct. He appears cultured and intelligent but is inclined, doubtless with intention, to speak in platitudes. It is unlikely that he has much influence on policy. He does not give the impression of great force of character and it may well be that his main task is to keep the Diplomatic Corps sweet. He speaks fluent French and spent the war years in Paris.

9. Dr. Ibrahim Kubba, the Minister of Economy, appears lucid and intelligent. He has been dubbed a Communist but I think this can be put down to the general practice of so labelling any socialistically inclined opponent of the previous régime. The I.P.C. and I have found him friendly so far, but it is not yet clear how he will react when dealing with matters of

substance. I have heard it said that his ideas on trade and economics are somewhat theoretical.

10. Dr. Jabr Umar, the Minister of Education, has been outside Iraq for some time. He has been friendly in his dealings with the British Council Representative and myself and has expressed the view that arrangements for Iraqi students in England should continue. He seems intelligent and competent.

11. Fuad Rikabi, the Minister of Development, probably owes his position to his leadership of the Baath Party in Iraq; he was dismissed from the Development Board four years ago, allegedly for incompetence, and has since spent some time in gaol reputedly as a Communist sympathiser. He is youthful and amiable but at first sight a lightweight and it remains to be seen whether he will be able to deal with the many complicated problems associated with the development programme.

12. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud, the Minister of Communications and Works, is the Kurdish representative in the Cabinet and that is presumably the main reason for his appointment. He is sensible and balanced in his views and friendly to the West. In conversation with me since the revolution he has said that he accepted his appointment in the hope that he would be able to exert a moderating influence.

13. Hudaib Haj Hamoud was formerly associated with Kamil Chadirchi's (Personalities No. 81) National Democratic Party. He appears to be intelligent and liberal-minded. I have not yet had dealings with the Ministers of Justice or Health, but indications are that they fit into the general pattern of liberal reform and that neither of them carry much weight *vis-à-vis* the military leaders or their civilian colleagues.

14. There is a three-man Council of State at present performing the functions of President of the Republic. The President of the Council, General Rubai, seems to be a mild fatherly figure, generally liked and respected by the nationalists. He made a reasonable but not forceful impression on me. It is not clear how much influence he wields, but such as it is, it is probably in the direction of moderation. Before the revolution he was in semi-exile as Ambassador to Jedda, since he was known to be an opponent of Nuri as Said. I have heard that the Egyptians have for some time envisaged him as the Iraqi Naqib.

15. Mohammed Mahdi Kubba (Personalities No. 95) is the former leader of the Istiqlal Party and the National Front. He has been active in the nationalist movement for many years. Before the revolution he was running a cotton ginning factory and in conversation with members of my staff has shown himself moderate and liberal in his views, although, of course, opposed to the previous régime. Since the revolution he has expressed the wish with apparent sincerity that the new Iraqi régime should have close ties of friendship and commerce with Britain. He makes an impression of earnestness, sincerity and honesty.

16. Khalid Naqshbandi, the third member of the Council, is a Kurd, an ex-army colonel and Mutasarrif of Erbil up to the time of the revolution. He toured the United Kingdom this summer on an officially sponsored tour of officials. He was an energetic, competent and enlightened mutasarrif who has been friendly to our consuls and members of the Embassy staff who visited him in Erbil.

17. There are three notable omissions among the old-established nationalists, from the present Government. These are Faiq Samarrai (Leading Personalities No. 54), Hussain Jamil (Leading Personalities No. 67) and Kamil Chadirchi. The two former have been given the important Ambassadorial posts in the United Arab Republic and India respectively. Kamil Chadirchi says that he does not want office but he appears to exert considerable influence on the civilian members of the Cabinet behind the scenes. In so far as the civilian nationalists had a leader before the revolution, Chadirchi occupied that post, partly because of his long nationalist history and also because he was imprisoned by Nuri as Said at the time of the Suez crisis and only released a few weeks before the revolution. He has been personally cordial to us since his release from prison and appears genuinely to desire socialist democracy for Iraq. It is not clear how much influence he has on the military. He says that he does not consider it to be in Iraq's interests to merge with the United Arab Republic, but he would probably be prepared to accept some sort of federation under which Iraq preserved its autonomy in internal affairs. His influence is likely to be in the direction of moderation and against military dictatorship. He appears to wish for Iraq to remain neutral between East and West but in conversation gives the impression that he under-estimates the

power and danger of Soviet Communist subversion.

18. The personalities and background of the Government and the Council of State, with the possible exception of Colonel Arif, who still remains something of an enigma, are such that co-operation with the West on economic and cultural affairs would be entirely natural to them. The West is familiar to them, and while they regret some of its policies, they appear to be mainly sympathetic towards the Western way of life. I doubt if any members of the present team, Arif included, would willingly see Iraq drawn into the Soviet orbit and I am sure that their professions of desire for a form of neutral position are genuine. Whether they will be able to maintain such a position depends on many factors which are outside the scope of this despatch. The most burning question, however, is whether they will be able to control the inevitable efforts of the Communists aided by Soviet and satellite Embassies to subvert the State, now that the security apparatus has been, at least temporarily, destroyed by the revolution. The Government appear to be aware of this danger to some extent but it remains to be seen whether they can translate this awareness into effective action. There is also the question of whether the mutual defence agreement with the United Arab Republic and the close co-operation with Egypt in economic, cultural and political affairs which has now been encouraged, will satisfy either President Nasser or the more extreme pan-Arab Iraqis. For this and many other reasons it is too soon to attempt any estimate of the likely durability of the new Iraqi régime and Government. As in the past it is likely to depend as much on events outside Iraq as on internal developments. It is impossible to exclude the possibility of a further *coup d'état* by military officers who for one reason or another may be discontented with the present Government, but the attitude of President Nasser may be decisive in determining whether a situation develops here in which such a *coup* might be attempted.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran and Karachi and to the Political Officer, Middle East Forces in Cyprus.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

Iraq Government

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence:
Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim.

Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister
of Interior: Colonel Abdul Salaam
Muhammad Arif.

Foreign Affairs: Dr. Abdul Jabbar
Jommard.

Finance: Muhammad Hadid.

Guidance: Siddiq Shanshal.

Economy: Dr. Ibrahim Kubba.

Education: Dr. Jabr Umar.

Development: Fuad Rikabi.

Social Affairs: Brigadier Naji Talib.

Agriculture: Hudaib Haj Hamoud.

Justice: Mustafa Ali.

Health: Dr. Muhammad Saleh Mahmoud.

Communications and Works: Baba Ali
Shaikh Mahmud.

Council of State

General Najib Ruba'i.

Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.

Khalid Naqshbandi.

EQ 1015/208

No. 15

THE IRAQI REVOLUTION OF JULY 14, 1958

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 22)

(No. 135. Confidential) Baghdad,
August 21, 1958.

In a number of telegrams and despatches I have reported upon events in Iraq on and since the revolution on the 14th of July. It is too early to be able to furnish either a full narrative or a balanced analysis. But I have the honour to submit the following additional, if provisional, comments.

2. At 8 a.m. on the 14th of July the King, the Crown Prince, Nuri and others were to leave by air for Ankara for discussions with the Presidents of Turkey and Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Iran prior to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact in London on the 28th of July. On the morning of the 13th of July the 19th and 20th Brigades stationed at Baquba received orders to proceed to Jordan in response to a request from King Hussain who had discovered a plot against himself. Both the Iraqis and Jordanians were gravely worried over events in the Lebanon, were convinced that Nasser had inspired active interference and subversion in the Lebanon from Syria, and were grievously disappointed at the failure of the United Nations' Observers and Mr. Hammarskjöld to take any effective action to halt this interference by the United Arab Republic in the Lebanon. Nuri had urged for several weeks that the Lebanon should invoke American intervention to protect her independence.

3. It has been alleged that the Iraqi Brigades had been alerted not merely to proceed to Jordan but for action in the Lebanon. From my conversations with Nuri and Taufiq Suwaidi at the time I believe this to be untrue. They could not have entered Lebanon without passing through Syrian territory; and so far as I am aware no request of this nature had been made by the Lebanon.

4. It is now known that the 19th Brigade, and apparently the 20th Brigade, were commanded by dissident officers led by Brigadier Qasim with Colonel Arif as his second. According to his subsequent statements Brigadier Qasim had been waiting since at least 1956 for a chance to overthrow the régime. Since the 19th and

20th Brigades formed part of the Division commanded by Brigadier-General Daghistani, the former Deputy Chief of General Staff and a loyal supporter of the régime, the question why both he and the Chief of General Staff were apparently totally unaware of the views of the dissident officers concerned is one of the questions still unsolved.

5. It was apparently the case that on the 14th of July there was no effective army unit in Baghdad itself. When therefore Brigadier Qasim received the order on the morning of the 13th to move to Jordan through Baghdad he decided that this afforded an opportunity to eliminate the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri without immediate opposition if the operation was carried out quickly and ruthlessly. This was done. Some time after 5.30 a.m. on the 14th of July the Palace was surrounded and attacked. There are conflicting versions of what passed there. It is certain that the Crown Prince, his mother and one of his sisters were killed and the Crown Princess wounded. The King was either killed at once or fatally injured. In the latter case he probably died on the evening of the 14th of July or the 15th of July. Nuri's house was attacked, but he escaped into the city. A price of 10,000 dinars was set on his head, and on the 16th of July he was discovered and killed. The dead body of the Crown Prince was handed over to the mob, mutilated, probably publicly hung, and dragged naked by the crowd through the streets. A body alleged to be that of Nuri was either handed to the crowd on the 16th or 17th of July or dug up by them after burial, dismembered and dragged through the streets.

6. Meanwhile, at about 6 a.m. on the 14th of July, a voice, believed to be that of Colonel Arif, was heard on the Baghdad Radio announcing the revolution and inciting the people to loot and to sack the Palace. Eye-witnesses saw soldiers on military vehicles addressing the crowd and urging them to loot and sack. A little later announcements were made saying that foreign lives and property and foreign missions were to be respected.

7. At or soon after 6 a.m. the names of the Ministers of the new Government were proclaimed. In the case of a number if not all of the civilian Ministers named this was apparently the first intimation they had of the revolution and of their inclusion in the Government.

8. It was not long before the mob began to get out of control. They entered and sacked the British Consulate and Information Services, housed in a building near the broadcasting station which was the chief centre of excitement but also surrounded by an army detachment which could have maintained law and order. They then broke into the Embassy grounds and looted and set fire to the Residence. Army detachments were in the vicinity and could have prevented this but failed to take the necessary action.

9. By the end of the morning the new Government feared that the mob was becoming completely beyond control. They accordingly imposed a curfew at 1 p.m. During the day they also arrested all members of the previous Government who could be found, and a number of others, partly to complete their seizure of power but perhaps partly also, as they themselves allege, to prevent their being attacked by the mob. Meanwhile, three Jordanian Ministers in the Union Government had been arrested at the Baghdad Hotel. Two of them were lynched by the mob on the way to the Ministry of Defence, and with them three American citizens and one German citizen who had been arrested by mistake.

10. Although the actual *coup d'état* was planned and executed by a very few officers at 24 hours' notice, they had succeeded in infiltrating previously a number of sympathisers at key points, one officer into the King's bodyguard and others at Divisional Headquarters. General Omar Ali, the loyal and energetic commander of the 1st Division at Diwaniyah, endeavoured to give the order to resist the revolution but was overpowered. The officers commanding the 2nd Division at Kirkuk debated until 5 p.m. on the 14th of July what action they should take, but, on learning there was no resistance elsewhere, gave their support to the new Government. The fact that the whole Royal Family had been liquidated at a stroke and that all the leading political figures had been seized (rumour had it that many had been killed) meant that there was no prominent figure to raise an immediate voice of resistance.

11. In Baghdad the new Government were themselves shocked and frightened at the djinn of mob violence and bestiality which their action had released. While on the one hand encouraging enthusiasm for the aims of the revolution they worked to get the djinn back into the bottle partly by security measures by the army and partly by such appeals to reason as were compatible with revolutionary fervour. But for several weeks the city remained almost at flash point. An explosion at a depot of the Khanaqin Oil Company in the middle of the city, which resulted in a spectacular fire and a pall of smoke hanging over Baghdad for a week, contributed to maintaining the tension. The landing of American marines in the Lebanon and British troops in Jordan also increased tension even if it had a sobering effect in parallel. To-day, five weeks after the revolution, it would take little to make the pot boil over again.

12. As a result the fact of mob violence, and the possibility of its recurrence, loom in everyone's mind. There looms also, leaving aside the fate of the Crown Prince and of Nuri, the murder of King Faisal. There is evidence of widespread shame and grief over the fact and the manner of his death, however much fear, caution or even welcome of change are keeping this submerged.

13. I have reported in other telegrams and despatches on the composition and policy of the new Government, whose declared aims are an internal programme of liberal radical reform and a foreign policy of good relations with all who are willing to co-operate with them, with special emphasis on Arab solidarity. I have also reported their repeated assurances of the desire that the relationship with the United Kingdom should remain as close as ever and if possible be strengthened. I will not enlarge on these issues in this despatch nor on their professed intention of close co-operation with the United Arab Republic without at least for the present joining it, nor on their apparent desire to keep Communism at arm's length. But it may be pertinent to offer some comments both on the internal and external situation which provided the background, the setting and the contributory causes of the revolution.

14. *Internal Factors.*—The King, the Crown Prince and Nuri (the two latter were repeatedly at loggerheads and should not be classed together) were devoted patriots, living modestly, and personally free from

any taint of corruption. The aim of the régime was to weld Iraq, with its mixed population of Sunni and Shia Moslems, Kurds and other minorities into a modern country with constitutional democratic life, and to use the oil revenues for the benefit of the people.

15. In the light of a relatively well-conceived development programme, under a Development Board commanding 70 per cent. of the oil revenues, considerable progress was being made, particularly bearing in mind that there were obvious limits in certain directions to what could be achieved until flood prevention and water storage were sufficiently advanced. By Middle East standards Iraq was relatively well administered, suffered from only a normal amount of corruption (much less than in many neighbouring countries) and was slowly developing Western standards of administration and legislation and a rising standard of living. Apart from major works the educational and housing programmes were making rapid strides, hospital and health services appreciable advance. A sound social security plan had made a start, labour legislation had been completed with the help of the I.L.O., and civil service reforms introduced on the British model. Experimental projects of various kinds, development of electricity services and clean water, and much else were under way. But there was so far glaring failure in remedying the extreme poverty and misery of the people in many country districts such as the Kut and Amarah Liwas, remote Kurdish villages, the town of Nejef, and the straw and mud hut slums around Baghdad. The latter were filled largely by the immigrants from the land attracted by the hope of rising wages in the town. Small building projects, local irrigation schemes and minor rural development, in spite of much talk and many plans, had failed as yet to make adequate progress or impact, more from administrative inefficiency and lethargy than from lack of goodwill.

16. The hope of the régime was that while the development plans were being pushed forward (and as much was probably being attempted, even if not always in the right directions, as the administrative capacity of the country could bear), political and social evolution could take place in parallel without an upheaval. This depended upon finding Prime Ministers and Cabinets with the necessary authority and ability, working out a system, whether

two-party or multi-party, which would suit the country, and meanwhile avoiding paralysis by conflict between political factions.

17. Meanwhile, the older generation of politicians were thinning out. The death of Saleh Jabr in 1957 was a specially severe loss. Younger figures of ability were appearing but they lacked authority. At the same time a ferment of new ideas was spreading in middle-class and intellectual circles, not least among the stream of students returning from abroad. There was criticism of corruption and nepotism, usually greatly exaggerated but not without foundation. There were demands for formation of political parties; for freedom or greater freedom of elections although this was impossible to achieve in the Western sense; and there was pressure for removal of control over Press and radio. In a country not yet able to draw an adequate distinction between liberty and licence no Government was likely to satisfy these pressures entirely. But pressure to do so was there. In general, there was a gap between Government and people which the more progressive among the politicians and administrators had been unable to do enough to narrow. These discontents were growing and were bound to find some outlet. Not least was it necessary, as politicians such as Jamali, Khalil Khenna, Abdul Karim al Usari and Nadim Pachachi were urging, to tackle questions of land tax and land distribution involving larger estates. Legislation or decrees for this purpose were under preparation and consideration when the revolution broke out.

18. None the less, there was no particular unrest and no effervescence at the time the *coup d'état* was made. Once, however, the revolutionary action was successful those who had favoured a change welcomed and applauded it and all the latent discontents came to the surface.

19. Serious as they were, these discontents might well, and in my view probably would, have worked themselves out in other ways had it not been for pressures from outside Iraq centring round and inspired by Nasser as the leading proponent of revolutionary Arab nationalism. It is somewhat ironic that in Egypt itself there was less political and social freedom, less prosperity and less general progress than in Iraq. Nasser's appeal lay not in the example of internal reform successfully

applied, but in emotion and, above all, in ruthless, skilful and strident propaganda.

20. *Outside Influences.*—The former régime had not spared efforts to reach agreement with Nasser. Practically all the leading political figures had tried their hand. All of them had been disappointed and, according to their own accounts, double-crossed. They desired nothing more, Nuri included, than friendly co-operation with Nasser without his interference in Iraq. But they did not wish Iraq to be dominated by Egypt or to have to devote part of her oil revenues to support the Egyptian economy. Whether because of this, or for other reasons, Nasser had for at least three years directed a violent propaganda campaign against Iraq, personally vilifying the Crown Prince, Nuri and other political leaders, inciting the people to rebellion and using every propaganda technique of lie and insinuation to foment the discontents in Iraq which, as I have said, were real enough but were gravely aggravated by this sustained inflammation.

21. One of the effects of these constant attacks and subversive activities by Nasser was to constrain the authorities, in order to meet them, to impose stricter security measures than they would otherwise have done. In retrospect the Suez crisis was particularly important in this connection. In the first place it increased the popularity and stature of Nasser. Second, it led to the cutting of the pipeline through Syria with a loss to Iraq in the neighbourhood of £60 million. Third, it obliged the Iraq Government, by forcing them to concentrate on other issues, to postpone social and reformist legislation, and perhaps a return to greater freedoms and even the formation of political parties which had been under active discussion. Finally, it placed the severest possible strain upon the relations and connections with the United Kingdom.

22. Further, the union between Egypt and Syria early in 1958 placed Iraq in a dilemma as regards Jordan. If they did not take advantage of King Hussain's willingness to conclude a union with Iraq they faced the prospect of Jordan succumbing to Nasser. If they did so, they had to shoulder financial responsibilities for Jordan which were bound to be unpopular. As I reported in so many telegrams at the time, it appeared only too probable that if the union between

Iraq and Jordan could not be consolidated and supported financially and otherwise by the time it came into effect on the 15th of May the situation would be in acute danger of crumbling.

23. In the field of foreign affairs Nasser's propaganda had achieved marked success in Iraq. His ceaseless attacks on the Baghdad Pact, on the connection and friendship with Britain, and on imperialism in general, and his accusation that Iraq was dividing the Arab world had borne much fruit. For nearly three years Iraq bore them with dignity and little reply. When during the last six months a more vigorous propaganda policy was adopted it increased the discontent of those who admired Nasser.

24. *The Future.*—It would be out of place in this despatch to attempt any forecast of the future course of events in Iraq. It is sufficient to say that while the revolution is popular in many quarters, has provided an outlet of discontent in others, and is passively accepted for the time being by all, the future remains a question mark. The monarchy which kept the balance between different sections of the population has disappeared. It remains to be seen whether the new régime can fulfil the same function and will strike deep enough roots to consolidate itself. The majority of the people are waiting to see. The minorities are anxious, and some of them afraid. The business community is nervous. Neither landlord nor cultivator yet know what the Government's policy will be for them. Extreme Nationalists and Communists will wish the revolution to go further. More conservative forces may in some form and at some time exert an influence. Meanwhile in the immediate future there is likely to be no more moderate Government in sight. Whether, however, their programme of liberal reforms succeeds will depend largely on their ability to improve the economic life of the country and to improve the lot of the people and this will be no easy task. Finally, the question of their relationship with the United Arab Republic looms over the scene.

25. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi and POMEF.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EQ 1015/211

No. 16

TRIAL OF SUPPORTERS OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME

Mr. Crawford to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 28)

(No. 139. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *August 26, 1958.*

One of the main fields in which the new Republican Government in Iraq has shown itself active is in seeking the punishment of the supporters of the previous régime. The principal instrument is the law approved by the Council of State of the 11th of August for the punishment of "those who plot against the security of the country and open the way for corruption," and the special High Military Tribunal set up to try those accused under it. (The text of the law was sent to the Department under Chancery letter No. 1013/93/58⁽¹⁾ of the 12th of August, 1958.) The first indication that the maximum sentence under the law was life imprisonment has now been proved false; the Minister of Justice has recently pointed out one article of the law which provides that, in the event of the existence of another law carrying a heavier penalty applicable to the case of the accused, the heavier penalty would be imposed. In the Baghdad Penal Code, the penalty for treason is death.

2. The law was explicitly designed to supplement the Baghdad Penal Code. This Code contains clauses dealing with treason and corruption, but it is unlikely that under its terms all the 108 members of the former régime who are being brought to trial could have been proved guilty. The new Government was, however, anxious in the interests of its international and particularly domestic prestige to make an example of the monarchy and those who supported it, to prove it guilty *in toto*, and to enhance republican virtues by comparison with monarchical vices. To do this effectively, new legislation had to be introduced.

3. The new law is a departure from normal legislation not only in being retrospective to the 1st of September, 1939, but also in having been drafted so that its terms fitted the particular circumstances of the recent crisis. Indeed, the impression is inescapable that the guilty men were found first and the law was then tailored to meet

their cases. Its articles have direct reference to those faults which before the revolution the Opposition (and, indeed, 90 per cent. of the population of Iraq) had particularly criticised in the old régime. In brief, it declares that attacks on neighbouring Arab countries, propaganda against them or their heads of State, and the direction of the country's policy against what is conceived to be the Arab interest, amount to treason under the law. Similarly, in internal affairs, the repressive security measures used by the former régime, the rigging of elections and the alleged squandering of national wealth on "illusory and unnecessary projects" (a palpable hit at the Development Board) are considered to have been the equivalent of corruption. Other articles of the law cover bribery and personal corruption, of which many former Ministers and officials were widely suspected to be guilty.

4. The men under trial may be divided into four categories:—

(i) *The Government and Administration.*—Most of the members of the last Iraqi Cabinet and the Arab Union Cabinet are on trial (there are some notable omissions which are referred to below). A number of Directors-General and public officials (for example, the Mutasarrif and the Lord Mayor of Baghdad) are included. Several members of the Directorate-General of Security are also among the accused.

(ii) *The Army.*—The Chief of General Staff, and the Deputy Chief of General Staff, together with two Divisional Commanders, are among those on trial, presumably because of their participation in the forming and execution of the international policies of the former Government. The other twenty-eight members of the Army fall roughly into four categories: first, those concerned in the alleged plot against Syria; second, members of the Royal Bodyguard and Aides-de-Camp to the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Crown Prince; third, officers known to be on terms of friendship with the British and personally committed to the policy of the old régime (e.g., Brigadier Afram Hindu and Brigadier Shukri Mahmoud Nadim); fourth, officers who appear to have resisted the revolution. (Two battalion commanders of the 1st Brigade at Musayib, the Brigade Commander of the 14th Brigade at Nasiriyah, and two colonels of the 20th Brigade at Jalowla (one of the Brigades responsible for the revolution).) Major Muhammad Khorshid, one of the seven men who planned the assassination of Bakr Sidqi in 1936, also appears among the accused.

(iii) *The Press and Radio*.—The Director-General of Guidance, the editorial staffs of the leading pro-Nuri papers and radio and television announcers responsible for attacks on President Nasser are all on trial.

(iv) *Members of the Chamber of Deputies* known to have been supporters of the former régime.

5. The selection of members of the former Government for trial is perhaps the most interesting. All are likely to be tried under several articles of the new law and, since the law is drafted to fit them, are unlikely to escape conviction. They shared in the responsibility for the direction of the country's policy of hostility to Nasser and of promoting the Arab Union and, if their policy is now to be judged dangerous to the national interest (as members of the new Government are at pains to point out almost every day), they are bound to be found guilty. This includes Fadhil Jamali and Khalil Kenna who were not members of either the Arab Union Government or the Iraqi Government at the time of the revolution, but whose participation in earlier Governments contributes to their alleged guilt. Fadhil Jamali's main "crime" is expected to be his exceptionally robust and public opposition to Nasser, whom he constantly identified with the Communists both in speeches and through the columns of his newspaper *Al Amal*.

6. The people of Iraq have long believed that Ministers and other leaders of the old régime were personally corrupt. Fantastic wealth and possessions were attributed to them (usually with little reason) and it was believed by all that Ministerial posts gave

opportunities for handsome profits. Since the revolution, the new Government leaders have played up the personal corruption of their predecessors on every possible occasion, and it is likely that in the court the prosecution will attempt to support these allegations. It seems probable that a number of those on trial will be hard put to it to defend themselves against them; Tawfiq Suwaidi and his son Louai, Fakhri al Fakhri, Ahmad Zaki al Mudarris (Director-General of Awqaf), Rushdi al Chelabi, Abdul Jabbar Fahmi, Ali Haider al Rikabi and Abdul Karim al Uzri have earned themselves reputations for corruption in the past few years and are likely to be brought forward as examples. Moreover, since the prosecution may well equate riches with corruption and would not be concerned with hair-splitting definitions, powerful and wealthy families such as the Pachachis, the Mirjans, the Bashayans, the Babans and the Kennas, all of whom have a representative on trial, may not escape attention on this charge. It seems probable, however, that the charge of corruption will not be the main one levelled at most of these men, since they were already either identified with or responsible for many of the policies of the former régime and may thus be charged with treason. The corruption charge will, however, help to satisfy the undoubted popular demand and will probably increase the sentences of the accused.

7. An analysis of the people on trial has revealed about ten names entirely unknown to members of this Embassy. It is expected that these people, probably minor officials or perhaps merchants, will be accused of corruption on a lesser scale and it may be that they will be brought forward as examples to the crowd of the depth of corruption in the former régime. More surprising, however, than the insertion of these nonentities is the omission of certain leading members of the old régime known to have been committed to the régime's policies. Examples are Dhia Ja'far, former Minister of Development and one of Nuri's strongest and most loyal supporters, Tahsin Qadri and Abdullah Bakr of the Royal Divan, and Dr. Abdul Amir Allawi (former Minister of Health). The process of selection whereby Abdul Hamid Kadhim, the former Minister of Education, a well-meaning, honest man and a competent Minister, or Tawfiq Wahbi, the elderly Kurdish scholar, are chosen for trial while Dhia Ja'far is not, is inexplicable.

8. The Minister of Justice has said that at present no more arrests will be made. In the next breath, however, he contradicted himself by saying that further investigations in the present trial, which may be expected to last for some considerable time, might necessitate further arrests.

9. As to the trials themselves, so far only General Daghistani has been in the dock accused under the Penal Code for conspiracy against Syria. The atmosphere of the court has been quiet and the thirty-nine witnesses produced, who include many of the other accused men, do not give the impression of having been intimidated or brain-washed. The Prosecutor had his finest hour at the opening of the trial when he delivered an oration in praise of the glorious revolution. Since then he has kept fairly quiet and most of the cross-examination has been carried out by the President of the Court. Questioning is sharp but not unduly unpleasant. A defence lawyer for Daghistani is present in court but has not yet spoken nor taken the opportunity of questioning the witnesses. Daghistani has in effect conducted his own defence, and on the 24th of August made a two-hour statement. The main points of his defence were:—

(i) He was an officer obeying orders.

(ii) By participating in the planning of what he admitted to be a plot against Syria, he was looking after the interests of the Iraqi army and ensuring that it was not used in operations against Syria.

10. There is no doubt that the present régime is anxious to present the cases against the 108 accused with an appearance of judicial procedure. They make play with the facts that the trial is public and

that members of the foreign Press and Diplomatic Corps are admitted. They have publicly denied rumours that defendants were not allowed to appoint defence counsel. At the same time they see it as essential to maintaining public support for the régime that most of those responsible for, or who participated in, the policies of former Governments should be proved guilty and that their corruption and criminal policies should be exposed. It is too early to hazard a guess at likely sentences, but I would expect fairly long terms of imprisonment for the principal men involved. Public opinion would not accept their acquittal and the régime are well aware of this fact. On the other hand, the court has not, as yet, gone out of its way to use the trial in order to attack the Western Powers. The latter's share of responsibility is not entirely overlooked but it is not emphasised, and the main references to them have been incidental to the case against General Daghistani. This suggests that the Government are not overlooking the risk that the trials may embitter Iraq's relations with the Western Powers with whom they are at present clearly anxious to remain on good terms. This is the best ground for hopes that the court will not impose extreme penalties and risk a very strong reaction from Western public opinion, which, the Government know, has already been horrified by the savagery displayed on the 14th of July and would be deeply shocked by any further deaths.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, New Delhi and Washington, and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

R. S. CRAWFORD.

EQ 1015/236

No. 17

SITUATION IN IRAQ

Mr. Crawford to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 11)

(No. 144. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
 Sir, *September 9, 1958.*

The question which is in the minds of all foreign observers in Iraq and, so far as is possible to judge, in those of most Iraqis as well is whether the events of the 14th of July and the establishment of the Republican Government, under military leadership but with important civilian participation, have completed the process of the revolution or whether the revolution will roll further. The picture of the country as seen from Baghdad presents conflicting indications of what the answer to this question is likely to be and it is probable that no one outside the inner circle of Government, and possibly no one inside it, can hazard a firm opinion.

2. On the face of it, law and order seem reasonably firmly established so far as Baghdad is concerned. Martial law is maintained but the police, though cowed, are back at work and the two army brigades who effected the *coup* on the 14th of July and are still responsible for security in town have to a substantial extent been withdrawn to the camps outside it. On the other hand, there is evidence that the reorganisation of the security police under military leadership is beginning to take effect, for they are now carrying out midnight searches and arrests. Victims of the latter have included local employees of this Embassy as well as British residents. A house-to-house search is reported to have been made through a large part of the residential area of Baghdad apparently for radio transmitters. All the Communists have been released from gaol or have returned from abroad and, with the presence of a Soviet mission in Baghdad to provide the inspiration, have an unrivalled chance to cause trouble. In consequence, the foreign community and middle-class Iraqis in Baghdad are still jumpy. The situation is, however, no longer being so directly exacerbated by speeches of the Deputy Prime Minister who in recent weeks has spoken in somewhat more sober terms, and comparatively few delegations from other parts of the country, who were so numerous a month ago, are now appearing in Baghdad to parade through the

streets. On the whole, the general impression here is of a very gradual simmering down on the surface but with plenty of explosive material not far below. It is impossible to tell whether the countryside is quiet because travel out of Baghdad is not yet possible for members of the Embassy and Consuls cannot travel in their districts but the latter report that the situation in the towns where they reside is much the same as in Baghdad.

3. On the other hand, the state of economic and commercial life is far from reassuring. Merchants are being tied up in a mass of regulations which, coupled with their general anxiety about the future, is causing them to reduce activity to a minimum and avoid future commitments so far as possible. Financial arrangements for the development programme and for various other schemes, such as that of the Habbaniya Co-operative Society for house building at Daura, are being overhauled and are causing interruption of work. Most Government offices and many of the technical services in the country are being seriously affected, at least temporarily, by the dismissal of many of the most efficient members of their staffs, whether Iraqi or foreign. Many landowners are reluctant to sow their lands in the absence of any knowledge of the contents of future land legislation. One of the inevitable results of this slowing down in activity has been an increase in unemployment. This is already serious in Basra but is probably becoming so in Baghdad as well. In addition, the productivity of labour has been seriously reduced by the universal decline in industriousness on the part of the workmen and by their agitation for more pay for less work. Her Majesty's Consul-General at Basra reports that the efficiency of the port has been reduced to about 40 per cent. of normal. Foreign contractors in the outlying parts of the country, both in the Kurdish and the Arab areas, find it extremely difficult to control their staff and to maintain impetus in the work. Only the oil industry has so far been relatively little affected, thanks to the full co-operation of the military authorities at Kirkuk and Basra and the determination of the Ministries of Economics and Social Affairs to ensure so

far as they can the maximisation of production. Meanwhile, though there is much talk about the review of the development programme, no decisions have yet been announced even on the general direction in which it will be changed. It is clear, however, that the results of any policy decision will take a long time to show themselves, and the questioning of the ordinary man in the street and in the countryside, who is already asking for the revolution to show him some results, will go on increasing.

4. The answer to the last question at the moment is that he can indulge in cheering for Colonel Nasser and for the new Iraqi leaders and he can execrate the Hashemites and Nuri as-Said and can give vent to his hatred of Western imperialism. In indulging in these emotional releases, the ordinary man is fed by a vitriolic Press stimulated by regular speeches by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and by the conduct of the trials in the Higher Military Tribunal which are regularly televised in Baghdad. How far the latter help the republican cause with the thinking minority is very doubtful. The trials were put on much too quickly to allow of careful legal preparation or stage management, they are not effectively conducted and the principal defendant so far, General Ghazi Daghistani, by his dignity and soldierly bearing, has undoubtedly won many supporters including, I am told, some of the younger officers in the army. On the other hand, the trials are serving to keep hatred of the previous régime and, to a lesser extent, that of the Western Powers alive in the clientèle of the coffee shops.

5. Yet the participants in a successful revolution, even in an Arab country, cannot be content indefinitely with these purely emotional satisfactions especially if they are accompanied by a creeping paralysis of the economic life of the country and the absence of any immediate hope of material gain. What has the Government done so far to keep this incipient dissatisfaction at bay? It has lowered the price of bread and meat and reduced the import duty on tea, sugar and coffee, it has introduced rent controls, it has assured tenant farm workers that they will enjoy at least 50 per cent. of the crops (many already did so), it has reduced slightly the cost of petrol and certain fixed charges encumbering the operation of motor transport, it has limited profits on cars and electrical equipment for the benefit of the purchaser. In order partly to pay for the price reductions on essential imported

goods, the rate of duty has been raised on non-essentials such as cigarettes, liquor and the larger cars. These were first-aid measures which to some extent depend for their effectiveness on the efficient administration of controls. There is already evidence that the Iraqi administrative machine is incapable of operating the controls and it is confidently predicted that black markets will soon grow up. Beyond this the Government has done no more than issue exhortations for discipline, hard work, unity and vigilance against reaction. There is consequently a growing feeling that, however capable some of the civilian members of the Government may be, and some of them are indeed capable, they are unable to pull their weight effectively because all decisions have to be referred either to the Ministry of Defence or to the Council of Ministers; and that the military leaders, in whose hands the real power lies, are completely at sea when confronted by the problems of governing this complex country. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence itself seems to be paralysed and incapable of reaching decisions, and there is plenty of evidence that the Council of Ministers finds difficulty in resolving the more important problems of foreign and internal policy, or, if it does so, reaches its decision on immediate emotional grounds and not on a realistic assessment of the facts. This is the only conceivable explanation of the decision to permit the return to Iraq of Mulla Mustafa Barzani so soon after the revolution. No rational assessment of Iraqi interests can justify this decision which, having regard to the history of Mulla Mustafa's rebellion in the 1940's, to his training and that of his men in Russia, and to the support which he will undoubtedly now be able to obtain from the Soviet mission, can hardly fail to produce trouble in the country. It is very difficult to resist the conclusion that the situation inside the Council of Ministers is very like that in the Arab world as a whole: the moderate realists are incapable of standing up to extremists when the latter desire action which is popular or justified on emotional grounds. The best that the moderates can achieve is the avoidance of an adverse decision, hence the impression of indecision on all questions connected with relations with the West. In the past this kind of situation was not uncommon but it was resolved by Nuri. The revolution has not as yet thrown up a Nuri, or anyone with the stature needed to impose himself on the Government.

6. The prevailing opinion of the Prime Minister is that he is moderate and sensible, an idealist but with no experience of government or idea of what ought to be aimed at. His Deputy, Colonel Arif, remains a controversial figure even though in his speeches he has kept closer to the statements of the Prime Minister than in earlier weeks. The opinion of foreign observers is that he is not a man of great ability, that he has a certain gift for oratory of a simple kind but that in this respect he is no second Colonel Nasser and that it is highly doubtful whether he has the ability on his own either to take charge of the Government or to exercise a decisive effect on policy. (There are even rumours that he may return to army service and be replaced as Minister of the Interior.) This is not to say that Colonel Arif might not, as a symbol of a more anti-Western pro-Nasser policy, be pushed into supreme command through a movement from below inside the military hierarchy. It is very difficult for any foreigner here to know at present what is going on inside the Ministry of Defence and in the army units around Baghdad, for we are all kept rigorously at arm's length. There is, however, known to be discontent among the younger officers. Some of this is due to the decision not to allow accelerated promotion despite the fact that many are doing jobs fitted to more senior rank than they hold. Some is due to dissatisfaction at the inefficiency of the régime, as shown *inter alia* by the Daghistani trial. But there have also been indications of discontent that the Government has not made a more complete break with the West and has not adopted a policy of closer union with the United Arab Republic. This is almost certainly the view also of very many young civilians in the 20 to 30 age group. Nevertheless there is no overt sign that the young men in the army have found a leader or spokesman, and it is by no means sure that they see Colonel Arif in this light. So the field may still be clear for Colonel Nasser.

7. My conclusion is that, unless the Government can soon show positive and hopeful leadership, discontent in the country will grow and there is bound to remain

uncertainty about the durability of their tenure of office. While there is little indication that the Government as a whole does not still enjoy the broad support of the masses, there is a widespread feeling at any rate among the middle class in Baghdad that there is bound to be another change of some kind before long. Nobody knows where it will come from or how it will be carried out, but it is confidently believed that any change is bound to be in an anti-Western pro-Nasser direction. In my judgment, unless Colonel Nasser takes a hand, it is doubtful if a change will come about except through an upheaval in the army but that this is by no means impossible. At any rate, there is in Baghdad an atmosphere of anxious speculation of which members of the Government must be aware. It is an atmosphere which will reinforce the apparent inability of the Government to take major decisions on foreign policy of a kind which will be unpopular, e.g., on the Baghdad Pact or the reactivation of the Royal Air Force staging post at Habbaniya. On the other hand, it is one in which the efforts of the Ministry of the Interior to discover real or imaginary plots, to send away foreigners and purge supporters of the old régime, are likely to be intensified. Developments here are not very different from those which occurred in Egypt after the revolution there, including the expansion of the network of informers, midnight arrests and the intimidation of the population. By these methods the régime may be able to consolidate itself for a time simply through fear. But unless it can show more capacity for giving positive direction to the country, someone else may think he can do better, probably another army officer acting with or without the support of Colonel Nasser. From the Western point of view any change is likely to be for the worse.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Washington and the Political Offices, Middle East Forces and British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

I have, &c.

R. S. CRAWFORD.

SECRET—GUARD

EQ 1015/270

No. 18

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAQ AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 2)

(No. 151. Confidential) *Baghdad, September 30, 1958.*
Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following comments on the situation in Iraq as I found it since my return from London on the 17th of September. It is inevitably based on somewhat sketchy evidence since reliable sources of information are few and the members of the present Iraqi régime do not talk freely with Western representatives. Nevertheless it coincides broadly with the appreciation made by friendly colleagues including those from the non-Arab Middle Eastern countries.

2. The revolution was made in Baghdad and the situation here is therefore of special importance. On the surface, tension has been steadily diminishing during the past few weeks. Despite the continuance of trials and the constant anti-Western propaganda from Baghdad Radio and the Press, there has been no sign of any concerted hostility to the British and other Western communities; indeed they move freely about most parts of the town without annoyance. The Pakistani Ambassador and the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires tell me that members of their communities are also finding the situation easier. Nevertheless all are agreed that there are strong and conflicting currents of feeling close below the surface and it would not take much, either in the shape of some outside event, an internal incident or act of sabotage, or the slightest incitement by the authorities, for disturbances to start again. There is however no sign of the authorities wishing to encourage such a development and indeed they appear to be doing all they can to maintain public order. There is evidence that they themselves are nevertheless fairly jumpy because on at least two recent occasions armed vehicles have appeared suddenly in particular localities apparently in connection with past or feared disturbances. They have also acted firmly and quickly when they became aware of Communist activities such as the circulation of pamphlets; some of the steps taken have added to the already irksome restrictions on foreign missions. Outside Baghdad the most disturbed areas have been the towns

on the Middle Euphrates including Nejef and Hilla, and Kurdistan, particularly Sulaimaniya. However, at present all seems to be quiet.

3. There is no doubt that the Army is in control and intends to maintain it. Active discussion is said now to be taking place for the formation of a Revolutionary Council which would be interposed between the three-man Council of State and the Cabinet; this is presumably on the analogy of the Central Revolutionary Council in Egypt. According to the information available, the new Council would be the decisive policy-making body of the Government. It would probably consist of about ten members, all or most of whom would be military. The Cabinet, predominantly civilians, would be responsible for executing the policy laid down by the Revolutionary Council.

4. Within the Army, Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim has been strengthening his authority, although he has not been immune from criticism on the grounds of being too moderate and of having allowed nepotism and other forms of personal influence to return, despite the fact that one of the proclaimed objects of the revolution had been to eliminate them. He has asserted himself among other ways by limiting the powers of his Deputy, Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, and by restraining his activities and speeches. There are in circulation in Baghdad various stories of the nature of the showdown between the two men, some of them sensational and clearly exaggerated, but it seems to be certain that Colonel Arif has at least for the time being been somewhat reduced in importance; nevertheless he remains the most influential spokesman of those who favour immediate union with the United Arab Republic. Meanwhile discussion is taking place on the appointments to be made to the projected Revolutionary Council. It has been known for some time that many of the younger officers, some of whom had supported the plan for the revolution and had participated in it, were discontented with their own rewards, were claiming that the Government was not sufficiently broadly based and were pressing

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the Prime Minister to spread promotions and key appointments more widely. Their attention has now been fixed on the question of membership of the new Council. Colonel Arif is known to have suggested some names, which have not been well received by the younger officers, and all are waiting to learn what selection the Prime Minister himself recommends. The decision may be decisive for the stability of the military régime in the immediate future.

5. The Prime Minister, who commands much general respect among Iraqis and foreign observers, professes apparently genuinely to wish to concentrate the national endeavour on internal stability and economic and social progress. Nevertheless he seems to have emerged from the revolution without having given any thought to what these ideals mean in practice and two months have now elapsed since the revolution without any positive measures having been indicated. Promises of social justice have been expressed in only the vaguest terms. It is understood, however, that detailed proposals for land reform are about to be published, and if these have been worked out in practical terms, they will for the first time show that the Revolutionary Government is capable of positive action as well as words and purges. In international affairs Brigadier Qasim appears sincerely to wish to avoid any immediate step towards union with the United Arab Republic, although he will clearly welcome the closest co-operation in all fields including defence. There is little or no evidence but rather the contrary, that he is in sympathy towards Communism. But there are certain indications that he may not be averse from accepting the support of the local Communists for tactical reasons. The latter are increasingly active and appear to be well organised; their propaganda is anti-Western and anti-Hashemite but in regard to the United Arab Republic they speak only of loose federation and it is believed that they are opposed to any immediate steps towards union. On a number of occasions there has been rioting between them and the Ba'athists. They are also active among the Kurds who do not welcome the thought of subservience to Cairo. For these reasons the Prime Minister who has no political party of his own and who may find it difficult to satisfy all the demands of the army officers, may be prepared to accept some Communist support if only for the time being.

6. The civilian members of the Cabinet have only limited influence and even this may be reduced when the Revolutionary Council is constituted. There seems no early prospect of facilities being given for political parties which might provide some of these politicians with outside backing. Nevertheless, their views are taken into account and their attitude to questions such as union with the United Arab Republic is not negligible. None of them would oppose very close co-operation with the United Arab Republic and probably all would favour some form of federal union, although they would differ on how close it should be.

7. Meanwhile, the Government administration is not working with its normal relative efficiency. As a result of the purging of senior Iraqi officials and the removal of many Western experts, and the fear that these processes will continue, it is difficult to find officials who will take the responsibility of giving decisions. The work of the Development Board is much hampered and is making little progress; such as it is in connection with plans formulated by the previous régime. As a result not only the planning of new developments but the fulfilment of existing contracts are in a state of considerable uncertainty. The Government have taken various steps to reduce the cost of living, but in some cases they have acted rashly, and in most cases do not possess the administrative machinery able to enforce their measures. The result has been unsettlement without much contribution to social justice. The business community is worried and the general economic outlook discouraging to initiative. There is a slowing down of economic activity with some unemployment and a risk of it increasing, which is one of the things the Government can least afford. They badly need to create an atmosphere of confidence in which new activities can go forward but they have not yet found a way of doing this and in the business world discontent against the new régime is developing and may become serious.

8. The Kurds are at present quiet but in a state of considerable suppressed excitement at the prospective early return of Mulla Mustafa Bazzani, the protagonist of an independent Kurdistan and a Soviet protégé. Although his public statements emphasise his devotion to the cause of Arab-Kurdish co-operation in the Iraqi Republic, his record suggests that the

Government will find him difficult to co-operate with. The attitude of the Kurds to any threat of Arab domination is probably the biggest single obstacle to an early step towards unity with the United Arab Republic.

9. In foreign, non-Arab, affairs the Government have been actively engaged in restoring relations with members of the Eastern bloc, most of whom have now set up missions in Baghdad and many of whom have embarked on trade negotiations. The Government's relations with the Western Powers have been dominated by the presence of British and American forces in Jordan and the Lebanon and this fact, coupled with the strong xenophobic emotions let loose by the revolution, have made it impossible so far for the Government, even if it wished to do so, to translate into concrete terms its cordial assurances of friendship and desire to co-operate with Britain and America. Indeed, their actions have been in appearance more unfriendly than the reverse. So far as the British community is concerned, they arrested four of its members for interrogation and later expelled them without formulating a charge; they have dismissed most of the British officials working for Government departments except those in the teaching and medical professions and in the Port Authority in Basra and some engaged in development work; and they have expelled from the country at short notice, or refused to renew the residence permits of a number of people in the business community. These measures, some of which have been extended to members of other foreign communities, have nevertheless appeared to hit particularly hard at the British because of their preponderance in numbers. The reason for this was given to me by the Prime Minister recently as being the desire of the Government not to be too dependent on any one country for outside help. A subsidiary reason appears likely to be that people are being dismissed and expelled because they know the country well, because they speak Arabic, or simply because they have lived here for a number of years. This naturally tends to affect the British more than the others. For somewhat similar reasons the Government have decided to dispense with the great bulk of the members of the British Loan Personnel and of the Royal Air Force servicing party which had been provided to assist in maintaining the squadron of Hunter aircraft with the Iraqi Air Force. Nevertheless, no decisions have

yet been given with regard to the future of the Staging Post and the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement. If it proves possible, as a result of Mr. Hammarskjöld's report to the United Nations, to withdraw the British and American forces from Jordan and the Lebanon, we shall have a clear opportunity for testing the intentions of the Government towards the West and ourselves. If at that point some of the present restrictions on the Embassy, on British subjects and still more on the Staging Post at Habbaniya are lifted, then it should be possible gradually to get back to more normal relations with the Government and settle some of the many problems which are at present in suspense. It is, however, also possible that, as happened in Egypt after the British withdrawal, the removal of the forces might lead to fresh demands on us on other issues and a general stiffening in the Iraqi attitude.

10. Thus in many ways the future of the country, even over the next few months, must remain a question mark. If the Prime Minister can consolidate his position sufficiently to pursue a moderate and constructive course in spite of the supporters of Nasser, the Communists and other forces, the country may settle down on a reasonable basis and with fairly cordial relations with Britain and the West. On the other hand, the fact that Brigadier Qasim seems to intend to extend the power of the military, although it will be beneficial for public order in the short term, does not seem encouraging in the longer term. There is no tradition of stable military rule in Iraq and there is no personality in sight who could impose it successfully for any length of time. Nevertheless any visible alternative to Brigadier Qasim at present would probably be worse. Among the civilians, Rashid Ali, who seems to be playing a waiting game in the wings, is a possible alternative. Although he is known to be favourably disposed towards the United Arab Republic and is publicly advocating union, there are some who believe that his main motive is ambition and that he might diverge from his present line if he saw some way of serving it without using Nasser's help. Kamel Chadirchi is a possible civilian leader but lacks the force of personality to impose himself. Both these men are old for a situation such as the present one which has been brought about by the young. In practical terms the alternatives to the present Government seem to be a series of military coups, union with Nasser, or a slide into chaos and possibly Communism. In

any case, even if these dangers are averted for the present, it is necessary to reckon with the probability of successive pressures on the West in the not too distant future. These are likely to include demands on the Iraq Petroleum Company for a greater share of profits, perhaps for the payment of part of these in hard currencies; and there may be a move to leave the sterling area unless Her Majesty's Government can meet stiff demands for the increase in Iraq's holdings of hard currencies. Although for the time being the Government appear to wish to proceed cautiously over Kuwait and to try to improve relations with it, the desire to share the oil royalties of Kuwait through its absorption is only too likely to raise its head in the long run. Opposition to British policy further down the Gulf and in Aden may be increasingly voiced. These pressures could easily be fomented by President Nasser whenever he wished. At best, therefore, we must expect a series of difficult issues between Britain and Iraq.

11. I suggest that in this difficult and uncertain situation our immediate policy must continue to be:—

- (a) to avoid doing anything which can be made to appear an attempt to influence Arab politics, either within Iraq or between Iraq and the United Arab Republic;
- (b) to concentrate on preserving economic and commercial ties between Iraq and the West;
- (c) to handle calmly and without haste bilateral questions affecting the United Kingdom and Iraq, and to accept, at least until we can see

whether the outcome of the United Nations action on Jordan improves the atmosphere, that there may be delay in settling the more controversial matters.

At any moment, however, something may occur to render a modification of this attitude desirable.

12. Finally, we must reckon on the dominating importance in Iraq of Nasser. There is no one who does not at least pay lip-service to the unity of the Arab world and few, apart from the Kurds, to closer union with the United Arab Republic, and some advocate the latter strongly. The fact that Qasim is playing the question of union slowly and that Nasser is not publicly trying to move towards it should not blind us to the strong probability that, in the absence here of a dominating personality and of any clear and attractive internal policy, union with the United Arab Republic may come to seem to most people in Iraq, as it did in Syria, to be the only way out of an impasse, and as the best way of combating Communism.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Tehran, Karachi, Washington, Paris, to the United Kingdom Mission in New York and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, to the Political Offices, Middle East Forces, and the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula, and to the Political Agent in Kuwait.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EQ 1022/17

No. 19

THE IRAQ REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 13)

(No. 159. Confidential) Baghdad,
Sir, October 9, 1958.

The Prime Minister of the Iraq Republican Government has in his public statements on the new Government's foreign policy constantly emphasised their desire to be on friendly terms with all countries, to co-operate closely with the Arab world and particularly with the United Arab Republic, and to avoid domination either by the West or by the East. It is a policy of positive neutrality if by the word "positive" is meant cordial relations with all and not subservience to the Soviet bloc. How far can it be said that the Iraq Government are successfully following this policy, and do their actions in this matter conform to their words?

2. I take first Iraq's relations with the Soviet bloc and with the Western world. The USSR was among the first countries to recognise the Government of the Iraqi Republic and recognition was quickly followed by the establishment of a Soviet Mission in Baghdad. Other Communist country missions came a little later and diplomatic relations with all the Iron Curtain countries, including the Chinese People's Republic, have now been established. The first actions of these missions have usually been to take up trade negotiations and to arrange for the entry of Press correspondents from the Iron Curtain countries. So far, however, the trade negotiations do not appear to have gone much beyond a preliminary stage, during which the Iraqi Ministry of Economics seems to have placed its main emphasis on barter deals designed to encourage the export of dates, barley and hides while the Iron Curtain missions were content to explore the needs of the Iraqi market and study the conditions of business. The sending of Press correspondents has probably been the main cause of the increase in the amount of news and commentaries from Iron Curtain countries which is now put out on Baghdad Radio, but whether Iraqi news figures more prominently in the Iron Curtain Press is perhaps more doubtful. There have been rumours of Iraqi negotiations with Soviet

Russia for the supply of Russian arms, but no result of these has so far been disclosed and friendly Iraqis tell us that they think it unlikely that even if Soviet arms were supplied the Government would permit Soviet service personnel to come to Iraq in connection with them. The Commanding Officer of the Iraqi Air Force recently gave the United States Air Attaché the most categorical assurance that no Soviet pilots or technicians were employed in the U.A.R. squadron of MiG-17 aircraft and the anti-aircraft battery which recently arrived at Habbaniya. This does not mean that some deal may not be concluded in the future involving the presence in Iraq of Iron Curtain military experts, but at any rate the Government have not yet rushed into a situation in which this would be inevitable. In domestic matters the Iron Curtain missions seem to be lying low and avoiding any activity which might make them unpopular. Their policy, like that of the local Communist Party, is evidently to support the present régime. It seems likely that this will also be their attitude in Kurdish affairs; I would expect them to advise the Mulla Mustafa, who has just returned to Baghdad, not to stir up trouble in the near future. Unless matters work out otherwise in Kurdistan, and it must be difficult for the Mulla Mustafa or anybody else to guarantee that they will not do so since the situation there appears to be tense and expectant, the present quietly friendly relations between Iraq and the Iron Curtain countries will probably continue along their present lines.

3. It is inevitable that the Iraq Government should appear to be treating Western interests less well, for it is on the West that Iraq has so far depended for all her weapons and most of her foreign technicians and foreign contractors, the West to whom all her oil has been sold, by whom most of her imports have been supplied, and with whom she has aligned her foreign policy. Retreat into neutrality is, therefore, bound to be expressed in terms of the breaking of ties and the reduction of Western activities in the country. This impression is increased by the stream of anti-imperialist propaganda poured out by

the Press and radio, by the conduct of the trials, and by the public support for anti-Western nationalist movements elsewhere in the Arab world. Yet it is surprising that the breaking of ties has not so far gone to anything like the limit. Iraq has not yet left the Baghdad Pact, though this seems bound to come, and has not yet denounced the Special Agreement with the United Kingdom, made under it, or asked for evacuation of the R.A.F. at Habbaniya, steps which are perhaps less certain, especially as the Government have already agreed to the overflying of Iraq by aircraft carrying British servicemen and their families between Britain and the East. The Government are clearly determined not to retain foreigners (which usually means Englishmen) in responsible administrative positions in Government offices or in senior advisory roles in the armed forces; however short-sighted their dismissal may seem, this is a natural result of the nationalist emotions released by the revolution, quite apart from the necessity of their dismissal as the expression of neutrality. On the other hand it seems to be the clear intention to retain English as a second language of the country and, for the present at any rate, Western nationals and particularly Englishmen in the medical and teaching professions. Although in the first two months after the revolution a number of foreigners, particularly from Britain, employed in private business, were expelled at short notice from the country, this process has now been slowed down. The difficulties which foreign contractors have been having are due partly to labour difficulties which have inevitably been created by the revolution, and may prove temporary, and partly to the deliberate policy of the Government in making more onerous the financial conditions under which they work, in an attempt to show that they can make better bargains than did the former régime, rather than as an attempt to penalise Western firms. It may be that these financial conditions will for a time facilitate the replacement of the Western firms by Iron Curtain concerns, but this has still to be demonstrated and meanwhile the large British firms are adopting a policy of "wait and see."

4. The Iraq Petroleum Company which although international in ownership is largely British in administration has not suffered any serious difficulties as a result of the actions of the Government; indeed the latter have done their best to help the

Company overcome these, such as labour troubles, which have been incidental to the change in régime, and have expressed themselves as ready to settle outstanding disputes before a British court. There seems bound to be in the future very heavy pressure on the Company to revise in favour of the Government at least the sharing of the Company's profits, if not the present ownership arrangements, but all the indications so far suggest that they wish to do this by negotiation and not by unilateral action.

5. As between the Eastern and Western worlds it cannot yet be said that the Iraq Government have yet departed from their objective of neutrality and indeed they are still leaning more to the West than to the East, in deeds though not in words. This picture is inevitably complicated by Iraq's relations with the rest of the Arab world. In all their statements primacy has been given to the need for furthering Arab unity and in particular for the closest relations with the U.A.R. The Ba'ath Party have been actively agitating for an immediate step towards union with the U.A.R. and it appears that Colonel Arif, until recently Deputy Prime Minister, had been pressing their case and in doing so too strongly contributed to his own downfall. The indications are that the Government as a whole are not yet ready for anything more than close co-operation in technical fields and more or less complete alignment in matters of foreign policy. This at any rate seems to be the intention of the Prime Minister who has expressed himself firmly against any association with the U.A.R. in which Iraq would not be an equal partner; and his views appear to have been accepted by his colleagues whatever their personal opinions about the degree of closeness with which Iraq should work with President Nasser. In general, they speak of readiness to accept some form of federation with the U.A.R., but they are vague about the details and do not seem to regard the matter as urgent. Co-operation with the U.A.R. is being steadily pursued in the educational field, both in matters of syllabus and in the recruitment of Egyptian teachers, and Egyptian experts have been accepted in the Codification Department of the Ministry of Justice, in the Oil Affairs Department of the Ministry of Economics, and in the Government Oil Refineries Administration; the new head of the Third Technical Section (Industry) in the Development Board is an Egyptian; it would be reasonable to expect

them to appear also in various posts under the Development Board as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Affairs, particularly in connection with land reform and irrigation. In foreign affairs Iraq is clearly ready to co-operate closely with the U.A.R. in the United Nations and the Arab League, and the arrival of a U.A.R. anti-aircraft battery and fighter squadron at Habbaniya indicates that defence co-operation is also intended. None of this, however, suggests any immediate intention to merge the identity of Iraq in a larger Arab unity, nor does it yet seem that the readiness to follow President Nasser's lead in foreign policy has inclined the Iraq Government to lean away from the West and towards the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, this situation can hardly be regarded as a stable one. President Nasser is still regarded by the great mass of Iraqis as a leader of the Arab world and the Government are in no position to challenge him on a major issue where public opinion is important. Iraq's interests as a country uniting Arabs and Kurds, and as a country with potentially an expanding and prosperous economy based on oil revenues, lie in the direction of independence. But the strength of pan-Arab emotions on one hand and Kurdish turbulence, possibly led astray by Russian propaganda, on the other, must always make these factors of uncertain strength in a crisis. So long as Nasser and his propaganda machine adopt a moderate and uncritical line towards Iraq and do not precipitate the crisis, it seems probable that the Iraq Government will continue along their present line of preserving an independent Iraqi State despite the emotional appeal of a greater Arab unity.

6. To sum up, the Iraq Government, though led by men who are largely untried in matters of foreign affairs, are set on the very difficult course of preserving a balance between the Eastern and Western worlds and of working closely with the other Arab countries and particularly the U.A.R. without jeopardising the identity of the country. For the present they are holding this line and have not seriously departed from their declared policy. In doing so they have succeeded in retaining tolerable relations with Britain and America, while getting upon terms with the Iron Curtain countries (where else have Hunters and MiG's flown in formation?), and have kept also the

balance between those who would unite at once with Egypt such as the Ba'ath Party and Colonel Arif and those, like some Kurds, who would prefer to cut their ties with the Arab world altogether. If, in preserving this difficult balance in a complicated and unstable situation, they make what appear to be undue difficulties for the United Kingdom, we have little alternative but to play matters slowly and to hope that they indicate a passing phase and not a fundamental change of direction. The danger of the situation lies in the possibilities it gives for the Communist penetration of Iraq in the internal field. The members of the Government maintain that they are aware of these dangers and do not intend to allow Iraq to go Communist. However there are indications that they may be extremely naive over this and under dangerous illusions about the power and efficiency of Communist subversion, and the Government's power to counter it. Yet the policy of the Communists appears to be opposed to the merger of Iraq with the U.A.R., and in view of the appeal of Nasser and Arab unity they also are unlikely to have things all their own way. Although Britain and America can hardly as yet bring any direct influence to bear on Iraq's policies, they can hope, by maintaining a steady friendliness and willingness to assist whenever they are asked to do so, to remain on terms which may perhaps permit them, when the immediate results of the revolution have passed over, to be brought gradually into closer consultation with the Iraq Government. If they are to do this, however, they must, I submit, accept that Iraq's policy is one of balance and neutrality. Any attempt to pull her more definitely into the Western camp in the foreseeable future is likely to be counter-productive and not in our best interests.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Kuwait, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Washington and Bonn, and to the United Kingdom Mission in New York, the United Kingdom Delegation at NATO, the Political Office, Middle East Forces, and the Political Office, British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EQ 1015/331

No. 20

POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 10)

(No. 170. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
 Sir, *November 6, 1958.*

After the revolution of July 14, the political parties of Iraq, although not given permission to operate openly, all immediately began to organise themselves for overt activity. The first in the field were the Communists and the Ba'athists, who had preserved their existence by clandestine means under the previous régime, but they were also followed by the National Democratic Party and the Independence Party, both of which have representatives in the Government.

2. I enclose a memorandum prepared by the Oriental Secretariat of this Embassy surveying the party scene and describing their aims. The principal points that emerge are:—

- (a) the well-organised strength of the Communist Party and the suitability of its political line for securing support from people with a wide range of political beliefs;
- (b) the relative lack of strength of the Ba'ath Socialist Party, whose chances were seriously prejudiced by the intemperate words and actions of Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, the Deputy Prime Minister of the first two months of the Revolution;
- (c) in the absence of permitted political activity, the lack of evidence of any widespread support for the National Democratic and Independence Parties, despite their representation in the Government, and the unlikelihood that these relatively moderate parties will, as parties, play a significant part in the struggle for power under the new régime;
- (d) pending the emergence of an Iraqi leader who can impose his personality on the country as a whole and unite the different factions, political control is likely to remain with the military authorities unless and until one of the extremist factions seizes and retains power.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in

Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Karachi, Kuwait, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Washington, POMEF, P.O.B.F.A.P., United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

Political Parties in Iraq

The pre-revolutionary Constitution of Iraq, drafted in 1925, provided for government under democratic forms, including a Parliamentary system modelled on Western examples. When the Mandate ended in 1932, attempts were made to establish Parliamentary political parties. From time to time such parties grew up or were artificially created, but on the whole their existence has been transitory and they cannot be said to have played an important part in the political life of the country. The reasons are:—

- (i) Under Constitution, effective political control remained with the Crown rather than with Parliament and the conditions in which political parties had to operate more closely resembled those in England at the accession of George III than those obtaining there to-day. As in 18th Century England, the Palace used its position to keep the leading politicians dependent on its own favour, rather than upon Parliamentary support, and political life therefore revolved round leading personalities who competed for Palace favour rather than parties.
- (ii) The largely illiterate population and the absence of any tradition of local political activity in the provinces (apart from opposition to the Mandatory Powers or to the central Government in Baghdad) meant that parties never struck roots in the country and amounted to no more than groups of politicians and intellectuals representative of no more than themselves.

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- (iii) The Arab character as manifested in political life shows a marked tendency towards emotional extremism and intolerance of moderation, and Arabs appear to find it difficult to co-operate for any length of time over positive policies, the achieving of which normally requires readiness to compromise and to consider practical alternatives.

2. As a result of these factors, the political parties that existed in the pre-revolutionary period up to 1952 (when all parties were banned) were usually formed for Opposition purposes and tended to drift into extreme positions, usually hostile to the régime. Moreover, contact between the politicians of all colours and the broad mass of the people never developed, and party policies were formulated by small groups of politicians whose cohesion was ephemeral as a result of shifting views and loyalties. The only exceptions have been the Communist Party and the Ba'ath Socialist Party, both imported from outside and both using the techniques of cell organisation and clandestine methods to keep themselves together.

3. Although, after the revolution, the ban on political parties was not officially lifted, the political climate was one of freedom for political activity and hopes were immediately raised that active political life would be possible. These hopes were actively encouraged, probably not intentionally, by the action of the Government in proclaiming an amnesty for political prisoners and exiles, and leading politicians of all groups came out openly and began thinking and talking in terms of party activity, even if at first clandestine. It seems however that after some six weeks the Government took fright at the extent of the political activity thus launched, not all of which was directed along the lines of Government policy, and the amnesty law was shortly followed by an edict forbidding demonstrations, meetings and distribution of pamphlets, and enforcing censorship of all published material. This was repeated more strongly in mid-September and effectively brought overt political activity to a standstill. Members of the Government justified this action in speeches by references to Iraq as a one-party State.

4. It is natural that, during the period immediately before the revolution, the only parties that had any significance were those

with revolutionary aims which were organised to work clandestinely, principally the Communist and Ba'ath Parties. In the preceding year, the Director-General of Security had made considerable progress in his persecution of the Iraq Communist Party, without doubt the strongest covert party in Iraq, and appeared to have completely disorganised it. The party, however, showed a typical resilience, and in spite of serious losses in personnel and equipment were able to re-equip to such an extent that, on the day the revolution broke out, they had an organisation ready for the immediate printing and distribution of pamphlets simultaneously in Baghdad and Basra. That they had achieved this state of preparedness was in great measure due to their membership of the National Unity Front, an amorphous body formed probably in 1957 and composed of Communists, Ba'athists and the National Congress Party, holding a common aim of resistance to and the overthrow of the former régime. Although there were many points of disagreement within the National Unity Front, the Communist Party were able in their days of direct persecution to rely upon the other members for refuge, shelter and printing and organisational facilities. Dissension within the Front became serious shortly before the revolution over the question of policy towards the May elections, but no actual break occurred and at the time of the revolution the Front still continued its precarious existence.

5. The Communists and the Ba'athists took immediate advantage of the revolution to pursue their own distinct objectives. Within 24 hours of the revolution, the Communist Party had issued and distributed a pamphlet setting out their aims. In brief, these were federal union with the United Arab Republic, severance of all treaties and ties with the West, and the establishment of a Popular Resistance Force. The most notorious and able of their leaders, Aziz Sharif, returned from exile in Damascus and was welcomed by a vast and enthusiastic crowd. Ghadhban Sa'ad and Abdul Qadir Ismail, both of whom had been exiled for Communist activities, also returned. Abdul Fattah Ibrahim, at least a sympathiser with the Communist Party, if not a member, and owner, in 1947, of the subversive quasi-Communist paper *Al Siyasa*, was rewarded with the important post of Director-General of Oil Refineries. As to the Ba'ath Socialist Party, their contribution to the revolution, which was admitted by the Minister of

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Finance in conversation, was recognised by the Government in the appointment of their leader, Fuad Rikabi, as Minister of Development. Within a short time, the Ba'ath Party, which had a considerable following among students and intellectuals, had evolved a policy of seeking immediate integration with the United Arab Republic and pursued this vigorously on every possible occasion. Occasions were provided by the then Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister, Colonel Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif, who in his frequent speeches in the provinces let it be understood that he was an enthusiastic supporter of this policy. This doctrine was also promulgated by Dr. Saadun Hammadi, self-styled "philosopher of the revolution," prominent Ba'athist and editor of the paper *Al Jumhuriya* which was closely associated with Colonel Arif, and supported, after his return from Cairo, by Rashid Ali al Gaylani in two interviews with the Press. There is no doubt that their frequently repeated demand for integration with the United Arab Republic fired the imagination of a large proportion of the population, particularly in the illiterate strata, and constituted a threat to the policy of national independence declared by the Prime Minister.

6. The civilian members of the present Government are principally drawn from two parties which had preserved some sort of existence during their six years of suppression without resorting to clandestine activities, the National Democratic Party and the Independence Party. The National Democratic Party derived from the Al Ahali group formed in 1934 under the leadership of Kamil al Chaderchi. It came into existence officially in 1946 when the Suwaidi Government granted permission for the formation of new political parties. Simultaneously the Independence Party was formed by members of the pre-war pan-Arab nationalist Muthanna Club under the leadership of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba. Many of the parties formed and given freedom in 1946 petered out or were suppressed by Government order, and in 1950 only the National Democratic Party and the Independence Party remained.

7. The National Democratic Party has a programme of social reform along democratic Socialist lines, with centre of gravity well to the Left. Its main points of difference with the Communist Party are that it preaches social equality without class warfare, and that it does not share the

Communist Party's attitude towards the USSR. It also professes a wish, apparently sincere, to practise democracy in Iraq. The party is strongly represented in the Government by Mohammed Hadid, the Minister of Finance, and Hudaib al Haj Hamud, Minister of Agriculture, who is said to be near to Communism, while Hussain Jamil has been appointed Ambassador in the key post of New Delhi. The Minister of Economics, Ibrahim Kubba, is not a member of the National Democratic Party but has in the past—and probably in the present—worked in close co-operation with it. He is generally considered to be the member of the present Government nearest to Communism and some say he is a Communist Party member. Kamil Chaderchi himself is active behind the scenes and is thought by some to desire office but without departmental responsibilities. He is opposed to military rule and wishes to introduce active political life as soon as possible but admits that martial law is necessary in present circumstances.

8. The Independence Party, created under the aegis of the remaining members of the Muthanna Club in 1946, has for all practical purposes continued the Arab nationalist beliefs of Rashid Ali (in his earlier pre-Nazi manifestation). They have a broad policy of Right-wing nationalism with a secondary aim of social reform. Their leaders though equally anti-Western in sentiment are probably less committed than the National Democrats to a policy of independence from the United Arab Republic; indeed, Siddiq Shanshal, a founder member of the party and one of its principal representatives in the present Government, has recently said that he personally favoured union with the United Arab Republic although he did not consider immediate union practicable. The Independence Party have for the present agreed on a policy of working gradually towards Arab unity step by step. Although the National Democratic Party is somewhat stronger than the Independence Party within the present Government, the rough balance between them is preserved by the inclusion of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba of the latter party, in the Council of State, and by the appointment of Faiq Samarrai of the same party to the key Ambassadorial post of Cairo.

9. Over the past six years, the principal aim of these two parties to which all other aims were secondary was the removal from power of the monarchy and the old political

groups, and they were able sufficiently to reconcile their basic differences of policy to form a common front. Now that their principal object has been achieved, it may be that they may tend to diverge especially in regard to relations with the United Arab Republic and the USSR. Neither party at present is, however, militant or otherwise a threat to the present Government. Indeed, their support gives some colour of political respectability to the Government whose centre of gravity is otherwise purely military. Both parties are anti-Western as a by-product of their anti-Hashemite past, their strong support for Arab unity and independence and their bitter opposition to Israel.

10. Three separate lines of thought are therefore discernible: those of the Government, of the Communist Party, and of the Ba'ath Socialist Party. Of these, the Government line supported by the National Democratic and Independence Parties appears to have popular support. The Prime Minister has emphasised that the Army, by carrying out the *coup d'état* of July 14, was acting on behalf of the people: he has stated on several occasions that when social reform has been achieved (e.g., the abolition of feudalism by land reform) and standards of living have been raised, a plebiscite will be held to determine the political orientation of the country. Martial law and limitation of political freedom will only continue until these preconditions have been realised (a period which the civilian Ministers appear regretfully to conclude may last up to two years). In international affairs, Qassim has defined the Government's policy as upholding Iraq as an independent, peaceful and neutral State, seeking friendship with all the world Powers and co-operating to the utmost extent possible with the other Arab States in general and the United Arab Republic in particular in the solution of Middle Eastern problems without allowing outside countries to interfere in their affairs. He has also emphasised the importance of Arab-Kurdish co-operation on an equal basis in the Iraqi State. His statements imply that no fundamental change in the status of Iraq, e.g., in the direction of an Arab Federation, would be effected without a referendum, presumably after the same preparatory period; he has been careful to avoid any public pronouncements about the political parties, though he is thought to be anti-Communist in domestic matters and to believe in upholding the middle class.

11. Paradoxically, the Government line is fully supported by the Communist Party. A revealing indication of Communist Party policy was contained in a pamphlet issued by the party at the beginning of September and distributed throughout Baghdad (it is significant that the Government ban on distribution of political pamphlets was imposed two days after the distribution of this pamphlet). In it, the political committee of the party considered the problem of union with the United Arab Republic and Yemen. It criticised those who had attempted since the revolution to push Iraq towards unification with the United Arab Republic, and held that any decision on Iraq's future should be taken by the whole people and not by certain narrow cliques with private political interests. The statement said that the Communist Party supported the unity of Arabs and Kurds within Iraq and that the first requirement now was to achieve the solidarity of classes, nations and peoples within Iraq. The eventual aim of the party was complete Arab unity from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, but this would be impossible until all Arab countries were "liberated." The lack of freedom of parties, Press and speech within the United Arab Republic was criticised, and the statement commented that the union of Syria with Egypt had produced negative results. Moreover, full economic co-operation between the United Arab Republic and Iraq was likely to lead to a lack of balance since the economy of the United Arab Republic was more highly developed than that of Iraq. The national wealth of Iraq should be spent on meeting the demands of the Iraqi people and the development of the country. The statement recognised the lead which Egypt under President Nasser had given in freeing Arabs from imperialism, but integration with the United Arab Republic, implying the sacrifice of newly-won political and intellectual freedoms, would be contrary to the democratic development of the country. The political committee of the party drew the conclusion that the only satisfactory answer was a federal union of all "liberated" Arab countries as independent equals with close political, economic, social and cultural relationships. This solution accorded with the wishes of the people, the interests of the country and the cause of an eventual unified Arab Democratic Republic.

12. The line which the Communist Party is putting across as reflected in this pamphlet is an intelligent one and is likely

to have wide appeal throughout the country. It expresses what many politically-conscious middle-class Iraqis feel, and it presents Communism in the best possible light, as an instrument for the welfare of the people and for national development rather than as a spearhead of Soviet Russia. Although it is technically still subject to ban, the Communist Party appears to be advancing from strength to strength, and the markets are full of Communist literature, much of it printed within the country, which appears to be having a good sale. It is said that Communist influence within the Army is increasing, but, although it is possible that some influential officers are Communists, it is doubtful if they are numerically strong as yet. Whatever the true numerical and organisational strength of the party may be, it is certain that the return of their exiled leaders from abroad and the help, facilities and advice doubtless given to the party leaders by the newly established missions from the Soviet bloc will have infused new life into the party.

13. The Kurdish element of the Iraqi Communist Party has always been strong, but in the past two years has increasingly taken a deviationist line. Over the past year in particular, the National Democratic Party of Kurdistan, with its policy of working for a united independent Kurdistan, has weaned away many adherents of the Iraqi Communist Party. The acknowledged leader in exile of the National Democratic Party of Kurdistan was Mulla Mustafa, the leader of the Barzani tribe who fled to Iran after the unsuccessful revolt of the Barzani and other tribes in 1945 and who has been living in Soviet bloc countries since 1947. About six weeks after the July 14 revolution, Mulla Mustafa applied to return to Iraq, announcing that he supported the aims of the present Government (thereby implicitly renouncing the aims of the National Democratic Party of Kurdistan). The Government gave their permission and Mulla Mustafa has now returned. Since his return he has on several occasions pledged his loyalty to Abdul Karim Qassim, whom he has recognised as his leader and has emphasised that he fully supports the unity of Arabs and Kurds within Iraq. It is possible that Mulla Mustafa, who is a clever and ambitious man, may have adopted a policy of loyalty to independent Iraq in order to ingratiate himself with the present régime and to allay the suspicions which have adhered to him from his earlier

championship of the independent Kurdish Republic; but most observers are inclined to believe that his first aim is to prepare the ground for later political action in Kurdistan, and he is, with good reason, feared as a possible Communist agent. However, the National Democratic Party of Kurdistan appear to have been lying low since the revolution and, although there have been sundry approaches both to British and American missions by proponents of an independent Kurdistan, these do not appear to have been related to the programme of the National Democratic Party of Kurdistan.

14. Before the revolution, the Ba'ath Socialist Party had been organised into four districts within Iraq: Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern. There was good reason to believe that they were receiving instructions and possibly arms through Syria via Abu Kamal. It was known that a high priority on the Ba'ath Socialist programme was penetration of the Army, but it is not known how successful this was; pan-Arab feeling in the Army was more probably inspired by Nasser. The party was organised on lines comparable to those of the Communist Party, i.e., the cell system, and worked under covert conditions. Immediately after the revolution, the chief propagandist of the party, Michel Aflaq, visited Baghdad and daily study groups conducted by him could be witnessed on the lawn of the Baghdad Hotel. Almost certainly a number of other party leaders visited Baghdad at the same time. The main aim of the Ba'ath Socialist Party as laid down in the party's Constitution is the unification of the whole Arab world on broad Socialist lines under one central Government. The party envisages that this will be carried out piecemeal rather than at one stroke and an example of what the party has in mind was provided by the creation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958. The Constitution envisages that the unification might have to be carried out by force. So far as Iraq is concerned, Ba'athism differs from Nasserism mainly in drawing its main strength and inspiration from Syria. Consequently it has more appeal to Iraqi intellectuals than Nasserism, and it may gain support from the fact that union with Syria is a more popular aim than union with Egypt. On the other hand, it has no leader with a fraction of the popularity in Iraq of Nasser himself. The Ba'athists in Iraq adopted immediately after the revolution a demand for immediate

integration with the United Arab Republic and the acceptance of the Presidency of Nasser. Although initially popular in Iraq, its policy has not been able to make headway in face of discouragement by the Government and opposition by the Communists who campaigned actively against it to the extent of conducting counter-demonstrations at meetings addressed by Colonel Arif, and its strength seems to have declined. The party has not been strong enough to force its own programme on the people as it did in Syria prior to the establishment of the United Arab Republic in February 1958. The inflammatory speeches of Colonel Arif, who from the beginning was regarded by moderate members of the Government and of the Iraqi Republic as a trouble-making demagogue, and the unbridled enthusiasm of his followers which led to riots and bloodshed, gained the party a disreputable name. It would be inaccurate to say that the followers of Colonel Arif were all supporters of the Ba'ath programme but it is probable that the Ba'ath Party saw in Colonel Arif an instrument for achieving their immediate demand of integration with the United Arab Republic. Probably the removal of Colonel Arif from office was as much due to his aggressive and irresponsible personality as to his having become the champion of this policy, and the popular approval for his departure should not necessarily be interpreted as a slap in the face for the Ba'ath Party whose leader, Fuad Rikabi, remains in the Government though no longer as Minister of Development. Although the party at present seems to be on the decline, pan-Arab feeling is as strong as ever and could be exploited. Moreover, the Syrian origin of Ba'athism might in the future lend itself to serving the cause of Iraqi-Syrian union which is more likely to appeal to the Government than union with the United Arab Republic as a whole with the inevitable acceptance of Egypt's primacy which that would imply.

15. The short-term policy of the Communist Party is support of the present Government and of the independence of Iraq. The removal of Colonel Arif from office and the decline in the fortunes of the Ba'ath Party have weakened the opposition to Communism. At present, the Communist Party, having had a chance to

reorganise, possibly represented in the Government by one or two sympathisers and apparently concurring with the policies of the Government, constitutes the main threat to the Iraqi State. Abdul Karim Qassim and other members of the Government claim that they are aware of the dangers of Communism and are able and prepared to deal with it if it shows signs of becoming too strong. So far, however, the edict of mid-September against overt political activities appears only to have driven it underground. The other revolutionary element in the situation is of course President Nasser. Nasser remains the principal symbol of Arab nationalism to Iraqi youth and probably to a number of Army officers, and the decline of the Ba'ath Party implies no decline in this popularity or prestige, for he has kept aloof from the recent crisis and does not appear to have intervened in support of Colonel Arif. The pressure for unity will inevitably be maintained by the more extreme Arab nationalists in the country, including the Ba'ath with or without Nasser's active support. The existence of these two revolutionary factors (apart from others, the Kurds, the dissatisfied younger Army officers) is bound to result in continued instability in the country. To deal with it, the Government to survive will have to maintain tight control on the situation. Iraqi political life is no more likely in the future than in the past to produce a political party standing effectively for national independence and moderate internal policies which can reconcile all classes and creeds. Yet these are what the country needs, and what it is to be hoped the Government will work for. To secure them, the only course, unpalatable though it may be, seems to lie in a continuation, perhaps even an extension, of military control pending the emergence of an Iraqi leader possessing the vision and strength of character to unite the country behind him and the ability to risk unpopularity by taking decisive steps to remove external and internal threats to the security and integrity of the country. There is no sign of this happening.

*Oriental Secretariat,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.*

October 30, 1958.

EQ 1015/385

No. 21

SITUATION IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 8)(No. 180. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *December 4, 1958.*

I have referred in other reports to the state of instability which I and other foreign observers discern in the present political situation in Iraq. This is widely felt also by those independent Iraqi observers with whom it is still possible to exchange impressions, and many of them believe that the present situation cannot continue for long without clarification of the direction in which the régime is proceeding. It seems desirable to attempt an analysis of reasons for the instability and the factors at work.

2. It is clear from the statements which the Prime Minister has made at intervals since the revolution, and is still making, that he regards his aim as being one of national unity in which would be achieved the aspirations of all the parties, Arab Nationalists, Communists and moderate Conservatives and Socialists, and which would take the form of an independent State pursuing a policy of neutrality as between East and West and co-operating freely with all countries, particularly those of the Arab world. Although the Government has fostered warm official relations with the other Arab countries and particularly the United Arab Republic by concluding trade and cultural agreements, by exchanging visits and by supporting Cairo in upholding the Arab cause against the Western Powers, wherever these are in conflict, they have not succeeded in satisfying either the Ba'ath Socialist Party or other extreme supporters of Arab unity. Although President Nasser has on occasions sent warm messages to the new Government and has apparently gone out of his way, as in his recent speech in Cairo on November 27, to praise the Prime Minister, Abdul Karim Qasim, no very warm response has been made. One reason why this was so was undoubtedly that Colonel Abdul Salem Arif, the former Deputy Prime Minister, tried to rush the Government into a policy of integration with the United Arab Republic, which the Prime Minister was not prepared for. Colonel Arif undoubtedly did his own cause the maximum of harm by his intemperate advocacy of immediate unity with the U.A.R. and still more so by the conduct

after removal from office which led to his arrest.

3. Nevertheless, when Colonel Arif fell, the Ba'ath Socialist Party did its best to dissociate itself from him and President Nasser took no overt action to sustain him. His arrest need not have prevented all further advocacy of steps towards Arab unity nor by itself created the present atmosphere of instability and anxiety. This has resulted much more from the increase in Communist influence in the Government and outside it, and from the fear not only among the more extreme pan-Arab Nationalists but also among the moderate supporters of the régime who are perfectly contented with the Prime Minister's declared objectives, that the Government, even if they wish, will be unable to arrest the slide to the Left. Yet, since the Communist Party has taken great pains to devise a policy which provides for full support of the Prime Minister and of the usual Arab Nationalist attacks of the West, while avoiding any social or economic reform proposals which might frighten the middle-class, it may be asked why so much concern is felt about them.

4. An assessment of their influence has to be based on conjecture since the party itself is still theoretically proscribed, its supporters do not openly declare themselves, and it is fairly successful in concealing its actions behind a Nationalist façade. Nevertheless there are real grounds for concern which it may be worth enumerating.

(a) There has been considerable infiltration of known and suspected Communists into the Administration. Whether they are actually represented in the Council of Ministers must be open to a scintilla of doubt since there are those who say that the Minister of Economics, Ibrahim Kubba, though a Marxist, is not actually a member of the Communist Party, and that the Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Education, Hudaib al Haj Hamud, is no more than the National Democrat which he claims to be, with party colleagues who can be clearly classified as moderate Socialists.

Nevertheless, with or without the influence of these two Ministers, a number of appointments have been filled by Communists or fellow-travellers at the level of Director-General and Director in various Ministries. In some cases, such as Major Salim Fakri, the Director of Radio and virtually controller of all propaganda, who is considered by many to have at least fellow-travelling sympathies, these positions are of considerable influence.

- (b) Several of the particular associates of the Prime Minister are strongly suspected of Communist sympathies, notably Colonel Fadhil Abbas al Mahdawi, the President of the Military Court, and Colonel Wasfi Taher, A.D.C. to the Prime Minister, who it appears see far more of him than some of his own Cabinet colleagues and indeed are able to control access to him.
- (c) The Press, which has recently been reinforced by the opening of three open Communist papers, has a predominantly Communist tone. The paper with the largest circulation, *Al Bilad*, which is run by a family whose only interest is in making money, has become an organ for nothing but Communist propaganda. Even those papers which have a Nationalist rather than Communist inspiration help to serve the cause of the latter by their anti-Western line. The Government-controlled radio station is from time to time pro-Communist as well as anti-Western in its selection of foreign news and comment, and in its own commentaries.
- (d) The demonstrations against Colonel Arif after his arrest and shortly afterwards in favour of the execution of the first batch of condemned prisoners, were clearly organised by the Communists and showed a considerable ability to produce the mob on the streets when required.
- (e) The conduct of the trials and the behaviour of the President of the Court took on a new bitterness when the trial of Dr. Fadhil Jamali began, for he had particularly made his reputation for attacking Communism. The death sentences have been interpreted as indicating Communist inspiration and furthering Com-

munist aims (it is the Communist Press which has been loudest in demanding their execution). The new series of trials in connection with internal affairs which have begun with that of Abdul Jabbar Fahmi, lately Mutasarrif of Baghdad, seem likely to have a flavour of bitterness resulting from a desire on the part of the Communists for revenge for the persecution which they have suffered in the past.

- (f) It is widely reported that Left-wing sympathies are strong now among the students where before all were Arab Nationalists. As a result, the student body seems to be badly divided and from this the Left wing are likely to benefit. As a result of a ruling from the Ministry of Education, foreign students (*i.e.*, Egyptians and other Arabs) were prohibited from taking part in the recent elections to representative student bodies in each of the Baghdad colleges. In most of the colleges, the Arab Nationalists boycotted the elections and those elected show a heavy Left-wing preponderance.
- (g) There appear to be the beginnings of a serious attempt by the Communists to organise labour in the more important industries. This is already noticeable in the Basra Petroleum Company, and the Iraq Petroleum Company expect to see a quick development of organisation in their labour which may be open to Left-wing domination. The same is probably true in the Basra Port Authority and elsewhere.
- (h) Although reliable up-to-date information from Kurdistan is slight, there have been indications of considerable activity in the area by known Communist leaders. Since the return of the Mulla Mustafa, the breach between the Communist Party proper and its chief rival in Kurdistan, the National United Democratic Party of Kurdistan, has been mended, both are solidly backing the present Government and the integrity of Iraq, and both in Kurdish affairs seem to be supporting Mulla Mustafa, whose future intentions are unknown but whose potentiality as the leader of a disruptive Communist pressure group must be considerable.

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5. It is not surprising that in these circumstances it is not only the extremist Arab Nationalists but also the middle-of-the-road people who are taking fright. A month ago some effort appears to have been made by the Ba'athists and the moderate parties to reach agreement on a compromise policy towards the United Arab Republic, which would enable them to work in union against the Communists. This attempt seems to have failed. It was followed by the resuscitation of the National Unity Front, with the strong support of Kamil Chaderchi, including the Communists and the National United Democratic Party of Kurdistan, which the moderate parties clearly hoped would be a means of exercising some restraint on the Communists. That this must be a forlorn hope is clear from all reading of the history of other countries; there is certainly no political party in Iraq with the determination and organisation strong enough to enable them to stand up to the Communists and the latter should have little difficulty in manipulating the Front to suit their aims. These in the long-term must remain a matter of guesswork, but it seems possible the party may well be content, if the situation allows it, to operate with a "front" Government which they can sufficiently control without having to come more out into the open. There is a considerable danger that at least the National Democratic Party will, from fear of too strong a move towards Arab unity, be drawn into close co-operation with the Communists, despite the supposedly anti-Communist views of some of its members.

6. If this trend goes on and nothing is done to arrest it, the indications are that more and more people will be looking for a means of escape from the Communist danger and it is the realisation that this must already be happening in some quarters which is adding to the present state of instability. For example, Siddiq Shanshal, the Minister of Guidance and an old supporter of Rashid Ali, who believes in a steady approach to complete Arab unity, told my Oriental Counsellor two weeks ago that many Nationalists were wondering whether they would not be forced, on the Syrian model, to ask for Nasser's help against Communism; he, Shanshal, made it clear that union in some form with the United Arab Republic might well be the only way to save Iraq. Another man, a former Member of Parliament, who occupied a more central position in the

political spectrum, said that he and some of his friends who had previously supported the old régime in Iraq felt that the country was between the devil of Nasser and the deep blue sea of Communism; they would choose the former without hesitation, for there was no third choice.

7. In this situation the keys to the future must lie to a considerable extent with the Prime Minister himself and with the Army on which his power rests. Abdul Karim Qasim is an enigma, not only to foreign observers but also to most Iraqis. He would not have achieved what he has done if he were not a master of duplicity and one must assume that he possesses considerable histrionic ability. His public statements and private assurances all class him among the moderates who wish Iraq to be independent and not at the mercy of any other Power. He has shown considerable caution in developing policy on major questions, for example the Baghdad Pact, the future of Habbaniya, the confirmation or commutation of the sentences. He appears in the Council of Ministers to work most closely with the Minister of Finance, Mohammed Hadid, who is a moderate Socialist and no extremist. When Colonel Arif fell from power, he replaced him in the critical post of Minister of the Interior by a moderate officer with long associations with the Hashemite house whose influence could hardly fail to be in the direction of reconciliation and a middle-of-the-road policy. He has not been accused of directly taking action to help the Communists, though he has not taken action against them. Yet it is with him as Prime Minister that the advance of the Communists has taken place and it is the Communists who have worked hardest to build up popular support for him. It is not surprising therefore that many people are uncertain what to make of him. On the whole, most foreign diplomats and intelligent Iraqis think that they should still give him the benefit of the doubt, at any rate so far as his own aims and intentions are concerned. What some of them doubt is his ability to control the situation which has been produced, not entirely through his own fault, and to give effect to his policy of balance and centrality without continuing to lean on the Communists. They say that he is in many respects trying to pursue the traditional Iraqi policy of independence, without possessing the stature and experience of Nuri As-Said, the constitutional framework of the Hashemite monarchy, or

the help, advice and, when necessary, tried support of Britain. They point out that in international affairs Iraq has always had to lean on some outside Power; since the Western Powers can no longer fill the role and the United Arab Republic has temporarily been rejected, the Eastern bloc are left without competition. They point out that, apart from the Army, Abdul Karim Qasim has no organised political support; the large body of moderate opinion in the country, much of which doubtless approves of his aims, is unorganised, unvocal and, as a political force, of small amount. They say that the Iraqi Army has never been able to stand up to the mob when it was aroused and that the Communist Party have now shown that they can bring out the mob in support of their policies whenever they wish, and are even able to intimidate the Prime Minister into at least delaying his decision on the sentences. They point to the situation of the Kurds who could without difficulty be induced to cause great trouble if the Prime Minister deviated from the policy which their Communist leaders can support. If in this situation he had not the support of the Army leaders, then he clearly could not stand up to Communist pressure indefinitely. Where does the Army stand?

8. This is a very difficult question to answer. There are certainly some Communist officers in the Army, and names are quoted such as Colonel Jalal Al-Auqati, Commanding Officer of the Iraqi Air Force, Colonel Farid Dhia Mahmoud, Director of Military Operations, and Colonel Taher Shaikh Ahmed, Director of Plans. There have been suggestions that Communism is also popular and spreading among the younger officers as it is among the young of all Iraqi professions. On the other hand, it may be doubted whether Communist influence is yet particularly strong in the senior ranks. If the Prime Minister decided to have a real showdown with the Communists, it is probable that the Army as a whole would stand by him. On the other hand, in the absence of such a showdown the position of the Army is bound to be much more uncertain. The loyalty of the officers was undoubtedly somewhat shaken by the arrest of Colonel Arif, accompanied as it is believed to have been by the arrest of a number of officers accused of plotting with him against the Prime Minister. This may well have tended to produce some disaffection towards the latter which could be played upon by the Ba'ath Party. The really serious factor is, however, the effect on the Army officers of

the Communist advance. There have been indications for some time that the anxieties of the moderate politicians were also shared by some of the senior officers in the Army. The Yugoslav Ambassador here, who speaks quite freely about the danger from the USSR, and through his pro-Nasser sympathies probably has good contacts with Arab Nationalists in the forces as well as in civilian life, is now saying that he believes the situation in the Army is becoming serious and that if the Prime Minister does not take some early action against the Communists he will lose a good deal of his support and as a result the Army will be divided. The senior Army officers are probably for the most part supporters of the idea of Iraqi independence. They stood by Qasim when he eliminated Colonel Arif, the extremist on one flank. They are probably the less inclined to do so if he refuses their proposals to act against the extremists on the other. As in the past, they must be conscious of the basic pan-Arab feeling of the troops and of the ordinary civilian population. It was the thwarting of the expression of this feeling which in the last analysis swayed the Army against the old régime. If they believe that Qasim, under Communist pressure, is getting into a situation where he may be obliged to thwart it again—or at least will not further its realisation—they may desert him.

9. It is with this background in mind that I read with great interest your telegram to the Embassy in Washington No. 8516 of November 30, listing the reasons why it is desirable to accept the régime of Qasim as the best available for the present. I agree with this conclusion since there is no one in sight, other than Abdul Karim Qasim, both willing and, possibly, able to keep Iraq independent and united. This is so important not only for the benefit of the Iraqis but also for the future of the oil industry, for British interests generally in the Arab world and for the staving off of the Russian advance into the Middle East, that it seems desirable to give Qasim a very strong benefit of the doubt. As long as there is reasonable hope that Qasim can achieve his aim it is logical that we give him such support as we discreetly can and in any event do nothing that might hasten his fall. It should become clearer in the near future whether the ideal of "independence" is attainable; if it is not then, since an Iraqi retreat from Communism must in local terms be expressed in a warmer attitude towards Arab unity and the United Arab Republic, our bias should I

submit be directed towards the latter. It would be best if Qasim himself were to move in the pan-Arab direction rather than to try to resist it against odds and probably be forced to use the Communists more and more as his allies. It must, however, be recognised that a great doubt remains as to his willingness and ability to move in the pan-Arab direction. I and my colleagues, like the Iraqi moderates, look for signs of Qasim turning away, even slightly, from the Communists and back towards such a middle position. We see practically nothing but fair words and the absence of actions. It is possible that by his decision on the death sentences, the Prime Minister will show his hand soon, but he may delay almost indefinitely as he has done over other decisions which he did not like taking. If he does not commute the sentences and if he does not take some action to reassure the Arab Nationalists and the middle-of-the-road moderates that he will not slide further towards Communism, the present situation

of extreme instability will continue and the risk will remain that another leader, probably an Army officer, will move against him and in doing so push Iraq far, perhaps decisively, towards unity with the United Arab Republic. By his delay in returning to a position of balance, the Prime Minister is in danger of hastening such a development; if it occurs it is very likely to tear the country apart.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Beirut, Amman, Paris, Moscow, Kuwait, Bahrain and Basra, to the United Kingdom Representatives to NATO in Paris and to the United Nations in New York, and to the Political Officers to the Middle East Forces in Cyprus and to the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula in Aden.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EQ 1015/402

No. 22

SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT'S FAREWELL DESPATCH

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 15)

(No. 181. Confidential
and Guard)

Baghdad,

December 7, 1958.

Sir,

Although nearly five months have passed since the revolution in Iraq on the 14th of July, conditions in the country are so uncertain as to make it fruitless to attempt to write a terminal despatch on customary lines containing a balanced assessment of past and future trends. In numerous despatches and other reports I have commented on the events of July and on subsequent developments. I will not attempt here to recapitulate or to summarise these. But I have the honour to submit the following observations for what they may be worth. Events at any moment may, of course, render them out of date.

2. The revolution in Iraq took place against the background of the rise of Nasser and his emergence as the symbol of Arab nationalism with the example which he set of military revolution against monarchy. It would, I suppose, not be unfair to say that Nasser was at least partly built up by the Americans, who then ran away from the consequences. However that may be, the general failure to deal with Nasser one way or the other at the time of Suez, but above all our own action in associating ourselves with an attack on Egypt by Israel (and France), contributed to what happened in Iraq this year. The King, the Crown Prince and Nuri had stood by us to the utmost of their ability during the Suez crisis. Although matters were nursed back through 1957 they had been gravely weakened, and the prestige and influence of Nasser in Iraq strengthened. Moreover, the pressures of Nasserism, and the need for firm internal measures to preserve the stability which his propaganda and subversive efforts constantly threatened, virtually compelled the former régime in Iraq to postpone the introduction of civil and political liberties and reforms on which they wished to embark and would have attempted in a calmer atmosphere. For these reasons the relationship of Iraq towards the United Arab Republic became a paramount issue when the revolution took place, a revolution

which his propaganda had for three years ceaselessly called for.

3. It is confirmed that the *coup d'état* was mainly planned and wholly carried out by a very small group of officers who made the actual plan at twenty-four hours' notice. Their leader, Brigadier Qasim, had been somewhat of a special favourite of Nuri who had been responsible for his successive promotions, and was personally trusted by the Palace. The previous régime were perpetually on the watch for plots of this kind in the army, since, indeed, their lives depended upon not being taken by surprise. That Qasim and his fellow conspirators should have held and gained the confidence of the King, the Crown Prince, Nuri, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, the Director of Military Intelligence and other senior officers and officials, loyal and since placed on trial, to a point where, as is now believed, warnings against them from sources which may have included King Hussain were disregarded, may be said to be no less a mark of their skill than of their treachery and perfidy. When they took power they associated with them in the Government a number of Left-wing and of Nationalist politicians including members of the Ba'athist and other groups. They succeeded at one stroke not only in killing the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri, but in arresting practically all the senior political figures, administrators and senior officers at the top levels of the régime.

4. The régime thus displaced were firmly committed to certain principles of policy. These included friendship with the West, anti-Communism, and a conviction that neutrality opened the way to Communism. They believed that Iraq needed at least several years more of internal peace, stability and firm Government while a far-reaching and liberal development programme for the benefit of the people was being put into execution. They desired friendship with Egypt, and many times sought it, but they became increasingly convinced that Nasser was unnegotiable and that his aim was to overturn the

monarchies in neighbouring countries and to lay his hands on the oil revenues of Iraq. They were accordingly opposed to domination of the Arab world by Nasser. They did not seek to divide the Arab world, or wish to see it divided. Their action with Turkey in founding the Baghdad Pact sprang from their sense of the danger to the Arab world, but particularly to Iraq, of Communist Russia. They were careful to make it clear that membership of the Baghdad Pact involved no derogation from their loyalty to the Arab treaty of mutual assistance or to their membership of the Arab League. They maintained that it was not Iraq or the Baghdad Pact which divided the Arab world, but that a division, which they would like to have seen healed, existed already as a result of Nasser's embracement of neutrality and attitude towards the Soviet Union.

5. When the *coup d'état* of the 14th of July swept away the whole top layer of the former régime the question immediately posed itself whether the new régime would reverse most or all of these former principles of policy.

6. In fact the new Government announced that the union with Jordan was dissolved, that Iraq would observe her other international obligations and commitments, that Iraq would be a republic co-operating to the utmost with sister Arab countries but maintaining a policy of neutrality and friendship towards all countries, and that the Iraq Petroleum Company would not be nationalised. Among its first steps were immediately to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, and later to obtain arms from behind the Iron Curtain. But the questions uppermost in all minds were whether Iraq would go so far as to join the United Arab Republic, and how far she would lean or gravitate towards Communism. In the event the former course was advocated by the Ba'athists and, in particular, among army leaders by Colonel Arif, who was then Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Minister of the Interior; the Communists opposed union with the United Arab Republic (so also did the Kurds and many of the Shias) and embarked on a course of infiltration combined with support for Qasim.

7. In the face of this situation, with the Embassy temporarily put out of action by the mob, with all means of communication with London by cypher interrupted except

through the limited but invaluable channel afforded us so long as was necessary by the American Embassy, and with the British, like other foreign communities, in constant danger and denied any immediate means of exit from Iraq, the problem of how to handle matters in Baghdad presented formidable difficulties. It seemed to me at the time that the only course was to make immediate contact with as many members of the new Government as possible and to seek to establish and maintain as far as might be feasible a relationship of confidence and belief in our words and actions, whether these were to be friendly, neutral or hostile; to make them feel that we said what we meant and meant what we said; and to probe by personal contact into their real intentions. Among major preoccupations were, of course, the safety of the lives and property of the British community, the position at Habbaniya, our stake in the production and flow of oil, and the lives of more than a 100 members of the former régime, all of them friendly to Britain and the West, who had been arrested. There were further the questions of Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact, and the validity of the Special Agreement between Iraq and the United Kingdom, linked with the pact.

8. There were, among others, three factors which might weigh in the balance either way. First, American forces landed in the Lebanon and British forces in Jordan. The new Government were inevitably concerned with the possibility that this might be a prelude to, or a first step towards, intervention in Iraq. This had a double reaction. On the one hand fear of intervention had a sobering effect. On the other hand, it induced intense suspicion of the Americans and ourselves, and led to a number of expulsions of and restrictions upon British and American nationals. Second, there could be no certainty whether the announcement that there would be no nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company was a cover to gain time in the hope of averting intervention and of consolidating power before a reversal of the decision, or whether it was based on a solid calculation of self-interest both in terms of assuring the uninterrupted production and flow of oil and of maintaining an economic and political relationship with the West. Third, the new Government, if they were to succeed in their announced policy of economic progress and social reform, could ill-afford to see enterprises and projects,

upon which this depended, interrupted by the departure of key foreign experts; yet extreme Nationalist feeling was likely to demand the latter.

9. As regards membership of the Baghdad Pact, it was difficult to conceive that Iraq would remain a member in view of the announced policy of neutrality and of past and continued attacks on the policy of the previous régime in this respect. On the other hand, termination of membership before the date provided in the pact for notice of termination of membership (six months before February 1960) would be contrary to the declaration that Iraq would observe all her international commitments. Moreover, Iraq's relationship with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were involved, as well as with the United Kingdom and with the United States. The first point applied equally to the Special Agreement.

10. Early visits to the Prime Minister at the Ministry of Defence, often with demonstrators out in the streets and, on arrival, with Tommy guns pointing at every conceivable portion of one's anatomy, were experiences in themselves. Nevertheless, contacts were gradually built up (I made early calls on most Cabinet Ministers) and it became possible to discern, and perhaps in one or two respects to influence, certain trends even if these were temporary or tentative.

11. It soon became clear that Arif favoured nationalisation of the oil industry, extreme anti-foreign measures, and immediate union with the United Arab Republic. On the latter, although not on the two former, he was supported by Siddiq Shanshal, the Minister of Guidance, Rekabi, the Minister of Development (formerly the secretary of the Ba'ath Party) and perhaps others. Meanwhile, Baghdad was plastered with photographs of Nasser and union was thought by many to be imminent. It became equally clear that Qasim, while favouring close association with the United Arab Republic, was not prepared to go so fast or so far. He concluded almost at once economic, educational and cultural agreements with the United Arab Republic and arranged for Egyptian aircraft to come to Habbaniya. He halted there. In this he was, no doubt, influenced by the views of the Kurds and of many Shias; but it soon came to look as though his own fixed policy was that Iraq should remain an independent entity even if eventually within some form

of Arab federation. Further, the views of the Government against nationalisation of the oil industry were consolidated, and this process was assisted by a decision of the Iraq Petroleum Company to show themselves forthcoming over the advance of a sum of £4 million in respect of the 1953 accounts, and by their attitude over other matters. For some time the speculation over the outcome of the conflict between the views of Qasim and Arif continued. But the question was resolved by the ousting of Arif, by his nomination as Ambassador to Western Germany, and finally by his arrest on return to Iraq apparently in connection with a plot against Qasim.

12. As far as our own relations with Iraq were concerned, our assurances that the landing of British forces in Jordan was not directed against Iraq were proved to be valid. The sale of the two British submarines to Israel caused a dangerous set-back, but we were in the end able to make a little background capital out of the many exaggerations and accusations by Cairo that we were planning to supply Israel with tens of millions of pounds' worth of arms and that an aggression by Israel with our backing was imminent, since at least the latter was soon disproved. Gradually, and step by small step, we were able to build up, at any rate with Qasim and a number of Ministers, a certain confidence in our attitude and intentions. In certain fields, such as medicine and education, British experts by and large were retained. The British Council library was reopened. In some but not in all other fields dismissal of British experts slackened and certain restrictions began to be removed. As regards suspicion and harassment on the part of the authorities the Americans suffered worse than we did.

13. The revolution, partly by the stunning effect of its successful execution, and partly because it released pent-up grievances, discontents and ambitions, was at first received by the country with acquiescence in general and with enthusiasm by a considerable number, although for varying reasons. But the success of the internal policy of the new régime, and therefore its popularity, was bound to depend to a considerable extent on its ability to show results from its programme of social reform and economic progress. In two respects the Government made a bad start. They appointed a brash and incompetent Minister of Development

(Rekabi) and they embarked on widespread purge, dismissal and pension of officials throughout Government departments, to a point where the administrative capacity of the country, already stretched and patchy, soon began to be impaired. For the first three months there was a good deal of economic uncertainty and some disruption. The business community did not know where they stood. The programme of agricultural reform left both proprietor and cultivator in doubt of their exact future. Although in November some upturn of business was noticeable, it was not back to more than 50 or 55 per cent. of conditions before the revolution.

14. Meanwhile, the partisans of union with the United Arab Republic on the one hand, and the Communists on the other, each pursued their aims, and from time to time there were clashes between the two. The evident desire of the Government was to steer a middle course, and to rally Centre opinion behind them while developing their economic and social programme. They were reluctant to take definite action against either wing, since this would have involved taking a leaf out of the book of the former régime. But the Arif conspiracy forced Qasim to take action against him and some of his friends. The fact that the Communists supported Qasim in this made it more difficult for him to round on them also, assuming always, as there was at least considerable internal evidence, that he did not wish to go too far their way. In the course of November, allegations that he was favouring the Communists, or at least being so weak with them that they were entrenching themselves dangerously, began to spread. Increasing murmurings were heard that unless he took some action against the Communists soon there would be movement against the Government by anti-Communist elements with the possibility that, if the army itself were divided on the issue, there might be civil war.

15. Among the causes of tension have been and still are the political trials of leading members of the former régime, including General Daghestani, General Rafiq Arif, Dr. Jamali, Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, Taufiq Suwaidi, and the former Mutasarrif, Abdul Jabbar Fahmi. These have been conducted in public with a maximum of venom and partiality on the part of the President of the Tribunal. They represent a travesty of justice. Since the proceedings are both broadcast and tele-

vised, and since every effort has been made to rake up past bitternesses and quarrels, they contribute to unrest and internal hatred when the Government are in need of exactly the reverse. The death sentences imposed on the first four named are awaiting confirmation by the Prime Minister and have become a source of controversy and demonstrations. The Communists are demanding executions and making this a political issue. Behind the scenes every possible influence has been mobilised and exerted in favour of clemency. But although Ghazi Daghestani by the courage of his defence has become something of a public hero not least in the army, leading Shias are urging clemency for Dr. Jamali, and a number of Arab and other countries and leaders are appealing for mercy, the issue is still uncertain. The decision either way may prove to be a political turning point.

16. To-day, nearly five months after the revolution, the country is uneasy, disillusioned and divided. Political, economic and administrative conditions are worse than before the revolution, when the country, apart from political discontents, was relatively quiet, prosperous and reasonably administered. The djinns of Communism, Kurdish nationalism and mob violence released into the open, hover over the scene. The Government has no structure of support in depth, and must rely on the army remaining sufficiently united behind it. The antagonism between Ba'athists and Communists continues with bitterness, and the latter are doing their best to entrench themselves with little or no interference so far by the Government.

17. The immediate future appears to depend on three factors: first, whether Qasim will take some very early steps to grasp the Communist nettle, a course which would probably unite behind him most middle of the road and moderate Nationalist opinion, and give him and his relatively sober policies a reasonable chance of survival; second, whether, if he fails to do this (or perhaps even if he does it), he will be skilful and strong enough to resist a possible move or agitation against him by Nationalist and anti-Communist elements; and third, whether through passivity on the part of the Government, or by some other means, the Communists will successfully infiltrate themselves into a position where they can dominate the scene.

18. So far as our own relations with the new régime are concerned, they are for the moment, in spite of formidable difficulties, considerably better than appeared even remotely possible in July. Matters are going relatively well with the Iraq Petroleum Company. The services of a large number of British officials and experts have been terminated, but a number remain and in the fields of medicine and education more are being sought for. The Government apparently wish to maintain the flow of students to the United Kingdom. The British Council is operating partially in Baghdad and may open up further in Baghdad and Basra. British firms and business men are suffering frustration, sometimes intense: but not in all fields. Virtually all the British Loan Personnel in Iraq advising the armed forces have been withdrawn at Iraqi request, and staging facilities at Habbaniya have been at a standstill since July. The future of the Special Agreement, which is linked with the Baghdad Pact, is wholly uncertain and termination in due course may be inevitable. But we obtained an early resumption of over-flying rights, and it is not inconceivable that we might reach an agreement of some sort over staging facilities. The Government are obtaining considerable quantities of arms from Communist countries. But they may well wish to continue to obtain arms from Britain also, if we are willing to supply them, and perhaps to continue to utilise the services of a few technicians. In the financial field we must reckon with a very strong possibility that Iraq may wish to leave the sterling area. Yet the present

Government clearly do not wish to break all or even many bridges with us. If Iraq does not either turn Communist or join the United Arab Republic her connection with Britain may remain substantial.

19. But can the new régime be expected to last, and if so to maintain something like its present course? As I have said in previous paragraphs, the prospects of this are far from encouraging. Indeed, at any moment some disturbance or upset might occur. All that can be said is that for the time being no better Government is in sight, and that a change would be likely to mean a move towards greater extremism of one form or another. It therefore appears to be to our interest not to make avoidable difficulties for the present Government, and, indeed, perhaps positively to do anything we can to help them to survive.

20. In the longer run it is just conceivable that middle of the road leaders, now unknown or in eclipse, might emerge. If he were ever to be freed, Ghazi Daghestani has many of the requisite qualities of mind and character. There may be others, military or civilian. Meanwhile we can only bend our own energies to the uphill task at the moment.

21. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Karachi, Kuwait, Tehran and Washington and the Political Office, Middle East Forces, Cyprus.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EQ 1015/415

No. 23

IRAQ: THE DECEMBER PLOT AGAINST THE QASSEM REGIME

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 27)(No. 186. Confidential) *Baghdad*
Sir, *December 22, 1958*

As reported in telegram No. 235 Separate of December 9 from this post, the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Iraq Armed Forces issued an announcement on the evening of December 8 that a serious plot against the régime had been discovered involving corrupt elements in Iraq working in collaboration with foreigners outside the country, and that the plotters were to be tried for treason. I enclose a copy of the text of the announcement. In addition, the Government revealed that cheques for substantial sums were to be drawn by the plotters and that weapons were to be used. The weapons which they showed on television on December 8 were in fact a sorry collection, including hatchets and knives as well as a few miscellaneous small arms. Apart from these few facts, the exact nature and extent of the plot have been concealed by the Government while the Military Court conducts its proceedings in secret. However, enough is known to indicate its general nature and the way in which it fits in with recent political developments.

2. The main name connected with the plot is that of Rashid Ali Al Gailani, the principal figure in the 1941 revolt, who returned from exile in August preaching Arab unity and who is now closely associated with the pan-Arab nationalist movement. The inclusion of other members of his family and certain Ba'athists among those arrested confirms that the plot had an Arab nationalist inspiration, and, although nothing has been officially divulged, suggests that the foreign assistance referred to was from the United Arab Republic. The inclusion of representatives of tribes in north-western and central Iraq can be explained by hopes of changes of policy in their favour following a successful plot. The tribes could hardly, however, expect to make much impression on the Iraq army unless the latter had been divided. Whether it would have been divided if the plot had succeeded in eliminating the Prime Minister, as it seems probable that it was intended to do, must be a matter of guesswork, but no

formation commanders seem to have been found to have connections with the plot and the army, at any rate for the moment, evidently remained united. The only senior serving officers whose names have been reliably connected with it are Colonel Abdul Latif Al Darraji, Commandant of the Military College, who has now been replaced, and Colonel Taha Yahja, the Director-General of Police, who had been posted away just before the announcement of the plot. Colonel Darraji has been known for some time to possess considerable influence with the younger members of the army, particularly in the camp, "Moascar Rashid," outside Baghdad and to have been dissatisfied with the course of events in Iraq since the revolution. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that other army officers have been arrested, and at the very least the affair must have given the army a serious shock coming so soon after the arrest of Colonel Arif. Judging from their telegrams of support and loyalty, and the absence of their names from any of the numerous lists of names of people alleged to be involved in the plot, which are circulating in Iraq, the four Divisional Commanders have all stood firm behind the Prime Minister on this occasion. But there are indications that some if not all of them have become increasingly apprehensive of the extent of Communist influence in the country and increasingly critical of the Prime Minister. Among the more junior ranks it can be assumed that the same conflicting trends towards Communism, pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqi independence are as active as among the civilian population and there is at least the strong probability that the army is now, following this plot, riven by differences and suspicions which must make it in the future a more uncertain prop for the régime.

3. In paragraph 9 of his despatch No. 180 of December 4, Sir Michael Wright wrote that if the Prime Minister did not take action to reassure the Arab nationalists and the middle of the road moderates that he would not slide further towards Communism, the risk remained that another

leader, probably an army officer, would move against him and in doing so push Iraq towards union with the United Arab Republic. The recent plot clearly fits into this pattern and can be seen as a direct reaction to the threat of Communist domination of the country which has caused not only Western and neighbour countries but also moderate Iraqis and pan-Arab Iraqi nationalists such great and growing anxiety. The plot was in fact one more stage in the struggle between pan-Arab Iraqi nationalism and the Communist-exploited nationalism which has dominated political developments here since soon after the revolution. Despite the apparently sincere desire of Brigadier Qasim that Iraq should follow a policy of neutrality and of all-round friendship, and should be allowed to retire from the scene of international conflicts and to cultivate her own garden, the country remains as sharply torn between conflicting international aspirations as she ever was under the old régime. Since the framework which the old régime provided has been removed, these conflicts have been all the nearer to the surface and if they continue, they are all the more likely to cause serious damage to the country. There is as yet little sign that, having dealt with this particular conspiracy, the Prime Minister is working to create conditions in which he will have a greater chance of carrying out his declared policy.

4. That Iraq continued to be an international battlefield since the revolution was due as much as anything to the liberty which was permitted to the Press, pamphleteers, and organisers of demonstrations, whose activities were very little hampered by the official ban on political parties and by the official censorship of the Press and other publications. That the parties took full advantage of this opportunity was natural, for the revolution was in large measure a reaction against a régime which gave little freedom to public opinion and few opportunities to the educated and semi-educated to express themselves, or to feel that they could influence political developments and become part of the wave of Arab nationalism which was sweeping the Middle East. Yet, as in the past, the Iraqis showed at once how incapable they were of enjoying even limited political and Press liberties without running to extremes. Encouraged as they were in the early days of the new régime, by the Deputy Prime Minister, Colonel Arif, the pan-Arab nationalists and Ba'athists were for a time in full cry, but it

was not long before the Communists and other Left-wingers had mobilised themselves for action and had shown their readiness to resist the Ba'athists in the streets to the extent of creating riots which caused serious casualties. Because of Colonel Arif's mistakes, the initiative has steadily passed to the Communists. Despite occasional pan-Arab jamborees such as the recent Congress of Arab Lawyers in Baghdad at which, however, considerable friction between the two parties was manifested, the Communists in the Press and in the streets meet little competition from the other wing. The rumours of plots surrounding the return of Colonel Arif to Baghdad on November 4 and the announcement of the discovery of the new plot on December 8 have dangerously discredited the pan-Arab nationalists and have enabled the Communists to pose as the defenders of the régime and the Prime Minister, and thereby to increase their influence all the more. This development has been accompanied by an amount of rowdy action by the mobs, Left-wing students and Communist supporters, which cannot have commended itself to the Prime Minister. On December 8 and 9, members of the Popular Resistance Forces, who are commonly believed to be inspired by Communist sentiment and whose expansion throughout the country is a current Communist demand, were allowed to operate in Baghdad at check-points on the bridges and in the streets, searching for cars of which the registration numbers had been publicised in connection with the plot, and, presumably, suspected supplies of arms. In the process these young men showed themselves over-zealous and somewhat undisciplined and caused irritation not only to members of the Diplomatic Corps but also to members of the Government and senior officers. At the same time, an unofficial Popular Resistance Force in Basra, under even less discipline, caused much disturbance in the town, and rumours that certain officers of the garrison were implicated in the plot brought the mob out in such numbers that the army did not dare to come out of their barracks. For a few hours there was virtual anarchy, although fortunately little serious destruction and few casualties, and a very serious shock was given to the authorities, the foreign community, and the Iraqi middle-class in the town. Two Americans were stripped and roughly handled and were lucky to escape with their lives, and even the Governor of Basra, in

general's uniform, was held up in his car. There have also been reports of unrest and in some cases large demonstrations in other towns, including Hillah, Diwaniyah, Kut, Mosul and Khanaqin. On December 15, despite the ban on demonstrations in Baghdad city, Mr. William Rountree, the American Assistant Secretary from the State Department, was greeted at Baghdad airport by a large crowd chanting slogans and hurling refuse and stones at the car. This must have been an embarrassment to the Prime Minister, though his apology to Mr. Rountree was somewhat perfunctory. It is apparent that neither the Government nor, where the mob is concerned, perhaps the Communist Party itself, is in complete control. The Minister of Communications, Baba Al Shaikh Mahmud, recently told the United States Chargé d'Affaires that there were signs that the Prime Minister was afraid of the senior officers in the army and was trying to ingratiate himself more with the junior officers and non-commissioned officers. If true, this is not only a pointer to instability at the top but also indicates a further stage in the Prime Minister's involvement with the Communists; for it is among the junior officers and N.C.Os. that they are thought to have had their greatest success with the army. The situation is, in any case, hardly one in which the Prime Minister will find it easy to give effect to his stated policy of moderation, balance and internal reform. It is moreover one in which the considerable unorganised and unvocal support for the policy for which the Prime Minister stands cannot make itself felt. The Foreign Minister has told me that present conditions, "necessitated by the revolution," cannot continue much longer, but there is no sign yet of any attempt to gain real control of internal security.

5. Although there is now greater scope than before the revolution for the expression of the desire for Arab unity, the unity of Iraq with the other Arab States seems, momentarily at any rate, to be even more remote than before the revolution. Although relations with the United Arab Republic were then as bad as they could be, Iraq was on good terms with Jordan and several of the other Arab countries. Yet to-day, so far as it is possible to see the picture from Baghdad, all the Arab countries are looking at Iraq askance for fear of what may be coming. In Iraq itself, the Arab nationalists are well aware how far the pendulum has swung against them. Even the moderates are increasingly anxious

about developments, including army officers. The drift towards Communism strengthens nationalist feeling in favour of Nasser. It is because increasing doubts are felt, even by the Prime Minister's own supporters, that he has the capacity to give the leadership that the situation requires, that more and more people are beginning to feel that only President Nasser can save the country from Communism, as they believe he saved Syria. It seems unlikely that the nationalists will tamely accept the present trend, revealed as it is not only by the insecurity described above but also by the strong Communist penetration which is going on in many parts of society, especially among the young, and in the army and administration. If the present atmosphere of tension and unrest continues, and full liberty is allowed to the Press and the leaders of the crowd to utter Communist propaganda, shout Communist slogans, and work up demonstrations, there are bound to be further attempts from the nationalist wing to reverse this trend. It is not impossible that another army leader will feel that the country must not be allowed to go to ruin and will seek an opportunity to take over the Government.

6. Whether further trouble occurs must depend, of course, on whether the Prime Minister takes serious steps to anticipate and avert it. He appears to think in terms of a balance of forces, yet if he is to preserve his régime and give effect to his policy, he can only do so by dominating these forces. This must mean taking drastic steps to remove Communists and sympathisers from influential posts in the administration, and pursuing a much more repressive policy towards the Press and streets. Indeed, many of the internal policies and methods of the Hashemite house and Nuri As Said will probably have to be applied if Iraq is to survive as a unified country. It is, however, doubtful whether the Prime Minister could dominate the situation in the way that is needed without calling upon the army to play a more direct part in government. So long as the army holds together it provides a measure of political strength independent of both Communists and pan-Arab nationalists, particularly as the most senior officers appear to be behind the Prime Minister's declared policy, if not behind his actions. Military rule would not be popular and if the Prime Minister were ready to use it to challenge the Communists, the response might be violent and disruptive. But if the Prime Minister does not show the

strength and courage to make this challenge quite soon, it is doubtful if he will long retain the independence of action to enable him to do so later.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Washington, Bahrain and Basra, to the Political Office, Middle East Forces in Cyprus, and the Political Office, British Forces in the Aden peninsula, and to the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to NATO in Paris.

I have, &c.

HUMPHREY TREVELYAN.

Text of Announcement on December 8, 1958

To the people from the High Command of the Armed Forces.

With the help of the Almighty and the vigilance of the people, we have been able to uncover a serious plot which was to have

been executed on the 9th and 10th of this month and which has subjected the foundations of our Republic to danger, and disrupted the internal security of the country. This was organised by some corrupt elements in collaboration with foreigners outside Iraq.

Let it be known to all that we have resolved to crush any force which dares to endanger the fate of the people or prejudice the interests of the country. From to-day onwards we shall not allow any faction or group of traitors to violate the security of the State; and we declare to the noble people of the Republic of Iraq that the evidence in support of the plot, the money and some of the arms which were to be used in its execution are now in our possession and the plotters have been referred to the People's Court for trial for treason against the Fatherland.

We exhort the people to increase their care and vigilance for the preservation of order in the face of acts of saboteurs throughout our immortal Republic.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EQ 1902/2

No. 24

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS 1958

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 8)

(No. 177. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *December 3, 1958.*

With reference to Mr. Beaumont's despatch No. 220 (1902/100/57) of the 20th of August, 1957, I have the honour to transmit herewith an annual report upon the Heads of the Foreign Missions at Baghdad.

2. In the absence, as yet, of a new official list of precedence, the dates of presentation of credentials shown are those of the presentation to His Majesty the late King Faisal II, except for Heads of Mission who have arrived since the Revolution of the 14th of July.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

(Passages marked with an asterisk have been quoted from previous reports)

Afghanistan

The former Minister, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Qasim Sharif, left Baghdad on the termination of his appointment in December 1957. He has not yet been replaced. Meanwhile the Embassy is in the charge of Mr. Abdul Wahed Karim, First Secretary, a young and cultivated bachelor of Western education and sympathies, who is fond of shooting.

It was announced in October 1958 that agreement in principle had been reached between the Governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to the raising of their accreditation to Ambassadorial level.

Belgium

M. Fredegond Cogels, Minister (October 27, 1955).

* M. Cogels was previously Counsellor in Rome. He is solid, pleasant, and with a true Belgian appreciation of the good things of life. (Written in 1956.) His wife is lively and sociable, with a sharp tongue and considerable ambition. His elevation to Ambassadorial rank is expected shortly.

Bulgaria

Mr. Radenko Grigorov, Ambassador (September 9, 1958).

Mr. Grigorov was appointed Bulgarian Minister to North Korea in August 1954, and Ambassador in May 1955. In 1957 he returned to take up the direction of a department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

People's Republic of China

M. Chen Chih Fang, Ambassador (September 22, 1958).

The Nationalist Chinese Embassy was withdrawn after the Revolution of July 14 and replaced immediately by the Mission of the People's Republic of China.

Czechoslovakia

Mr. Josef Zabokrtsky, Ambassador (October 6, 1958).

The first Czechoslovakian Embassy in Iraq was opened on September 15, 1958. Mr. Zabokrtsky was previously Minister in Damascus until the establishment of the United Arab Republic.

Denmark

M. Christian D. Holten Eggert, Minister (May 9, 1956).

M. Eggert normally resides in Cairo. In his absence the Legation is run by M. Frederik de Jonquieres, a career diplomat with the rank of Counsellor. M. de Jonquieres has previously had service at Berne and Rome. He is a friendly, civilised and helpful colleague who speaks excellent English. He was joined in the autumn of 1957 by his agreeable wife, who also speaks good English.

Egypt

See United Arab Republic

Germany (Federal Republic)

Dr. Herbert Richter, Ambassador (November 28, 1957).

Dr. Richter was born in Dresden in 1899. Having qualified as a Doctor of Law, he entered the German Foreign Service in 1924. Prior to the war, he served in Berlin, Rome, Bombay, Addis Ababa, Colombo and Calcutta (where he was five years as Consul). He was Consul in Tetuan from 1939 to 1945. After the war he served in the Land Ministry of Justice at Hamburg and in the District Office at Cologne. He returned to the Foreign Service in 1951 when he was appointed Consul-General at Bombay. In 1952 he was appointed Counsellor at New Delhi where he remained until his present appointment. He is married, and has a daughter and a small son.

They are a conventional couple, but they are friendly and helpful and make the best of a post which has few attractions for them. They both speak good English.

Holy See

Mgr. Armand Etienne Blanquet du Chayla, Apostolic Delegate (November 20, 1948).

* Mgr. du Chayla, Latin Archbishop of Baghdad, a Frenchman and a member of the Carmelite Order, was appointed Apostolic Delegate in 1948. He is a cousin of the former French Ambassador in Cairo (written in 1955), and a descendant of the French

Admiral defeated by Nelson at the Battle of the Nile. (Written in 1957.)

* A courtly and cultivated figure, aristocratic and fastidious, whom it is a pleasure to meet and who gives the impression of a Cardinal *manqué*. He is outspokenly tired of this country and frankly critical of the shortcomings of its people. (Written in 1955.) The departure of most other cultivated Frenchmen has left him rather high and dry in Iraq, but he sees no prospect of release. His health is indifferent.

Hungary

Mr. Vencel Hazi, Ambassador (October 29, 1958). The first Hungarian Embassy to Iraq was opened here on October 1, 1958.

Indonesia

Haj Mansur Daud Datuk Palimo Kajo, Minister (November 25, 1956).

* His predecessor having resided in Tehran, Haj Mansur is the first resident Indonesian Minister at Baghdad.

* Born in 1909, Haj Mansur received a religious education and became a teacher at religious schools. He was arrested in 1937 and sentenced to a year's imprisonment for political activity and during the Second World War took part in resistance to the Japanese. President of the Sumatra branch of the Muslim Masjumi, he was elected a Deputy in 1955. Haj Mansur set out again upon the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1957. My relations with him and his diminutive wife are friendly but tenuous. (Written in 1957.)

Iran

Mr. Mahmood Malayeri, Minister and Chargé d'Affaires (August 21, 1958).

General Batmanglidj, the previous Ambassador, left Baghdad soon after the Revolution of July 14 to take up a Ministerial appointment in Tehran.

Mr. Malayeri was sent from Tehran soon afterwards to take over as Chargé d'Affaires. He has served in Paris, in London as Press Attaché and in Basra as Consul-General, where he was helpful and friendly. He is capable and well-informed, with a strength of character and outspokenness which is somewhat belied by his quiet manner. He is a friendly and co-operative colleague who appreciates the value of Anglo-Iranian co-operation in the Baghdad Pact. He speaks good English. His wife has not yet come to Baghdad.

Italy

Signor Renato della Chiesa d'Isasca, Minister (May 13, 1958).

Signor della Chiesa is 55 and entered the Italian Foreign Service in 1933. He was Consul in Nairobi after the war, and in 1949-50 Secretary in Washington where he had also served before the war. During 1951 he was a member of the Italian Delegation to the United Nations and was then appointed Counsellor at Addis Ababa. He returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1955 where he served as head of the South-East Asia and Far-Eastern Department.

He is a spare, aristocratic figure with a quiet manner which conceals considerable strength of character. He has an acute intelligence and a ready wit which he reveals when it suits him. Something of an eccentric, he speaks excellent English.

His wife has not yet joined him.

Japan

M. Shiro Ishiguro, Minister (September 9, 1956).

* Born in 1908, M. Ishiguro graduated from Tokyo University of Commerce in 1931 and entered the Japanese Foreign Service in that year. After service in London and at Shanghai as well as at the

Ministry in Tokyo, he became in 1949 Chief of the Special Assets Division of the Reparations Agency and later Deputy Chief of the Agency. In 1951, he was appointed to the Japanese Overseas Agency in São Paulo, where he became Consul-General in 1952. From 1954 until his appointment to Baghdad he served in Tokyo in the rank of Counsellor in the Planning Council.

M. Ishiguro is a quiet, earnest and rather dull man. He is friendly and speaks excellent English. He has a charming and more lively wife (written in 1957), and they have a daughter being educated in England.

Jordan

In consequence of the formation of the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan, the Jordan Embassy in Baghdad was closed down on July 12, 1958. Relations have not been resumed since the dissolution of the Union on July 14, 1958.

Lebanon

Mr. Kazim al Solh, Ambassador (November 3, 1953); *Doyen*.

* Kazim al Solh is a cousin of the late Riad al Solh, formerly Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Born about 1903, a Sunni Moslem of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist, but his newspaper was suspended by the French. He later organised a small but influential Nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, Nida al Qawmi.

He speaks good French and some English. His wife does not appear in mixed society and spends nearly all her time in Beirut. He, himself, goes frequently to Beirut for long periods and has had political aspirations there (written in 1955) which are probably temporarily eclipsed. He is Western-minded and friendly though reserved in manner; he has been bitterly disappointed by the Revolution of July 14, and is extremely unhappy in Baghdad.

Morocco

Si al Haj Fatmi ben Slimen, Ambassador (December 18, 1956).

* Haj Fatmi was the first Moroccan Ambassador to be appointed to an Arab country of the Middle East. Born at Fez in 1908, he served in the Customs Administration from 1923 to 1927, as Khalifa of Meknes from 1937 to 1944 and as the Grand Vizier's *Délégué* for Education from 1945 to 1953, and became President of the High Shereefian Tribunal. Becoming Pasha of Fez in 1946, he is reputed to have made a fortune in that capacity. In October 1955, he was invited by the Council of Guardians of the Throne to form a Government, but resigned, without having done so, upon the Sultan's return. He became Governor of Fez in 1955.

Haj Fatmi is a devout Moslem and an engaging personality. He is a close friend of the Sultan (written in 1957), and has done his best to cultivate close relations between his own country and Iraq. His father was once decorated by King George V, he has a great love of Britain and retains a strong admiration for France. His influence has been consistently in favour of moderation, and he has been a respected and much-liked colleague. He speaks excellent French but no English.

His wife rarely goes out.

Netherlands

M. C. Vreede, Minister (February 2, 1958).

M. Vreede was born in 1908 and obtained a Doctorate in Classics at the University of Leiden. He joined the Netherlands Foreign Service in 1945 and worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1948. He has served subsequently in Washington and Bonn.

He has a somewhat stiff and Germanic appearance with a mechanical grin, but he has proved a sensible and level-headed colleague and is most ready to co-operate freely and exchange confidences. He talks good English.

His wife is pleasant and sociable.

Poland

Mr. Kazimierz Krawczynski, Chargé d'Affaires (September 23, 1958).

Saudi Arabia

Shaikh Ibrahim as Suwayil, Ambassador (July 2, 1957).

* Shaikh Ibrahim was born in 1916 at Anaiza, studied at Cairo University and entered the Saudi Foreign Service. He was First Secretary at Cairo from 1943 to 1952, and Counsellor at Beirut from 1952 to 1955. (Written in 1957.) Immediately before his appointment to Baghdad he was Permanent Head of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs where his work appeared to be mainly to act as a post-box for the Court at Riyadh. He speaks good English and shows himself to be friendly on the rare occasions when we meet socially.

Spain

His Excellency Professor Emilio Garcia Gomez, Ambassador (September 1, 1958).

The former Spanish Ambassador, Don José Ricardo Gomez-Acebo y Vazquez, left Baghdad on the termination of his appointment on July 7, 1958. His replacement is a well-known Orientalist; born in 1905, he is not a career diplomat, but has represented Spain at a number of international conferences, including the U.N.E.S.C.O. Consultative Committee in 1958. He studied at the Universities of Madrid and Cairo and held the Chairs of Arabic at Granada and Madrid Universities. He has published works on Moorish and Andalusian poetry and is a member of the Royal Spanish Academy and of the Royal Academy of History. Well known at Oxford and Cambridge, he has lectured widely abroad.

He and his wife are charming and sincere colleagues. He speaks good French and a little English; his wife speaks both fluently and vivaciously.

Sudan

Mr. Jamal Mohamad Ahmad, Ambassador (November 28, 1956).

* Born in 1915, in the Northern Sudan, Jamal Mohamad Ahmad was educated at Gordon College in Khartoum (1932-36). He became a teacher and wrote children's stories for a Government publication. From 1944 to 1946 he studied education at Exeter, and after post-graduate studies at Oxford between 1952 and 1955 he became B.Litt. with a thesis on social and political development in the Arab world. Returning to Khartoum he was appointed Students' Warden of the University. (Written in 1957.)

In manner he is reticent, but in fact he has shown himself to be well-disposed, with "New Statesman-like" views. He is a sincere democrat, troubled by the spread of military dictatorships in the Middle East.

Jamal Mohamad Ahmad is accredited also in Amman, Ankara and Beirut.

Switzerland

M. Egbert de Graffenried, Minister (December 18, 1956).

* M. de Graffenried is accredited also in Beirut, Amman and Damascus and resides in Beirut. The Legation in Baghdad is conducted by M. Giovanni Enrico Bucher, a cheerful and sociable little bachelor,

a keen worker, whose last post was in the Political Department in Berne and who has served in India and Pakistan. He speaks excellent English. (Written in 1957.)

Since November 1956, the Swiss have been responsible for French interests in Iraq. M. Max Rudolf Joss (Attaché), an agreeable diplomat from Zurich has an unwilling responsibility for French affairs.

Syria

With the formation of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Legation in Baghdad has been closed. See *United Arab Republic*.

Tunisia

M. Mohammed al-Habib al-Shatti, Ambassador (February 2, 1958).

M. Habib Shatti is also accredited to Damascus and Beirut, where he resides. The Embassy in Baghdad is normally conducted by the Counsellor, M. Mohammed Laroussi al Matoui, who speaks French and is friendly and forthcoming.

Turkey

Lieutenant-General Behcet Türkmen, Ambassador (April 3, 1957).

* Born at Mitylene in 1899, General Türkmen was commissioned in 1915 and served in the infantry and on the General Staff both in Palestine and against the Greeks at Izmir. After post-war service in Eastern Turkey, when he distinguished himself in action against the Kurds, he became Military Attaché at Athens, Moscow and Stockholm. He returned to the Eastern frontier in 1942 as a Staff Officer. From 1944 to 1948 he was Director of Military Intelligence, was appointed a Brigadier-General at Iskenderun in 1950 and Major-General in 1951, and in 1952 became Turkish Assistant Commander at H.A.L.F.S.E.E. at Izmir. From 1953 until 1957, General Türkmen was head of the Turkish Security Service, devoting himself to radical reform and improvement. He is a close associate of the Turkish Prime Minister.

General Türkmen is very friendly towards the Western Powers and proud of his British and American connections in the Security Service. He is a little "touchy" and *protocolaire*, but he is an energetic head of mission with wide contacts among the Iraqis. He was an amiable if obstinate colleague in the Council of the Baghdad Pact. He speaks a little English and rather more French. (Written in 1957.)

His wife, who speaks French, has suffered from poor health.

United Arab Republic

Mr. Sayid Fahmi, Ambassador (August 1, 1958).

We have no relations with the Embassy of the U.A.R. My colleagues tell me that Sayid Fahmi is a pleasant and friendly person. He was the first Ambassador to present his credentials to the new régime. He speaks good English. His wife seems quiet and apparently speaks French.

USSR

Mr. Gregory Titovitch Zaitsev, Ambassador (September 9, 1958).

Diplomatic relations between Iraq and the USSR were resumed very shortly after the Revolution of July 14, and Mr. Zaitsev arrived in Baghdad on August 5, 1958. Born about 1902, he is a graduate in oriental studies, and has served in Iran. He was previously Ambassador in Iraq in the period before relations were broken off by Nuri Said. After a tour as Ambassador to the Netherlands, he became Director in 1953 of the Near and Middle East

Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. He accompanied Mr. Shepilov to Cairo in June 1956 and to the Suez Conference in London in August 1956. He is married with one child, but his family have not yet joined him in Baghdad.

He seems an energetic, relatively informed person with a potentially overbearing manner in political discussion. He has so far conducted himself in a friendly manner towards the United Kingdom. He speaks fair English and good Persian.

United States

Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador (November 3, 1954).

* Mr. Gallman was born in 1899 in Wellsville, New York. He graduated B.A. at Cornell University in 1921, spent a year at Georgetown University Law School and joined the State Department in 1922. He served in Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Latvia and Poland. In 1942 he became Consul in London where he was later promoted to be Counsellor and Minister. He was Ambassador to Poland from 1948 to 1950, spent a year at the United States War College and from there he was appointed Ambassador to South Africa.

He is amiable and equable but rather lacking in drive. He is basically friendly to Britain and co-operated well in the Council of the Pact, but he is shy, and it has been difficult to get on to terms of intimacy with him. He was greatly distressed over the Anglo-French action at Suez, and under his inspiration the American Embassy dissociated themselves from us. But relations between the two Embassies are now close and cordial. His wife is agreeably simple, sincere and unaffected. They both take a friendly interest in people and life in Iraq. Mr. Gallman is a keen tennis player. (Written in 1957.)

Mr. Gallman will soon be leaving Iraq.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Diajaz Dizdarevic, Ambassador (September 15, 1958).

The first Yugoslavian Embassy in Iraq was opened in September 1958. The Ambassador was born in 1920 in Bosnia, a Moslem, and graduated in Oriental languages at Belgrade University. He joined the partisans in 1941, and in 1944-45 was Secretary of the Military Mission in Albania. Since the war, he has served in Ankara and Cairo, and more recently held important posts in the Republic Council of the Bosnian People's Assembly and the Central Committee of the Bosnian Communist Party. He is a

friendly colleague who claims to have gone out of his way to warn the Iraqis of the danger of too close relations with the USSR. He has been described as "strongly pro-Nasser, even for a Yugoslav."

He speaks Arabic and French. His wife does not go out much.

Missions accredited in Iraq without Representatives resident in Baghdad

(Dates in parenthesis refer to presentation of credentials in Baghdad)

Austria

Mr. Kurt Farbowsky, Minister (April 3, 1957)—Beirut.

Ethiopia

Mr. Mered Mengasha, Chargé d'Affaires *a.i.*—Cairo.

Greece

M. Antoine Nomicos, Chargé d'Affaires *a.i.*—Beirut.

Libya

Mr. Ali Essad el-Jarbi, Minister (February 24, 1957)—Ankara.

Mexico

Mr. Marco A. Almazan, Chargé d'Affaires (February 3, 1951)—Beirut.

Norway

Mr. Ivar Lunde, Minister (February 19, 1957)—Ankara.

Portugal

Mr. Luis Norton de Mattos, Minister (May 22, 1957)—Ankara.

Roumania

Mr. Constantin Stanescu, Ambassador (October 13, 1958)—Cairo.

Sweden

Mr. Ragnvald R. Bagge, Minister (April 2, 1953)—Tehran.

Thailand

Luang Bhadravadi, Minister (January 1, 1958)—Karachi.

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APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ IN 1958

Mr. Crawford to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 22)

(No. 182. Confidential) Baghdad,
Sir, December 15, 1958.

With reference to Mr. Beaumont's despatch No. 245 of September 26, 1957, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in Iraq in December 1958.

2. As it is impossible to see far ahead in the present situation, I have retained many members of the old régime in this report, however unlikely it may be that they will play a further part in the politics of Iraq. I have also included those new personalities who are of interest in the Iraqi political scene to-day, even though it is impossible to be sure that the prominence of some of them will last for any appreciable time. As a result, the number of personalities dealt with in this report is rather greater than usual.

I have, &c.

R. S. CRAWFORD.

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72. Faisal Farouq Damluji.
73. Fakhri Jamil al Fakhri, C.B.E.
74. Fakhri Shehab.
75. Fakhri Tabaqchali.
76. Fuad al Rikabi.
77. Fuad Said Arif (Brigadier, Retired).
78. Gharbi al Haj Ahmad.
79. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil al Daghestani, C.V.O. (Major-General).
80. Hafidh al Qadhi.
81. Hashim Jawad.

82. Hassan al Talabani (Shaikh).
83. Hikmat Sulaiman.
84. Hudaib al Haj Hamud.
85. Husamuddin Jumaa.
86. Hussain Jamil.
87. Ibrahim Kubba (Dr.).
88. Ihsan Rifat.
89. Ihsan al Umari (Major-General, Retired).
90. Ismail Safwat.
91. Izzuddin Mulla.
92. Jabr Umar (Dr.).
93. Jalal al Awqati (Colonel).
94. Jalal Baban.
95. Jalal Khalid.
96. Jamal Baban.
97. Jamal Umar Nadhmi.
98. Jamil Abdul Wahhab.
99. Jamil al Urfali.
100. Jussam Muhammad Shahir (Colonel).
101. Kadhim Abadi (Brigadier).
102. Kamil al Chadirchi.
103. Khaddouri Khaddouri.
104. Khalil Ibrahim.
105. Khalil Jamil (Major-General).
106. Khalil Kanna.
107. Khalil Said Abdur Rahman (Brigadier).
108. Mahmud Baban.
109. Majid Mustafa.
110. Mar Shimun (His Beatitude).
111. Matti Aqrabi (Dr.).
112. Muhammad Ali al Chalabi.
113. Muhammad Ali Mahmud.
114. Muhammad Hassan Salman (Dr.).
115. Muhammad Hadid.
116. Muhammad Ja'far al Shabibi, C.B.E.
117. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri.
118. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.
119. Muhammad Nasir.
120. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi (Saiyid).
121. Mohammed Saleh Mahmud (Dr.).
122. Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal.
123. Muhyi ud-Din Abdul Hamid (Brigadier).
124. Mulla Mustafa.
125. Mumtaz Akram al Umari.
126. Musa Shabandar (Dr.).
127. Mustafa Ali.
128. Mustafa Rifa'at al Haj Sirri (Colonel).
129. Mustafa al Umari.
130. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi.
131. Nadhir al Umari.
132. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi (Dr.).
133. Nadhim al Tabaqchali (Brigadier).
134. Naji al Asil (Dr.).
135. Naji Talib (Brigadier).
136. Najib al Rawi.
137. Najib al Rubaii (Major-General).
138. Najib al Sayegh.
139. Nasrat al Farisi.
140. Nuruddin Mahmud.
141. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi, K.B.E. (Lieutenant-General).
142. Rashid Ali al Gailani.
143. Rashid Najib.
144. Rauf al Bahrani.
145. Rauf al Chadirchi.
146. Rushdi al Chalabi.
147. Sa'ad Umar.
148. Sabih Mumtaz al Daftari.
149. Sadiq al Bassam.
150. Said Qazzaz.
151. Saleh Mahdi Haidar (Dr.).
152. Saleh Saib al Jubhuri.
153. Saleh Zakki Taufiq (Major-General).
154. Salim Fakhri.
155. Sami Fattah.
156. Shakir Maher.
157. Shakir Mahmoud Shukri (Brigadier).
158. Sheet Na'man.

159. Siddiq Hassan (Brigadier).
160. Taha al Hashimi.
161. Tahir Yahya (Colonel).
162. Tahsin Qadri, G.C.V.O., O.B.E.
163. Talib Abdul Majid Jamil.
164. Tariq al Askari.
165. Taufiq al Mukhtar.
166. Tariq Said Fahmi (Major-General, Retired).
167. Taufiq Suwaidi.
168. Taufiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.
169. Wasfi Taher (Colonel).
170. Yahya Qassim.
171. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid).

The Former Royal Family

1. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born at Istanbul 1900, he is the youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz and a half brother to the late Kings Ali of Hejaz and Faisal I of Iraq, and to King Abdullah of Jordan. His mother was a Turk.

He was educated at Istanbul. He served with the Sharifian forces during the first world war and won the good opinion of British officers. He was appointed an Honorary G.B.E. for his services.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and was commissioned in the Iraq cavalry. He acted as Regent for a short time during King Faisal's absence in 1924. From 1925 to 1928 he studied agriculture at Oxford and from 1928 to 1931 he lived in Cyprus where his father had retired after being driven from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud.

After the death of King Hussein in 1931 the Amir Zaid was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932. He was transferred to Cairo in 1934, owing to the scandal caused by the marriage of his sister to Ata Amin (q.v.), but he refused to accept this appointment. At the end of 1934 he was engaged in litigation in Athens about properties which he claimed to have inherited in Greece. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In 1937 he was recalled for enquiries into allegations that he had used his position to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He survived the enquiry and returned to Berlin. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and remained in Iraq until the summer of 1939 when he went to live at Istanbul.

In 1933 he had married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her previous husband. This *mésalliance* was the main reason for his not being made Regent on the death of King Ghazi in 1939.

During World War II he remained for the most part in Turkey though he came occasionally to Iraq to act as Regent in the absence of Amir Abdul Ilah (q.v.). In 1946 he was appointed first Iraqi Ambassador in London and has remained there ever since, making almost annual summer visits to Baghdad to act as Regent in King Faisal's absence. He was awarded the G.C.V.O. on the occasion of King Faisal's State Visit to London in 1956.

The Amir Zaid is a friendly and well-mannered man. He is a shrewd observer who takes a detached and cynical view of Iraqi and Arab politics. He speaks English and Turkish in addition to Arabic. His wife has had some success as an artist, having held exhibitions of her paintings in London and in Paris, but she is seldom seen in Iraq. They have one son, Raad, born about 1938, who was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and is now at Cambridge. She has a daughter in Turkey by an earlier marriage.

Was out of Iraq on July 14, 1958. Dismissed from his post of Ambassador in London after the revolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Hussain Ali, Sherif

Born about 1920. A member of the Egyptian branch of the Hashemite family. Is married to Princess Badia, sister of Amir Abdul Ilah, and the father of three small boys. A pleasant if not very intelligent man who has family and property in Egypt. He played little political role in Iraq. Went into hiding with his family after the revolution. They all left for Egypt in August 1958 and eventually reached Switzerland.

3. Hussein Nasir, Sharif

A cousin of Faisal II and of Abdul Ilah with the style of "Highness."

He was educated in Istanbul during the 1914-18 war. From 1935 to 1938 he was attached to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara and later held an appointment in the Royal Palace at Baghdad. Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem from 1946 to 1948.

He is married to a daughter of King Abdullah of Jordan, whose service he entered in 1948.

A good humoured, genial and friendly man without much ability or personality.

He is little seen in Iraq.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Ali Ghalib

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Baghdad 1908. Was a cadet at the Royal Military College, Baghdad, and the Royal Military College, Woolwich. After graduating became a Royal Artillery officer. He passed the Staff Colleges at Baghdad and Quetta. Was senior Iraqi Liaison Officer in Palestine in 1948. Has been Director of General Staff in the Ministry of Defence, promoted and given command of the 1st Division, 1953, and promoted major-general, 1954. Transferred as Director-General of Police in 1956. Dismissed after the revolution, arrested and accused under the corruption law of July 1958.

A capable and ambitious officer with a pleasant manner and speaking English well. Sympathetically inclined to the West and a supporter of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. He accompanied the Chief of the General Staff to the United States in 1954 after Iraqi acceptance of American aid. After an initial period finding his feet in the police appeared to have settled down to be a competent Director-General. His wife goes out.

2. Abbas Mahdi

Shia. Born 1898. Served in the Head Post Office, the Iraqi Legation at Tehran and the Ministry of Education. Minister of Education, 1932-33. Minister of Economics and Communications in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in 1934. Director-General of Tapu, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace, 1937. Minister of Economics and Communications, 1937-38, in the Cabinets of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madfai. Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Minister at Tehran, 1943-45. Appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow in 1945. Was made Senator in 1949, after his return from Moscow. He played a prominent part in opposing the policy of Nuri al Said's Government in the Senate in 1951 and again in 1952.

He is now a spent force politically, but in the past enjoyed a certain amount of patronage which led to his being made a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly on several occasions. He is friendly to the United Kingdom and speaks English. His younger brother, Saleh Mahdi, is a member of the Iraqi Foreign Service. His wife does not appear in society.

3. Abdul Amir Allawi (Dr.)

Shia. Born 1911. Graduate of the Baghdad Medical College and for many years at Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital. Entered the Medical Service of the Iraq Government in 1933 and was appointed Director of the Child Welfare Hospital in 1947.

Although he had taken no part in politics he was Minister of Health in Jamali's Government in September 1953, in Nuri's Government from December 1955 to June 1957, and again in Ali Jaudat's Government from June to December 1957.

Minister of Communications in Abdul Wahhab Murjan's Government in December 1957 and returned to Health in Nuri's Government in March 1958, retained post in Ahmad Mukhtar Baban's Government in May 1958 and stayed there until the revolution. Elected as Deputy for Muntafiq in September 1954. A close friend of Sayid Abdul Mahdi and married to a daughter of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi, and it was largely due to this that he was a Minister so often. Dr. Allawi is a very good children's doctor, a pleasant though opinionated man, and speaks excellent English. His wife, who appeared in society, speaks a little English.

Although he had a bad reputation for corruption, he was, somewhat surprisingly, not arrested after the revolution.

4. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Born 1899 at Kadhmain of the well-known Shia landowning family. Brother of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.). Educated Baghdad and United States (q.v.). D.Sc., Michigan University. Appointed engineer in Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1929, and rose to Assistant Director-General in 1941.

Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of 1944. Minister of Supply for a month in August 1944 and then returned to Communications and Works. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation, 1946. He resigned this post in November 1950 on being appointed a member of the Development Board. Resigned from the Board in December 1952. Appointed Ambassador to Tehran, July 1956; recalled after the revolution. A rather weak personality, incompetent, unreliable, and said to be corrupt.

His wife speaks no English.

5. Abdul Aziz al Duri (Dr.)

Sunni. Born 1908. Joined Government service in 1943 as assistant professor at the Higher Teachers' Training College in Baghdad. Appointed Director at Headquarters of the Ministry of Education in 1949 and returned to the H.T.T.C. as professor in 1950. He became Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences in March 1951. Visiting professor at London University in 1956. Dismissed from his post at the College of Arts and Sciences after the revolution and suspended from Government service for one year.

By profession an Arab historian, he is internationally respected as a sound scholar. A mild, shy and intellectual personality, he is little interested in administration or apparently in politics. He speaks English fluently. His wife, who also speaks English, rarely appears in public.

6. Abdul Aziz Al-Uqaili (Brigadier)

Graduate of Iraqi Staff College and instructor there, 1951-53. G.S.O. (I) of First Division, 1953-54. Director of Military Training, 1956-57. Reported in 1952 to be an able officer and friendly towards the British. Also to have suffered a breakdown from overwork. Appointed Commander of the First Division at Diwaniyah, after the revolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. Abdul Fattah Ibrahim

Educated in the United States. Member of the National Union Party (of Communist inclinations, dissolved in 1947) and proprietor of its paper, *Al Siyasa*. Charged with sedition in 1949. Appointed Director of Government Oil Refineries Administration in August 1958.

8. Abdul Ghani al Dalli

Shia of Suq al Shuyukh. Born about 1920. Educated at Nasriyah, Baghdad Law College and the London School of Economics (1945). Became a teacher at the Baghdad Law College in 1946 and in the same year was appointed by Saleh Jabr Assistant Master of Royal Ceremonies in the Palace. Became director-general of the Industrial Bank in September 1947, in which post he proved himself to be a competent official. Assistant Director-General of Finance, September 1952. Elected Deputy for Suq al Shuyukh, January 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of Agriculture in Dr. Jamali's Government. Served in the same capacity in Dr. Jamali's second Government and the Cabinet formed by Arshad al Umari in April 1954, but resigned after a quarrel with Arshad in June 1954. In March 1954 he accompanied King Faisal on State Visit to Pakistan. June and September 1954 re-elected for Suq al Shuyukh. Appointed Ambassador to Morocco and Tunis in July 1956; recalled after the revolution.

A founder member of the Ba'ath Club in 1949. Intelligent and, though critical of some aspects of Western policy, a believer in co-operation with the West. As a Minister appears to have been conscientious and hardworking, if a little pompous. He speaks excellent English and his wife, whom he married in 1950, also speaks a little.

9. Abdul Hadi al Chalabi

Shia of Kadhmain. Born Baghdad 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner.

Deputy for Baghdad, 1934. Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Arshad al Umari, 1946. Appointed Senator in June 1947 and elected First Vice-President of the Senate in February 1950, 1951 and January 1953. Re-elected First Vice-President of the Senate, December 1953 and November 1954. Visited Turkey with Iraqi Parliamentary delegation in April 1955.

His principal interest is in business and in pursuance of it he supported at different times both Saleh Jabr and Nuri al Said, and was used by the latter as an intermediary with the Shia community, particularly the religious dignitaries of Kadhmain. He was also on good terms with the Crown Prince, who used him to further his designs on Syria, and this strengthened his position with successive Prime Ministers, who were careful to keep on good terms with him and to appoint members of his family to their Governments. He did not fail to profit by this, manipulating the grain market and particularly the export market, through his political contacts. His business record shows that he is unscrupulous and will not hesitate to evade his obligations if it suits him.

He is good company in Arabic and Persian, but speaks very little English, though he visits London annually. He is a philanthropist and has subscribed generously to Iraqi charities, and has built a hospital at his own expense at Kadhmain. His wife appears in public.

Abdul Hadi was one of the favourite targets of the Opposition before the revolution. This was because of his wealth, said to have been amassed by dishonest means, and the considerable political influence which this wealth enabled him to exercise. He was out of Iraq at the time of the revolution and

has not yet returned. His property has been seized, but he is not down for trial.

10. Abdul Hadi al Dhahir

Baghdad Shia, born about 1900, whose wealth derives mainly from property in the city of Baghdad. Interested in politics, but too rich to need to work, he twice entered Government service and twice resigned after two or three years. He has often been a Deputy and has intermittently practised as a lawyer. As Mutasarrif of Hilla from 1943 to 1944 he showed himself an experienced and honest but lazy administrator. He was Minister of Economics in Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet in 1946 and is a bitter opponent of Nuri al Said and Saleh Jabr. He was a founder member of the United Popular Front and was elected to the Front's Political Committee in June 1951. Member of the Court of Cassation, April 1953.

He has a clear mind, but though by nature affable and moderate, he has in recent years been under the influence of his more energetic and fanatical younger brother, Abdul Razzaq (q.v.).

His wife does not appear in society.

11. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi (Dr.)

Sunni. Born in 1894. Son of a former Rais Belidiya of Baghdad and cousin of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). Educated in Baghdad and Istanbul, he qualified as a doctor in France and entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital.

He was Minister of Social Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet from June to November 1946, was appointed Mayor of Baghdad in 1948, and Director-General in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1949. He has represented Iraq at the International Labour Organisation Conferences from 1951. Appointed Minister of Health under Arshad al Umari, April 1954, but returned to his post as Director-General, Ministry of Social Affairs, in order to attend the I.L.O. Conference in Geneva in June. Dismissed after the revolution.

Fat, genial and lazy but, nevertheless, accounted to be of some ability, he did not play a prominent part in politics. He is married to a White Russian wife and speaks fluent French and some English.

12. Abdul Hamid Kadhim (Dr.)

Born 1910. Shia. Joined Government service in 1930 on the educational side. Assistant professor at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1941, and Dean of that college, 1950. Seconded to UNESCO on Cairo for one year, September 1952. Appointed Director-General of Education, 1953. Minister of Education in the Government of Arshad al Umari (q.v.), 1954. Member of Iraqi Delegation to Bandung Conference, 1955. Reappointed Director-General of Education, 1956. Minister of Education in Ali Jaudat's Government, June 1957.

Remained Minister of Education in the Governments of Abdul Wahhab Murjan, Nuri es Said and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban. Dismissed after the revolution and is awaiting trial. As Dean of the Higher Teachers' Training College, he was most successful. His views on education are clear, decisive and progressive and had he remained in office, there was every chance that he would have tried hard to carry them out. He has visited the United Kingdom as the guest of the British Council, was a member of the British Institute Club Committee and well disposed towards us. Although holding relatively liberal views in politics and being a believer in academic freedom, he held office in the authoritarian Governments which preceded the revolution. He was an honest and competent Minister and it is unfortunate that he has been excluded from public affairs.

13. Abdul Ilah Hafidh (Dr.)

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of Mohammed Ali Fadhil who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris where he qualified as a dentist but also took a degree in political science. On his return to Baghdad he practised as a dentist.

Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and again in 1935. In 1935 and again from 1938 to 1940 he held foreign service appointments at Paris, Beirut and Bombay. In 1936 he was Director-General of Commerce and in 1941 Director-General of Revenue.

Held a number of ministerial appointments from 1942 onwards under Nuri al Said, Arshad al Umari and Saleh Jabr. Appointed first Governor of the National Bank in 1949 and reappointed for a further term of three years in 1952 and again in 1955. In July 1953 was a member of Iraqi Economic Delegation to United Kingdom. Has so far survived the revolution, but his position seems somewhat precarious.

Fat, with a passion for growing roses, he is friendly and co-operative, but not energetic.

When he came to his present job he had little knowledge of banking, but as a result of the experience he has gained is now much less of a fool than his enemies allege; but he is inclined to play safe. He speaks French and English. His wife speaks good English.

14. Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi

Baghdad Shia, born about 1906. Graduated in agriculture at the University of California and in education at Colombia Teachers' College. He served first in the Ministry of Education, in which he became Director of Primary Education (and Acting Director-General) in 1943 and Chief Inspector in 1946. He left Education in 1946 to become Minister of Supply in Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet. When this Cabinet resigned he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Communications and Works. He has also been a member of Iraqi delegations to the San Francisco and other conferences. Minister of Agriculture, July 1952. Member of the Development Board, December 1952 from which he was dismissed after the revolution, but he is not in trouble.

He is a sincere nationalist but broad-minded and reasonable with a keen sense of humour. He was convinced of the need of Western assistance for Iraq, and highly respected by his many British friends, who could always rely on his co-operation. Was an active member of the committee of the British Institute Club. He was the most efficient and intelligent Iraqi member of the Development Board, before the revolution, where he co-operated well with the British and United States members in trying to secure orderly and efficient administration, and in opposing the intrigues of Abdul Rahman al Jalili (q.v.). One of Iraq's few honest and competent officials, he has no illusions about his countrymen and is subject to fits of depression. He drinks fairly heavily and is inclined to be lazy. He speaks English very well. His wife, who speaks some English, appears in public. She is a sister of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.).

15. Abdul Jabbar Fahmi, C.B.E.

Born 1905. Joined the Police in 1922 and rose fairly rapidly. Was Director of Police, Mosul, 1948, and Commandant of Police in Baghdad Liwa in 1952.

In 1953 appointed Mutasarrif of Baghdad and was active in this post during the severe flooding in 1954. Speaks fair English and returned from a visit to the United Kingdom in 1954 with favourable impressions of the relative efficiency of British administration and has made several visits to the United Kingdom to study particular aspects of it. As a result he was

active in promoting similar schemes, e.g., school meals, courses for the handicapped, night classes, &c., in Baghdad. He also organised agricultural and industrial exhibitions in Baghdad, partly, it is thought, in the interest of advertising himself as well as Iraq's products. He is politically a trimmer, but inclines to Nuri Pasha's Party, being related by marriage to Mohammed Ali Mahmud (q.v.). He was an efficient policeman and a good Mutasarrif. His reputation was tainted by rumours of corruption and he narrowly escaped the axe of the Purge Committee in 1956-57. Dismissed from his post after the revolution, arrested and put on trial.

Awarded a C.B.E. in 1955 for his help in the arrangements for the British Trade Fair held in Baghdad in 1954.

His wife, who, like himself, speaks good English, is a school-teacher and a charming and intelligent woman.

16. Abdul Jabbar Abdullah (Professor)

A scientist, Professor Abdullah was appointed to be President of Baghdad University in the autumn 1958. He is well disposed to us.

17. Abdul Jabbar Jommard (Dr.)

Born about 1907 in Mosul. A journalist and newspaper owner. Deputy for Mosul 1948, he resigned with other members of the Opposition in 1950.

Elected again in January 1953 as a member of the United Popular Front but resigned from the U.P.F. in October 1953 as he disagreed with the policy permitting members to serve in the Cabinet of Dr. Jamali; he himself was not invited to join it. In 1954 he was elected again for Mosul but as a member of the National Front. An effective speaker, Dr. Jommard was one of the main personalities of the then Opposition.

Between the return to office of Nuri-as-Said in 1954 and the revolution little was heard of him. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Revolutionary Government. In this post, he has been courteous, but tends to confine his conversation to platitudes. It is clear that he has as yet little influence on policy, and he gives the impression of being somewhat of a front man whose main object is to keep the Diplomatic Corps relatively contented. He has, however, travelled since his appointment both to the United Nations and to other Arab States and may be gaining in experience and influence. In so far as he expresses any views, they appear to be moderate and neutralist. He is apparently anti-Communist, he is not hostile to the West and he has an affection for France where he spent World War II. He speaks fluent French, but little English. In his youth was one of Iraq's best footballers.

His home remains in Mosul and his wife has not appeared in Baghdad since the revolution.

18. Abdul Karim Kannuna (Dr.)

Born 1913 of a Sunni mother and a Shia father. Studied in Germany, travelling also in France and Algeria, where he got into trouble with the French authorities. Joined Government service in 1931, appointed Inspector-General of Finance in 1951, Director-General of Income Tax in 1952. Accountant-General in 1953 and acting Director-General of Income Tax in 1955. A member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration Board since 1952. Appointed Director-General of the Estate Bank in September 1957.

An able accountant, he has risen steadily through hard work (he claims to have taken no leave for 15 years), and through cultivating useful friends. He survived the revolution which is logical in view

of his pronounced but moderate nationalist views. Friendly and helpful to the British, he resembles one of the nicer characters in the "Wind in the Willows." He speaks excellent English, German and some French. His wife also talks well.

19. Abdul Karim Qasim (Brigadier)

Sunni Moslem, born in 1914. Graduate of Baghdad Staff College and Senior Officers' School in the United Kingdom. Commanded the 19th Brigade in Jordan at Mafrak during the Suez crisis. As lieutenant-colonel took a genuine interest in the welfare of his men and was extremely popular. A devout Moslem and among the few Iraqi Army officers who regularly keep Ramadan.

Together with Staff Colonel Abdul Salem Mohammed Arif, Qasim organised and carried out the *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958. Immediately on seizing power he took rapid and effective measures to restore order and establish a Government. He made it clear that in the internal field he wished to carry out a programme of moderate social reform, to raise the standard of living of the people and to root out corruption. In foreign politics, he advocated neutrality and friendship towards all countries prepared to be friendly with Iraq. He has been cautious in his dealings with the United Arab Republic and has shown no tendency to move quickly towards a merger on which issue he was challenged by Arif but at the moment appears to have won. Qasim gives the impression that he wishes to be on good terms with the West and to maintain Iraq's economic and cultural ties. He appears to be a dedicated perhaps naïve idealist, but he has had no previous experience of the problems of government and it is not clear if he is a big enough man to master them. He has accepted Communist support in his struggle with Arif and the Ba'ath Party and there is some doubt whether he will be able to control Communist activities in Iraq in the future. There is no indication that Qasim himself has Communist sympathies. He has considerable personal charm and apparently not a robust constitution.

He understands English, but is not fluent at speaking. He is unmarried.

20. Abdul Karim al Uzri

Kadhimain Shia, born in 1908; brother of Abdul Amir al Uzri (q.v.). Educated in Baghdad and at the London School of Economics, he has held a number of Government appointments. Secretary to the Ministry of Education, 1932. Assistant Secretary at the Royal Palace, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1936. Acting Director-General of Revenues, 1937. Director of Commerce, 1938. Director-General of Economics from 1939 until he resigned again in 1942 after being involved in a financial scandal.

Minister of Finance under Taufiq Suwaidi in February 1950, and under Dr. Jamali in September 1953. In March 1954 was Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's second Cabinet but resigned in April.

Elected Deputy in 1943, 1950 and again in March 1954, and May 1958 he represented Baghdad (Kadhimain) in double harness with Nadim al Pachachi (q.v.) from June 1954 to the revolution. He joined the National Democratic Party on its foundation in 1946, but resigned about a year later. A member of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of the National Bank, he has a profitable estate near Kadhimain and interests in a cement factory.

As a nationalist, he was highly critical of many aspects of British policy in Iraq and the Middle East generally; but he is Western in outlook, realised the value for Iraq of the British connexion, and was friendly and co-operative. He was an able Minister of Finance and was chiefly responsible for the

passage through Parliament of the law establishing the Development Board. He supported Saleh Jabr in the past. He was at one time anathema to Nuri Said, who regarded him as the worst kind of Western-educated Iraqi youth and a trouble maker. The dislike was reciprocated and was really a contrast of two generations as well as of two creeds. This difference was, however, patched up sufficiently for Uzri to accept office under Nuri in March 1958. Abdul Karim is a Socialist in outlook and it can be held to his credit that he resigned from Dr. Jamali's Cabinet because the reforms which he outlined as Minister of Finance were being obstructed. Not many Iraqi Ministers have done this. It was probably unfortunate for Uzri that he accepted office as Minister of Finance under Nuri in March 1958 and occupied the same post in the Arab Union Government. He did this, although he disapproved of much of Nuri's policy, in the hope that he would be able to institute the economic reforms necessary if the country were to avoid a revolution. When he was in office, his reformist zeal became a little discouraged, probably because of Nuri's refusal to understand the problems. He became obsessed with the necessity of Kuwait joining the Arab Union and predicted that this was the only way to save the Union from disaster. He was also a fervent supporter of Dr. Jamali's violently anti-Nasser line. Arrested after the revolution, but subsequently released. It is unfortunate that Abdul Karim should be out of action as he was one of the ablest Ministers of the former régime and a genuine reformist.

He speaks English well, and his wife, from the Rifa'i family of Naqaf, speaks it a little. One daughter has married into the Chelabi family.

21. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shia from the lower Gharraf (Muntafiq). Born about 1894 of an influential family and owns a large estate.

Deputy in the Turkish Parliament and in most Iraqi Parliaments from 1927 onwards. He was a supporter of the late Yasin Pasha al Hashemi.

Minister of Education under Rashid Ali in 1933. Minister of Economics in the Governments of Taha al Hashimi and Nuri Said in 1941 and of Communications and Works under Nuri in 1942. Senator from 1941. Again Minister of Communications and Works under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1950. He was a friend and supporter of Saleh Jabr with whom he founded the Popular Socialist Party. He later led the extreme faction of the party after its splits in 1953 and 1954.

In November 1950 he was accused of the attempted murder of Senator Khaiyun al Ubaid but was released on bail after a week in prison. Although the case against him was subsequently stopped, he bitterly resented what he considered to be a deliberate act of hostility on Nuri's part.

A strong nationalist and fervent Shia, he was fairly well in with the palace before the revolution. We have not heard of him since. He speaks no European language.

22. Abdul Majid Abbas (Dr.)

Born in 1910 at Qala'at Sikkar on the Gharraf. Shia of tribal origin. Educated at the Scots College, Safed, Palestine, the Friends' School, Brummana, the American University, Beirut, and Chicago University from 1934 to 1939 (where he studied economics), all at the expense of the Iraq Government. Professor at the Baghdad Law College from 1940 to 1949. Deputy for Amara in 1947 and for the Muntafiq in 1948. Joined Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party in 1949 and was for some time editor of the party newspaper. He submitted his resignation from the party in May 1951, but Nuri Pasha refused to

accept it. Served with the Iraqi Delegation to United Nations in December 1950 and September 1951. Again elected as Deputy for the Muntafiq in January 1953 and served as Minister of Communications and Works in both Dr. Jamali's Cabinets. Re-elected for the Muntafiq in June 1954 and appointed Minister of Agriculture by Arshad al Umari. This appointment led to a dispute with the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party, who felt they should have been consulted before acceptance and considered him as having resigned from the party. In March 1955 was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. In June 1955 was made a member of the Board of the Government Oil Refineries Administration. Appointed Permanent Delegate of the Arab Union to the United Nations in June 1958. Dismissed after the revolution.

A pleasant enough person, but too ingratiating and lacking in character and reputedly corrupt. A keen reader, he claims to be happy with his books. Was in close touch with the American Embassy before the revolution and holds strong anti-Communist views. Was a friend and supporter of Dr. Jamali. Speaks good English and his wife, who appears in public, knows a little English. She is a Shia from the Lebanon of the Osseiran family.

23. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.

Born 1901. Shia of Baghdad. Graduate of the Baghdad Law College. Subsequently joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held various appointments, including that of legal adviser, until he was appointed Head of the Political Section. Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet of Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. After serving as Mutasarrif of Karbala until 1948, he was an Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior until his appointment as Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Resigned with Mustafa al Umari in November 1952. Appointed Director-General of Customs in February 1953. Appointed Executive Member, Development Board (July 1953), where he has proved himself an honest, painstaking but somewhat unimaginative official. Appointed Senator in February 1958 and left the Development Board. We have not seen him since the revolution. In recent years he became an increasingly warm supporter of the British connexion. He speaks English pompously, rather in the manner of someone addressing a public meeting, and is intensely proud of his C.B.E., which was awarded to him in 1945 for the friendly and co-operative attitude he adopted towards the Embassy as acting Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1941 to 1944. His wife speaks some English.

24. Abdul Majid Jalil (Colonel)

Appointed Director-General of Security after the revolution. Formerly at the Reserve College, Baghdad, he seems to be suspicious and cautious. It is difficult to get decisions out of him and he is probably afraid of his superiors.

25. Abdul Majid Mahmud

Shia. Born about 1909. Educated in the United States where he obtained a degree in Agriculture. Director of Education in the Muntafiq in the early 1930s. Superintendent (Personnel) of Public Revenues. Inspector in the Income Tax Department in 1941. Held an appointment in the Ministry of Economics in 1942. Appointed Assistant Accountant-General in 1944. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945. Director-General of Agricultural Bank, 1945-50. Appointed Minister of Economics under

Nuri al Said in December 1950 and Acting Minister of Agriculture in April 1952. Defeated by Sadiq al Bassam in the elections of January 1953. Appointed to the Government Oil Board in February 1953. Appointed Minister of Finance under Arshad al Umari, April 1954. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq, June 1954, and September 1954.

Appointed Minister of Development, August 1954, and subsequently Minister without Portfolio after a small financial scandal and was dropped from the Government in May 1955. Appointed Vice-President of the Arab Union Chamber of Deputies in May 1958. Went to ground after the revolution.

Abdul Majid Mahmud was secretary of the Muthanna Club, most of the members of which were Western-educated nationalists with leanings towards national Socialism, and was a founder member of the Ba'ath Club. He played an active part in the Rashid Ali movement. He was much under the influence of Fadhil al Jamali, but owed his ministerial appointments to Nuri al Said. He is president of the Alumni Club of the American University of Beirut in Baghdad.

Abdul Majid Mahmud is a mild and friendly little man holding somewhat naïve nationalist views about which he is extremely garrulous. He says that he has moved away from his earlier extreme nationalism and believes in co-operation with the West, but the fact is that his part, as Nuri al Said's Minister of Economics, in signing the new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952 cut him off from his former nationalist associates, who disapproved of this agreement. His English is good and his wife, who is friendly like himself, also speaks some English. As a Minister he appears to have been neither particularly efficient nor particularly honest. He had opened a law office in Baghdad and hoped to exploit his influence in official circles by acting as adviser to foreign companies.

26. Abdul Majid Qassab

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1908. Educated at Baghdad and Beirut. Took a medical degree at Montpellier. A member of the Muthanna Club. Joined the Constitutional bloc in 1947 and the Nationalist bloc of Independent Deputies in 1952. He voted for the ratification of the agreement between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952. Appointed Minister of Health in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. During his few weeks in office he attempted to undo the work of his predecessors and antagonised most members of his Ministry. Was appointed Minister of Education in Jamali's first Cabinet in September 1953, when he and the Prime Minister insisted on reinstating in the schools and colleges students who had been expelled or imprisoned for Communist agitation. This measure, though liberal in its inspiration, led to an undoubted recrudescence of agitation among the students. Appointed Minister of Health in Jamali's second Cabinet (March 1954). Re-elected Deputy for Baghdad, June 1954, and again in June 1955. Arrested after the revolution; at time of writing is under house arrest.

Though somewhat unbalanced and moody, is pleasant company and has gone out of his way to be friendly to visiting British Members of Parliament, since he was himself a keen member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He speaks French and some English.

27. Abdul Muttalib Amin al Hashimi

Born 1907 in Baghdad. Sunni Moslem. A regular army officer who was at Sandhurst and later attached to the Royal Corps of Signals. He has also been on courses in England. Passed the Iraqi Staff College

in 1949 and was for a short time Director of Military Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence. Military Attaché at Damascus, 1949-52. In November 1952 was Military Commander of Baghdad and made a good showing during and after the riots. Assistant Chief of General Staff, 1953. In October 1953 was appointed to Planning Staff of Military Committee of the Arab League and was Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and Major-General, 1954. Retired and appointed Minister in Iraqi Foreign Service, February 1954. Appointed Minister to Indonesia, June 1954, where he was an *ex-officio* member of the Iraqi Delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Returned to Baghdad in June 1957 with the reputation of having been too deeply involved in Indonesian politics. Was appointed Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya, July 1957.

Intelligent and pleasant, Abdul Muttalib has figured in various highly complicated intrigues, notably concerning Syria, with the result that no one knows whether they can trust him. Speaks excellent English and is regarded as pro-British. Nevertheless, retained his job after the revolution. His wife goes out.

28. Abdul Qadir al Gailani

Born in Baghdad in 1904 of the family of the Naqibs of Baghdad and a lineal descendant of Abdul Qadir Gailani who in the 11th century founded the Qadiriya Sect which spreads over North-West India and North and Central Africa. Elder brother of Yusuf al Gailani (q.v.). Educated at Baghdad and studied at the London School of Economics. Entered the Foreign Service, 1926, and served in London and Cairo, where he was in charge of the Legation several times between 1934 and 1940. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1940. He was closely associated with the rebel Government of Rashid Ali and after its collapse was interned in Rhodesia and later in Iraq. Released, 1944. Re-appointed to Foreign Service and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Karachi, 1948. Transferred to Cairo, 1949, but was not appointed Minister because the Regent distrusts him for the part he played in 1941. In June 1951 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Foreign Service on special duty with the Arab League. Appointed Minister to Pakistan, 1953, and Ambassador, 1956.

He speaks good English. His Egyptian wife has little English, but speaks excellent French.

29. Abdul Qadir Ismail

Lawyer, generally considered to be Communist. Returned to Iraq from exile after the revolution of July 14, 1958, and reported to be politically active.

30. Abdul Rahman al Bazzaz (Dr.)

Born about 1915. Doctor of Law of London University. He was dismissed from his post as Dean of the Law College after Suez for anti-Government political activity. He was allowed to continue his private practice until the revolution when he was reinstated as Dean of the Law College having turned down the post of the Rais of the Diwan of the Council of Ministers (Secretary of the Cabinet). Abdul Rahman is an intelligent, lucid and clear-headed nationalist who is friendly to the West. He is strongly opposed to Communism and hopes that the new Iraq Government will maintain cultural and economic ties with the West. Is at present in disfavour because of his pan-Arab views and sympathy towards the Ba'ath. He would probably make a competent Minister and might have a political future, if Iraq's policy were to move in a pan-Arab direction. Speaks good English.

31. Abdul Rahman al Jalili (Dr.)

Born about 1907 of a leading family of Mosul. He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 but resigned with the Opposition in March 1950. In 1951 he was elected to the Permanent Bureau of the United Popular Front Party and in 1952 to its Administrative Committee, of which he became secretary in 1953. In 1953 he was re-elected Deputy for Mosul. In September 1953 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Dr. Jamali's Government, when he made clear his conviction that the Iraq Government's agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company should be radically revised in favour of Iraq. In 1954 he resigned from the Cabinet because it would not abolish martial law in Basra. On June 27, 1954, he was appointed an executive member of the Development Board. In 1956 he undertook an extensive tour in Europe, including the United Kingdom, in an effort to engage European engineers for the development programme. In 1957 he revisited Germany. Dismissed from the Development Board after the revolution.

A man of considerable intelligence, if also self-important, and a powerful personality, he is self-seeking, politically ambitious, an enemy of Nuri al Said, a strong Arab nationalist and bitterly anti-Zionist. In the Development Board he betrayed a pronounced anti-British and anti-American prejudice and tended to favour German interests. He believes that the existing relationships between Arab Governments and the oil industry represent a form of exploitation by the Western Powers and that the 50/50 share is unfair to the Arabs. He has published a book on the subject. He speaks English well and is personally friendly. He is unmarried.

32. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi

Shia of Kadhmain and a nephew of the Shia Mujtahid Muhammad al Khalisi. Born in 1910. Joined Government service in 1932, served as Administrative Inspector and was appointed Mutasarrif of Karbala in September 1948. Transferred to Diyala in June 1950 and to Baghdad in June 1951. Appointed Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Communications and Works in Nuruiddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. Elected Deputy for Kadhmain in January 1953. Re-elected for Kadhmain, 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said, December 1955 to June 1957. Minister of Justice under Ali Jaudat, June 1957. Arrested after the revolution but released without trial in October 1958.

He owed his success principally to his connexions with Muhammad al Khalisi and Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.). He is a quiet, not very intelligent man and an ardent Shia. He is married to a sister of Abdul Amir Allawi (q.v.) who does not appear in society.

33. Abdul Razzaq Abdul Wahab (Major-General, Retired)

Was Quartermaster-General at the Ministry of Defence before the revolution. Appointed Mutasarrif of Basra after the revolution. A quiet man who gives the impression of being more of a civil servant than a soldier. Her Majesty's Consul-General, Basra, says that he is a cypher without authority.

34. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir

Shia of Baghdad. Born about 1903. Younger brother of Abdul Hadi al Dhahir (q.v.). He has travelled in Europe and speaks English fairly well. In 1942 he was attacked by a nervous disease which affected his brain commonly reputed to be due to hereditary syphilis, and he spent some time in a mental home in Beirut. Joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1946, but soon left it to join

the late Sa'ad Saleh's Liberal Party, of which he continued to be a member until Sa'ad's death early in 1949. Deputy for Baghdad in 1948 and went on Iraqi delegations to several inter-Parliamentary conferences. Minister of Economics in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. He resigned with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950 and is a founder member of the United Popular Front. In June 1951 he was elected to the Front's Permanent Bureau. Arrested after the riots in November 1952. Announced in December 1953 his decision "to abandon politics temporarily."

Abdul Razzaq and his brother are well off, having property in Baghdad and lands in Abu Ghuraib. He was a voluble member of the Opposition before the revolution and expressed their standard views, which have now been translated into the policy of the new Government. He is personally friendly. He has not yet been rewarded with any office. He has published a book damning tribal feudalism in Iraq and three volumes of essays inveighing against British imperialism.

His wife does not appear in society.

35. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud

Sunni of Basra. Born in 1909. Educated Basra and Baghdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. As a young man he held advanced Leftist opinions. Arrested by Jamil Madfai's Government in 1938 for attempting to raise the Diwaniya tribes against them. Released by Nuri Pasha after the military demonstration which removed the Madfai Government. Deputy, 1939 to 1947. Minister of Finance in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. Member of the Liberal Party from 1946 to 1948, when the party suspended activity. Elected President of the Bar Association in 1950, 1951 and 1952. He is one of the leading Iraqi fellow-travellers and played a prominent part in the agitation leading up to the riots in 1952. As a result he was detained for six weeks.

He was active during the elections of June 1954 but after the formation of Nuri al Said's Government withdrew from politics and turned his attention to making money.

Elected President of the Bar Association after the revolution. Headed a delegation to Communist China in September 1958.

Personally cordial he is intelligent and good company. His daughter is married to Usama, son of Tahsin Qadri (q.v.), in the Iraqi Foreign Service. His wife is amiable and emancipated and speaks English.

36. Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif (Colonel)

Sunni Moslem, born in 1921. He held administrative and training appointments in the Ministry of Defence and graduated at the Staff College. He was reported to have been a not particularly impressive Staff Officer and as having an indifferent foundation of knowledge. In July 1958 co-operated with Brigadier Qassim in the *coup d'état*, when he was temporarily in command of the 20th Brigade which moved into Baghdad ahead of Qassim's 19th Brigade. His troops occupied the radio station and Arif himself broadcast the news of the *coup* to the people and played a part in inciting the mob to destroy the King's Palace. He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He was relieved of the latter post on September 11, 1958, and of the other two posts on September 30, 1958, and was appointed Ambassador to Bonn. He returned to Baghdad on November 7 without having taken up his appointment and against the orders of the Government. He was arrested and charged with conspiracy against the régime. At the time of writing he is still under detention but has not been tried.

Immediately after the revolution Arif set himself up as the chief Government spokesman and toured the country making inflammatory anti-imperialist speeches and advocating the equality of all Iraqis. He was also the chief advocate of immediate union between Iraq and the United Arab Republic and enjoyed the support of the Ba'ath Party. He was even hailed by the crowds as the "Nasser of Iraq." His uncontrolled activities, demagoguery and egoism coupled with the inefficient execution of his ministerial duties built up the resentment of his Cabinet colleagues, of many Army officers and of the middle class against him. There is a strong belief that he was plotting to supplant Qassim, possibly with the help of Rashid Ali, but if so his plans came to nothing.

Arif has a certain charm and evident vitality. He is an effective, rather elemental orator. He does not seem to be very intelligent, his detailed political ideas are unpractical and doctrinaire and even at private interviews he has a tendency to pronounce as though he were addressing a crowd. He is a devout Moslem and claims to be a sincere and intense nationalist strongly opposed to Communism. His erratic behaviour was a serious embarrassment to the pro-Nasser faction and increased the Prime Minister's difficulty in maintaining a middle of the road policy in international affairs.

He speaks and understands some English.

37. Abdul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a rich Shia landowning family of Hilla. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he was appointed a judge about 1935 but soon resigned to practise as a lawyer.

In 1946 and 1947 he was leader in Hilla of Kamal al Chadirchi's National Democratic Party but resigned in 1947 owing to his exclusion from the party's Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Saleh Jabr, who secured his election to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1947.

He was again elected Deputy for Hilla in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in June 1948 in Muzahim al Pachachi's Government. Resigned on his election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in autumn 1948. Elected vice-president of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party in December 1949. Became Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri al Said in September 1950 and was transferred to Finance in December 1950. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1951. Deputy for Hilla in January 1953. Minister of Communications and Works, January and May 1953. Resigned after a quarrel with Said Qazzaz in May 1953. Elected President of Chamber of Deputies in December 1953. Re-elected for Hilla in June 1954 and September 1954, when he was again elected as President of the Chamber of Deputies after serving for a month as Minister of Agriculture. Minister of Communications and Works in Ali Jaudat's Government, June 1957. Appointed Prime Minister in December 1957. By helping to arrange this appointment, Nuri was trying Murjan out as a possible successor for the role of leading Shia politician of the generation which would take over after Nuri's departure. The appointment was a mistake and Murjan's Government a fiasco, although it made its mark by the agreement to form the Arab Union with Jordan.

In general Murjan proved weak and incompetent and totally incapable of dealing with the issues which faced him. He is a pleasant enough fellow and was just adequate as President of the Chamber of Deputies to which post he returned during Ahmad Mukhtar Baban's premiership in May 1958. He is now in poor health and has been released from prison on bail, a rather pitiful victim of events that were too big for him. He speaks a little English.

38. Abdul Wahab Shakir (Brigadier, Retired)

Former Commander of the Second Division. Appointed Mutassarif of Hillah after the revolution. He is inclined to be brusque but is businesslike to deal with. He is substantially built but tougher than he looks and genuinely enjoys training and camp life. He had a grievance against his more senior officers because of their failure to pay more attention to purely military matters such as training. He is respected by all Iraqi ranks. He speaks good English.

39. Abdullah Bakr, K.C.V.O.

Born 1907. A Sunni from Mosul. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service at its inception and, after serving in various posts, was promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary in 1948. Chargé d'Affaires at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in 1952. In the summer of 1953 was appointed Deputy Rais of the Royal Diwan and held that post until appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Dr. Jamil's Government in September 1953. Headed the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in autumn 1953. Appointed Rais of the Royal Diwan in March 1954 and accompanied King Faisal on his State Visit to Pakistan that month. Also accompanied the King on his visits to Jordan in April 1955 and Turkey in June 1955 and in his State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1956, when he was made honorary K.C.V.O. A quiet and pleasant personality, he always took a sensible view of things and was a good influence in the Court. He was fully aware of the need for internal reforms, but was probably not forceful enough to impress his views on the Crown Prince. He is at present unemployed, but is not on trial.

40. Abdullah Damluji (Dr.)

Sunni, born in Mosul in 1895, and formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Studied medicine in Constantinople and served in the Turkish army, but transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud when the latter occupied Hasa in 1913.

As Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 he signed the Uqair Protocol, and in 1926 took part in the negotiations in London which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. His influence with Ibn Saud afterwards waned and in 1928, after the failure of the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa, at which he was Ibn Saud's representative, he posted his resignation to Ibn Saud and came to Baghdad instead of returning to the Hejaz.

In Iraq he has been thrice Minister for Foreign Affairs (in 1930-31, 1934 and 1942), thrice Director-General of Health (1932-33, 1934-35 and 1941-42), and Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in 1937-38.

From 1942 onwards, he devoted himself mainly to business. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1947 and was elected Deputy for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

He was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran in February 1950. He spent most of his time in Baghdad, however, and eventually resigned from this post in May 1951. Minister of Education under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952.

In 1956 he was appointed a roving Ambassador by Nuri al Said with a view to effecting a reconciliation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In this capacity he achieved some success which culminated in the State Visit of King Saud to Iraq in May 1957.

An intelligent old man, loyal to the old régime and very friendly and helpful to us. In his visits to Saudi Arabia, he did what he could to improve relations between ourselves and the Saudis. Dismissed from his post after the revolution. He speaks fair English.

41. Abdullah Isma'il al Bustani

Born about 1915. Brother of Abdul Qadir Isma'il. Lawyer and teacher at the Law College. He was dismissed his post at the Law College for political activity at the time of the Suez expedition, and reinstated after July 14, 1958. He is a member of the National Democratic Party and a vigorous Left-wing nationalist, but less extreme than his brother. At the time of writing he is active in writing for and helping to edit the daily *Al Thaura* (The Revolution) which is following a Communist line. The N.D.P. disapprove of this action on Abdullah's part, which he started without consulting them.

Abdullah Isma'il has been personally cordial to us both before and since the revolution. He speaks French but little English and is married to a daughter of the late Jamil Midfai. He is intelligent and engaging.

42. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1900, the son of an 'Alim, Abbas Amin al Fetwa. Educated Baghdad, graduated from the Law College, 1928, and entered Government service. Qaimaqam Samarra, 1936. Director of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 1938. Mutassarif of Diwaniya, 1941. Minister of Interior under Nuri al Said (October-December 1943) and again under Arshad al Umari (June 1946), reverting in the interim to Mutassarif of Mosul, 1944. Director-General of the Date Association, 1947. Appointed Mayor of Baghdad, 1951. Returned to Date Association, March 1953. Represented Iraq at Arab/Italian Economic Conference held in Italy in September 1953. Was made Deputy for Muntafiq, November 1956. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in May 1958 and appointed to the Arab Union Parliament. Up for trial after the revolution.

A fairly capable administrator without marked political leanings.

43. Adnan al Pachachi

Born about 1920. Son of Muzahim al Pachachi and an up and coming member of the Iraqi Foreign Service. Adnan holds moderate nationalist views but is not so extreme as his father. He is personable and intelligent and speaks excellent English. He may well have a future in the Foreign Service. He is married to a daughter of Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi.

44. Ahmad Adnan Hafidh

Born 1909 of a Sunni family from Mosul. He joined Government service in 1934. Became Acting Chief Engineer, Posts and Telegraphs in 1944. Appointed member of the Board of Agricultural Machinery and Implements Administration in 1954. Promoted to Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs in the same year. Made President of the Baghdad Electricity Services Board of Administration, September 1955.

He has travelled abroad a lot. Was invited to the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in the autumn of 1956. Has represented his country at various meetings of the International Telecommunications Union and, in February 1957, at the Arab Postal Conference in Libya. Remained at his post after the revolution.

An enormously fat man with a cheerful disposition. Not very cultivated but likeable. He relied much on his British technical advisors, but naturally insisted that credit for success should be his. Has always been co-operative with this Embassy. He speaks good English.

45. Ahmad al Ajil al Yawir (Shaikh)

Sunni Shaikh of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Younger brother of Sfuq al Ajil, he was born about 1923 and educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and in Mosul and Baghdad.

He went to London with his father Ajil in 1937 to attend the coronation of His Majesty King George VI. After Ajil's death in 1940 Ahmad set about undermining Sfuq's position in the tribe, disputed the inheritance with him, and in 1944 was suspected of being involved in an attempt to poison him with locust bait.

He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 and in October of that year he was recognised by the Government as paramount Shaikh of the Shammar in Iraq instead of Mish'an al Faisal who had replaced Sfuq the previous June. He is now more popular than his rivals with the tribe, but constant intrigue amongst themselves has reduced the influence of all Shammar Shaikhs. Accompanied King Faisal II to America in 1952. Deputy for Tel Afar, January 1953, but because of Palace intervention was not re-elected in 1954. Included in Nuri's list of Deputies in September 1954. Has visited Europe and Asia extensively as member of the Iraqi Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies in May 1958. Remained free after the revolution.

Flashy, engaging and plausible, Ahmad is one of the very few English-speaking tribesmen. During the past six years he has, with two Syrian partners, devoted much time and hard work to mechanised grain farming on his land in the Jezireh and appears to have prospered. He is believed to be in touch with Ibn Saud.

His wife does not accompany him away from home.

46. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni from near Khanigun. He is not a true Baban but takes the name from a marriage connexion with the late Jamil Bey Baban of Kifri. Educated Baghdad Law School and served as a judge for many years. Director-General of Supplies, 1942. Successively Minister of Social Affairs, Communications and Works and Justice under Nuri al Said, 1942-44. Minister of Justice under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. Minister of Social Affairs, 1946. Head of the Royal Diwan, 1946. He visited Europe in the summer of 1951. Took a prominent part in the conduct of the elections of January 1953. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai, January 1953. Head of the Royal Diwan again in April 1953. Deputy Prime Minister in Jamali's second Cabinet, March 1954, and appointed a Senator. Appointed Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri from October 1954 until June 1957. Minister of Defence under Ali Jaudat, June 1957. Appointed Prime Minister of Iraq after formation of the Arab Union in May 1958.

The advice he gave when Head of the Royal Diwan was not always good and, by being all things to all men, he acquired a reputation for insincerity and intrigue. He was always very much a palace man and this was the main reason for his appointment as Prime Minister. In this latter post, he was really no more than a palace executive and unfortunately an ineffective one. His stated intentions to carry out internal reforms were admirable, but he had no time to put them into effect before he was overwhelmed by the revolution. It is however unlikely that he would have been able to do anything. He was a benevolent avuncular figure, friendly to all including ourselves, but entirely lacking in drive and personality. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to death after the revolution largely because he became involved in events which were too big for him. At the time of writing there is still a chance that the Prime Minister will commute the death sentence.

He has divorced his wife and has one daughter at school in Beirut. He speaks little English.

47. Ahmad Mohammed Yahya (Staff Brigadier)

Sunni Moslem from Mosul. Born about 1913. He was Aide to King Faisal in England during the King's school-days. Commanded the 15th Brigade in Basra until shortly before July 14, 1958. At the time of the revolution he was in Jordan in the post of Deputy Commander of the Western Forces of the Arab Union. After the revolution he was appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia but did not proceed there. He was appointed Minister of the Interior on the dismissal of Arif on September 30, 1958. Brigadier Yahya has always been friendly to the British. He is reputed to have been an efficient officer, and is intelligent and a strict Moslem. He has been cordial towards us since his appointment as Minister of the Interior. It is likely that he will prove a competent Minister without ever becoming a prominent or controversial figure. He told the Vice-Consul in Basra after the revolution that, although he did not approve of everything that had happened, he was going to look after his own interests in the future. At present these interests are with Qasim. He speaks good English and has polished manners and an elegant appearance.

48. Ahmad Salih al Abdi (Brigadier)

Born about 1910. Commandant of the Iraqi School of Artillery in 1954. Commander, Royal Artillery of the 3rd Division, 1957-58. Appointed Military Governor-General and Chief of the General Staff after the revolution. He is fat, humorous and friendly. He was popular amongst the middle and junior ranks of the army as he was one of the few senior officers who treated them like human beings. Since the revolution he has been a success as Military Governor and appears to have a good grip of the situation. He is business-like to deal with.

49. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896, the son of a Baghdad Sunni Alim. Brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraq Government and after reaching the rank of Commandant, served in several liwas as a mutassarif. In 1939 he was made an administrative inspector and soon afterwards was placed on pension.

After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government in 1941 he was recalled by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. He held this position successfully for four years of war and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British Forces. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for his war services in 1946.

Created Pasha by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan in 1943, he was appointed Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1945 and to Transjordan in 1946. He returned to Iraq the same year to take up the post, first of Director-General, and later (1949) of Under-Secretary, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he represented Iraq at several meetings of the Arab League Political Committee in 1948 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in the latter half of 1949. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Amman in January 1951. In May 1952 he was appointed Iraqi Minister at Karachi. Defeated in the elections of January 1953. Appointed Ambassador to Lebanon, 1953. Elected as Deputy in Dulaim June 1954. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Arshad al Umari, July 1954.

Ahmad Pasha was a supporter of Iraq's British connexion, and an intelligent and pleasant man. More politician than administrator, he was generally well-informed but did not carry the weight that his position and connexion would lead one to expect.

Was on bad terms with Nuri al Said and particularly the former Nazis among Nuri's supporters. For

this reason he has remained jobless for the past four years and is correspondingly embittered. He speaks English well. His wife speaks some English.

50. Akram Ahmad Salman (Major-General, Retired)

Sunni Moslem, born Baghdad 1911. An artillery officer, educated at R.M.A., Woolwich. Attended young officers gunnery course at Larkhill in January 1937. Was Director of Artillery before the revolution. After the revolution appointed Mutasarrif of Diwaniyah. Cheerful, ineffective and indecisive, lazy and in the past inclined to be hostile to British advice.

51. Ala Ud-Din Mahmoud (Major-General, Retired)

Appointed Mutasarrif of Erbil after the revolution. Born in Baghdad in 1910. Formerly Adjutant-General to the Iraqi Army and Director of Military Training. In the latter appointment he did not impress, greatly lacking drive and fresh ideas. He was at one time A.D.C. to King Faisal. He speaks English and is said to be honest.

52. Ali Haidar Sulaiman

Born at Rowanduz 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family. Educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut.

Lecturer in Modern History at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1930. Transferred to Ministry of Interior, 1933. Transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service and served at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939. He was interned after 1941 as a sympathiser with Rashid Ali (he is a brother-in-law of Yunis Sab'awi who was hanged for his part in the rebellion). Released in 1944 he became a partner of Ali Kemal in the New Baghdad scheme. In 1949 he was associated in business with Abdul Hadi al Chalabi and was director of the firm, Iraq Engineering Works.

Deputy for Rowanduz, 1948. Resigned, 1950. Re-elected, 1953 and June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Muzahim al Pachachi, 1948. Minister of Communications and Works under Ali Jaudat, 1949-50. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951. Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and of Economics in his second Government, March 1954, when he also acted as Minister of Development for a time. After returning to commerce for two years, he was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Bonn in 1956 from which he returned in November 1958. He is likely to continue in employment under the new régime.

A sincere and intelligent nationalist with moderate reformist views. As a Minister he was industrious and painstaking, but finds it difficult to delegate responsibility. His health is not robust and this is a continuous disability for him. Speaks good English. His wife appears in public, but does not know English.

53. Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi

Sunni of humble Mosul origin, born 1886. Educated at Istanbul and commissioned in the Turkish army. In Turkish times he was a member of the Arab Nationalist society, Al Abd al Iraqi. He fought against the British at Shu'bah but surrendered soon afterwards and was employed in 1915 to encourage Arab officer prisoners to join the Arab Revolt. Later he joined Faisal, and in 1920 was Faisal's Military Governor at Aleppo.

He returned to Iraq with King Faisal in 1921 and from then until 1923 he held various posts in the provincial administration. In 1922 he took an active part in agitation against the Mandate.

As Minister for Interior under Ja'far al Askari (1923-24) he voted for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. He was again a provincial Governor and later worked in the Ministry of Interior between 1924 and 1930, when he became Minister of Interior under Nuri al Said. He resigned from the Cabinet in September 1930 and also (in company with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali) from the Chamber of Deputies in protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Private Secretary to the King, 1933; Prime Minister 1934, he was forced to resign by an agitation against him throughout the country organised by Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935. Iraqi Minister in London, August 1935; Paris, December 1936-October 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri al Said, 1939.

After the Rashid Ali *coup d'état* in April 1941 he joined the Regent at Basra and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After the collapse of the rebellion he returned to Baghdad and became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Iraqi Minister at Washington, 1942-48. He joined Muzahim al Pachachi's Government in the reshuffle of September 1948 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and was made a Senator, and in December 1949 he succeeded, after two failures, in forming a Cabinet, which resigned in February 1950. Deputy Prime Minister under Jamil Madfai, January to September 1953. His term as a Senator was renewed in November 1956. Appointed Prime Minister in succession to Nuri al Said in June 1957.

As Prime Minister, Ali Jaudat steered a careful course between Arab nationalism and Iraq's previous pro-Western policy. By this means, he succeeded in lowering the tension between Iraq and Egypt which had become violent during Nuri's long premiership (1954-57). His lack of enthusiasm for the Baghdad Pact and his tendency to incline towards Arab nationalism and Egypt caused the displeasure of the Crown Prince and Nuri. He sought to dissolve the Chamber in November 1957, and have new elections. The Crown Prince did not agree with this and Ali Jaudat resigned in December 1957.

He has not been arrested but it is improbable that he will play any political role in the future. His wife is a Syrian who speaks good English. His elder son, Nizar, is married to an American and his daughter is married to Adnan, the son of Muzahim al Pachachi, a Counsellor in the Foreign Service. Nizar is a merchant with a dubious reputation and the agent for several British firms. Ali Jaudat speaks English.

54. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali

Sunni, connected with the Ubaid tribe. Born Baghdad, 1902. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he practised as a lawyer from 1923 to 1936. An extreme Nationalist, he was arrested both in 1924 and 1930 for violent agitation against Anglo-Iraqi treaties. He was twice elected Deputy.

Appointed judge in the Court of Appeal in 1936 and Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937. Mutasarrif of Basra, 1939; Director-General of Customs, 1940. Again Minister of Justice in Rashid Ali's rebel Cabinet, he fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse but was later surrendered to the British Military authorities and interned in Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq, tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in 1942. During his internment he embarked upon an immense history of Palestine, taking the story back to pre-Islamic times.

Released in 1949, he practised as a lawyer. Appointed Director-General of Customs, July 1952. Minister of Finance under Mustafa al Umari for one week and then under Nuruddin Mahmud in November 1952. He drafted most of the ordinances issued by that Government aimed at lowering the cost of living of the lower classes. Appointed Vice-President, Court of Cassation, July 1953.

55. Ali Mumtaz al Daftari

Born 1901. Sunni of the Daftari family of Baghdad. Educated at Baghdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Rose to be Director-General of Revenues by 1935, but had to leave Iraq after Beki Sidqi's *coup d'état* which overthrew the Government of Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 to whose daughter he is married. Reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri al Said in 1939.

Minister of Finance under Taha al Hashimi, 1941. Director of Rafidain Bank, 1941. Again Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said in 1941 and 1943. Minister of Communications and Works under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1946. Minister of Finance under Muzahim al Pachachi in 1948 and under Ali Jaudat, December 1949 to February 1950. Resigned from the Chamber of Deputies in 1950.

Appointed a member of the Development Board in November 1950 and tendered his resignation from the Board in June 1951. Minister of Finance under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953. Appointed Senator, April 1953. The most energetic Minister in that Cabinet, Ali Mumtaz earned the respect of almost all Deputies for his conduct of affairs in the Chamber. Accompanied King Faisal on a State Visit to Amman, August 1953. Minister of Finance in Jamali's second Government, March 1954. He then reverted to his law practice for four years. Minister of Finance and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jaudat, 1957. Has not been in office since the fall of Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in December 1957. It was said at the time that he supported Ali Jaudat in asking for the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and new elections. This could account for his being given no further office under the old régime. Was in London at the time of the revolution of July 14. May yet have a political future.

He gives an impression of sincerity and ability, but when in power found difficulty in co-operating with his Cabinet colleagues. He has been involved in at least one financial scandal. In recent years he has invested heavily in land and his financial reputation continues to be clouded, due, it is rumoured, to his having to find large sums to pay his wife's gambling debts. He and his wife speak very good English. They have a son at Cambridge and several children at school in England.

56. Ali al Safi (Dr.)

Born 1913. Shia of Najaf. Studied at Heidelberg, taking a Ph.D. in political economy, remained in Germany during at least part of 1939-45 war, and is believed to have co-operated there with Rashid Ali al Gailani. He joined the Iraq Government service in 1948 as an instructor at the College of Engineering and became subsequently Assistant Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in the Ministry of Communications, where he failed to get on with the Director-General and was appointed Director of the semi-official National Leather Industry Company.

Was delegated by the Arab League, with two others, to try and dissuade the Federal German Government from paying reparations to Israel.

Appointed Minister of Economics by Arshad al Umari in April 1954. Elected Deputy for Najaf in June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954.

A gay, outspoken friendly nationalist, he is good company, but a light-weight and unlikely to play any important political role. He remains friendly towards Germany and in close contact with the German Embassy.

Speaks good German and a little English.

57. Ali al Sharqi

Shia from Najaf. Born about 1890. Originally a Mulla in Najaf and later Qadhi in Basra and elsewhere, he finally became Head of the Supreme Ja'fari Court. He was made a Senator in 1947 during Saleh Jabr's term of office. Minister without Portfolio in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai, May 1953, under Nuri in August 1954, under Ali Jaudat in June 1957, Muriqan in December 1957 and Baban in May 1958.

Although a man of little political importance, he was retained as an almost permanent Minister of State by the old régime because he was a Shia, in touch with Najaf and with a knowledge of what was going on in the Shia parts of Iraq. Was said to be making a tidy fortune by smuggling. His reputation for dishonesty and incompetence was damaging to the Governments of which he was a member and to the old régime in general.

58. Amin al Mumaiyiz

Born Falluja, 1909. Sunni. Educated at American University, Beirut. Joined Iraqi Foreign Service in 1933. Served in London, Washington (1947) and Damascus, then appointed Director of Arab Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950. Appointed Minister in Jeddah, February 1954. Returned to Baghdad and the desk of Arab Affairs as Director-General in February 1956 at the request of the Saudis, for among other things rebutting Saudi criticism of Iraq's Western connexion.

An experienced and cautious man, he was one of the few Iraqis in the Foreign Service who could withhold information as easily as give it. He acted as Permanent Under-Secretary during the absences of Yousif Al-Gailani but appeared to have relatively little authority. He was basically friendly to the West and appeared to be aware that it was in Iraq's interests to have good relations. On the other hand, he held Arab nationalist views and could probably have served the new Government well. As it was, he was suspended from his post for five years after the revolution. He was also arrested but later released on bail. He has published two books in Arabic, "The English as I knew them" and "The Americans as I saw them." The former was frank and objective but friendly, the latter equally frank and therefore, to its subjects, rather less acceptable.

He speaks English well. His wife from a tribal background speaks some English and French.

59. Arkan Abadi

Shia, born in 1919. A tribesman of the Fetlah tribe of Diwaniyah. Brother of Kadhim Abadi (q.v.). Educated at the London School of Economics. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1944. He accompanied Fadhil al Jamali to the Palestine Conference in London in September 1946.

Deputy for Diwaniyah in 1947 and 1948. Resigned in 1950. Contested a by-election in 1950 but was defeated by Government action. Deputy for the Muntafiq in November 1950 and for Shamiya in January 1953. He was offered the portfolio of Agriculture by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. Re-elected in 1954. Was a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Spent the summer of 1953 in the United States on an American bursary. Was Minister without Portfolio in charge of village

and tribal affairs in Jamali's first Government (September 1953) and Minister of Social Affairs in Jamali's second Government (March 1954). Minister of Social Affairs under Ali Jaudat, June 1957, and under Abdul Wahhat Murjan, December 1957.

Arkan Abadi is not particularly bright but he has common sense and energy and was not a bad Minister. He claimed that he tried hard to carry out reforms while he was at the Ministry of Social Affairs, but was frustrated by caution at the top. Before the revolution he was extremely critical of the old régime's refusal to carry out reforms and predicted that it was heading towards disaster. He remained free after the revolution and is still friendly towards us.

He and his wife who is the daughter of the late Jamil Madfai speak excellent English.

60. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Baghdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of the modernisation of Baghdad since the war.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Pachachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation did nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there was probably no other Iraqi who would have applied so much energy to the work of the Board; but even his ebullient nature was finally overborne by the merciless criticism of his work in the Development Board. He threw in his hand in June 1953 and his resignation from the Board was accepted in July. As a sop he was reappointed to the Senate.

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Development, April 1954. He was responsible for the elections of June 1954 and managed to quarrel with a number of his Ministers. He was untouched by the revolution of July 14 since he was generally acceptable to the nationalists. At the time of writing he is in Turkey and reported to be anxious about developments in Iraq.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Mumtaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some rather curious French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946,

and is always referred to as "Pasha." He is separated from his wife, who lives on the charity of her relatives as he is too selfish to maintain her.

61. Afa Amin

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1898. Educated at the Baghdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between 1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949. Director-General of Government Oil Refineries Administration in July 1952, but in 1956 was shunted into the virtual sinecure of Chairman of the Administration. His appointment to the Oil Refineries Administration caused some criticism as he had no qualifications for the job either in experience or personality. Dismissed from his post after the revolution.

His is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid who does not normally appear in public. He speaks good English.

62. Aziz Sharif

Leader of the People's Party (Communist) in 1946. Arrested in 1947 when the premises of the People's Party were seized but later released. Exiled in 1952 and lived in Damascus until the revolution of July 14, 1958. Returned to Baghdad, August 1958, and is President of the Partisans of Peace.

63. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud (Shaikh)

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud. He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a classmate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1938, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. Before the revolution of July 14 he was a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Revolutionary Government in 1958. To judge from his conversations with members of the Embassy since the revolution, he appears to be a stabilising and moderating influence.

Claims to have been responsible for persuading the Government to allow the return of Mulla Mustafa Bazani to Iraq.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco.

He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy.

64. Bahauddin Nuri

Kurd, born in Baghdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known 'Alim. Educated in Baghdad, he joined the Turkish Army in 1917 and the Iraqi Army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College, Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the Army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn, 1941, he rejoined the Army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran. Ambassador there in 1953, where he proved a competent representative. Appointed Ambassador in Amman, January 1956. Recalled after the revolution of July 14.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi Army, he suffered twice for his connexion with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking and miserly. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connexions with a Lebanese firm supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well. His wife speaks some English.

65. Burhanuddin Bashayan

Born 1914, a member of a prominent Sunni Muslim family of Basra.

Trained as a lawyer and has also commercial interests in Basra. A member of the United Popular Front Party with Taha al Hashimi (q.v.) and was on its political committee. Deputy for Basra on various occasions. He participated in the walk-out which the U.P.F. and other Deputies staged from the Chamber in 1950. Left the U.P.F. in 1954 and joined Nuri al Said who secured his election for Basra in September 1954. Appointed Minister without Portfolio by Nuri in August 1954 and was Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the prolonged absences of Dr. Musa al Shabandar. As such he played a considerable part in the negotiation of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955. Was appointed substantive Minister for Foreign Affairs in May 1955, and was thus involved in the early meetings of the Baghdad Pact, being Chairman of the Deputies for 1956. Minister for Foreign Affairs again under Abdul Wahhab Murjan in December 1957, in which capacity he played a large part in negotiating the Arab Union with Jordan. Minister without Portfolio responsible for information and guidance under Nuri in March 1958 and Minister of Guidance under Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, May 1958. Tried after the revolution, July 14, 1958, and sentenced to death. At the time of writing there is still hope that sentence may be commuted.

Although not unintelligent he is slow and ponderous and in particular lacked the necessary drive and initiative to be a successful Minister of Information. He was personally friendly towards the British and a pleasant and patient negotiator.

Visited the United Kingdom in March 1954, as a member of the Iraqi Parliamentary Delegation, guests of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

His English is good. He has been handicapped by trouble with his sight and underwent operations in the United Kingdom in 1956, which appear to have cured him. His wife does not appear in society.

66. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Baghdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture and was awarded an honorary degree in 1956.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933, and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940, Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943. Director-General of Agriculture, 1946-54, in which capacity he attended several international conferences and went to Canada to purchase grain. Director-General of the 4th Technical Section of the Ministry of Development, 1954-56. Director-General of the Date Association, 1956. Iraqi representative in the Committee of Economic Experts of the Baghdad Pact.

Fat and jovial in appearance, friendly and good company, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination. He is a devout Moslem and a passionate Arab Nationalist. He was a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. In spite of his strong disapproval of the lack of energy of the old régime in carrying out reforms, he lost his job after the revolution. He is still around and cheerful, but his future is obscure.

He unsuccessfully contested a by-election in Baghdad in June 1955. He is a keen farmer on his own and tries to put into practice some of the principles he has preached. He and his wife, an intelligent and charming woman who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir al Gailani, speak good English and French.

67. Daud al Haidari

Baghdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Baghdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945. Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

He was an intermediary when the British Oil Development Company's concession was negotiated and has since been paid a retaining fee by the Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies, who describe him as their legal adviser, but do not in fact consult him. He resigned from the Senate under a new interpretation of the Constitution in March 1949 rather than give up this fee.

Daud Pasha was a friend of the Crown Prince but is widely distrusted both politically and financially. He was involved in the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but by 1952 he had become a supporter of Saleh Jabr.

His daughter and his step-daughter are well known in Baghdad society, being married respectively to Dr. Saib Shawkat and Rauf al Chadirchi (q.v.).

He speaks French and a little English and is well disposed towards the British, but his actions tend to be dictated by his financial embarrassments. A nice old man with a taste for horseracing. He looks as though he had spent a fortune—as indeed he has and enjoyed every minute of it. He is a widower.

68. Dhia Ja'far (Dr.)

Baghdad Shi, born in 1911. He studied mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, where he obtained a B.Sc. in 1934 and a Ph.D. in 1936, and then had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railway.

Appointed Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the Iraqi State Railways in 1937, he was subsequently promoted to be Mechanical Engineer. During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies.

Deputy for Baghdad in 1947. He failed in the 1948 elections, but was later returned for Karbala in a by-election.

Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr in 1947 and of Economics under Nuri al Said in 1949 and under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1950. A founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister of Economics under Nuri al Said in September 1950. Transferred to Communications and Works in December 1950. He played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1950 and 1951. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance in December 1951. Elected Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953. Re-elected, 1954. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai in January and May 1953. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said, 1954-55 and Minister of Development, 1955-57. Minister of Economics under Nuri, March 1958, and of Development under Baban in May 1958. Dismissed after the revolution, but not put on trial. He was in England at the time.

He was a successful Minister of Economics, and was a strong supporter of Nuri al Said and had close connexions also with Saleh Jabr. He is a conservative and orthodox financier. He was a relentless politician with a strong Shia bias which made him a troublesome colleague, but he has energy and ability.

He enjoys British company, but was resentful against what he considers the unequal relationship between Britain and Iraq, and was consequently difficult to deal with officially. The I.P.C. regarded him as the main obstacle to an agreement on oil problems.

His wife, who is related to the Aga Khan, looks as though she would be more at home in Beirut than in Baghdad. She speaks some English and he speaks it very well.

69. Fadhil Abbas al Mahdawi (Colonel)

Born about 1912, related to Brigadier Qasim. He seems to have had an undistinguished army career, his last post being in charge of stores at Musayib. Our information indicates that he was not associated with the planning or execution of the *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958.

Mahdawi first came to the public eye when he was appointed President of the Special Military Court set up to try members of the pre-revolutionary régime. In this capacity, he has acted more as a prosecutor than as a judge. He has indulged in vitriolic invective and sarcasm at the expense of the accused and continually made political statements irrelevant to the matter in hand. It is likely that he has had a considerable part in deciding the harsh sentences issued by the Court. Since the trials have been televised, broadcast and reported in full in the Press, Mahdawi has become a familiar figure throughout Iraq. He is said to attend Cabinet meetings and to be close to Qasim. He is generally believed to have Communist sympathies. His public personality is repellent in the extreme and has made a most unfavourable impression on moderate and thinking Iraqis.

Has also been appointed President of the Union of Democratic Youth, a Communist front organisation.

70. Fadhil al Jamali (Dr.)

Shia of Kadhmain, born 1902. Educated American University, Beirut, 1921-27, and Columbia University 1927-29. Joined the Ministry of Education, 1929. Director-General of Instruction, 1933; Inspector-General of the Ministry, 1937. He visited Germany in 1937 and made arrangements for an Iraqi party to attend the Nuremburg Rally of 1938. Visited England in 1938 at the invitation of the British Council.

He was a founder member of the Muthanna Club, whose members were mostly Western-educated nationalists, and whose political thinking was much influenced by national Socialism. He strongly resisted British influence in the Ministry of Education and it was British influence which caused his transfer from that Ministry to a position in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in January 1943. He did not take up this appointment, but became Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Foreign Minister from June 1946 to January 1948 in the successive Cabinets of Arshad al Umari, Nuri al Said and Saleh Jabr. During this time he attended the Palestine Conference in London in 1946 and the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. He was out of politics for a time after the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but was given a sinecure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs later in the same year and was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in February 1949. He was recalled almost immediately to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Pasha in March 1949. He resigned after six months under a constitutional rule, since he had no seat in Parliament, and was appointed Permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation. He was elected Deputy for Diwaniya in the by-elections of June 1950 and became President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1950. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952, and Nuruddin Mahmud, November 1952. Headed Iraqi delegations to United Nations, October 1952. Deputy for Diwaniya, January 1953, and elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Was appointed Prime Minister in September 1953 and in March 1954 formed a second Cabinet, which, however, only survived a few weeks. He attended the Arab League meetings of October 1953. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Government April 1953, when he was taken ill with a gastric ulcer. Re-elected for Diwaniya 1954. Received an honorary degree from Columbia University (July 1954). Represented Iraq at the United Nations in 1954, 1955 and 1956, and at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

His period as Prime Minister was characterised by fair promises and lack of performance. He gave up the premiership in April 1954 with his reputation for integrity and sincerity unimpaired but his political weakness, instability of purpose and lack of powers of leadership had been exposed. He also showed a remarkable capacity for self-deception which led him to form his second Government when his political reputation made it much wiser for him to refuse to do so in view of his lack of support in the Chamber.

The xenophobic nationalism of his younger days was greatly modified by his extensive contacts with the West and by a genuine conviction of the necessity for Iraq of co-operation with the West. During 1957-58 Jamali became increasingly convinced of the danger of Gamal Abdul Nasser to Iraq and that Nasser was in league with Soviet Russia and Communism. In addition to speaking frankly on this theme he published a newspaper, *Al Amal*, in early 1958 which was largely noted for attacks on Nasser, Egypt and the United Arab

Republic. Jamali was appointed Foreign Minister under Nuri on March 2, 1958, but rather surprisingly was given no Ministerial post either in the Union Government, when this was formed in May 1958, or in Baban's Iraqi Government. He was appointed to the Union Parliament. He continued up to the revolution to pursue a violent anti-Nasser line and in consequence made himself exceedingly unpopular with the majority of Iraqis who had previously respected him for his honesty and sincerity and liked him personally.

Arrested after the revolution of July 14, 1958, tried and sentenced to death. At the time of writing there is still hope that the sentence may be commuted.

Throughout his trial Jamali conducted himself with great courage. He renounced nothing he had done and took full responsibility for his actions.

He is bitterly anti-French and took a leading part in Arab agitation against French policy in North Africa. He is interested in Western literature and likes Western music. He has a great interest in the study of education. He is vain and self-important but has shown himself to possess great courage. He is effective in debate and speaks very frankly in private discussion. He is married to a Canadian and has a large circle of British and American friends. His wife plays a leading part in running local charities such as the Cripples' Home (the Jamalis have a spastic child in the United Kingdom) and the Temperance League.

71. Faiq Samarrai

Sunni, born at Basra about 1904. Educated Baghdad Law College, 1928-32. Appointed a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, 1933; transferred to Tapu Department, 1934; Superintendent of Labour, Ministry of Interior, 1935, and attended a Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936. After a further period in the Ministry of Justice, he became Director-General of Press and Propaganda in 1939. After a short period of service in the police and at the Ministry of Social Affairs, became Director-General of Municipalities in 1940.

An extreme nationalist since his student days, he served a short sentence in 1930 for his part in the demonstrations against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was an active supporter of Rashid Ali and was interned from 1941 to 1945 at Fao, where he caused much trouble to the authorities. He was a founder member of the Istiqlal Party in 1946, secretary-general in 1947 and vice-president, 1948, 1949 and 1950. Deputy for Samarra, 1948, he resigned with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950, but was again elected in the by-elections of June 1950. In 1949 and early 1950 he travelled in Syria and Lebanon for his party to make propaganda for Iraqi-Syrian union. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952 in protest against the manner in which they alleged Nuri al Said was attempting to railroad the Oil Agreements through Parliament. Took a leading part in the agitation which led to the riots in 1952. He was interned for six weeks. In June 1954 was defeated in elections at Samarra but is convinced that it was as a result of fraud by the Government. He was banished to Halabja for his part in the disturbances of November 1956 (Suez crisis) and allowed to return to Baghdad in July 1957. Elected President of the Bar Association, August 1957, he resumed full political activity in sympathy with the revolutionary ideas of the Egyptian and Syrian Governments. Appointed Ambassador to the United Arab Republic in July 1958.

Faiq is intelligent and a persuasive talker. He is prepared to be friendly to individual British people and before the revolution preached the standard nationalist neutralist line with great vigour.

Has recently become concerned about increased Communist influence in Iraq and the estrangement between the U.A.R. and Iraq.

72. Faisal Farouq Damluji

Born Mosul 1920. Sunni. A nephew of Dr. Abdullah Damluji (q.v.). Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1943. Served in London and in the Foreign Ministry. Resigned 1954. Elected Deputy for Shaikhan, Mosul, in September 1954. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955, to the Helsinki and London Conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1956 and 1957, and to the United Nations in 1956. He has gone to ground since the revolution.

A shrewd and able man, he put his knowledge of foreign affairs to better use in the Chamber of Deputies than most. Although one of our critics, he is very friendly to British and Americans, and supported Iraq's connexion with the West. Both he and his Lebanese wife speak good English.

73. Fakhri Jamil al Fakhri, C.B.E.

Born in Mosul in 1910. Shia. Joined Government service in 1933 after studying abroad at Birmingham University. Chief Engineer to the Baghdad Municipality and subsequently served with the Development Board, where he was Director-General of the 2nd Technical Section in charge of public works. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works by Arshad al Umari in April 1954 and in June 1954 became Lord Mayor of Baghdad.

Awarded a C.B.E. in 1955 for services in connexion with the British Trade Fair held in Baghdad in 1954. For a time in 1957, it looked as though he might fall a victim to the Purge Committee on a charge of corruption, but he survived. Arrested after the revolution and awaiting trial at time of writing.

Is not a politician and did his job as Lord Mayor energetically. He claims that by doing so he has made for himself a number of enemies. His general attitude to ourselves has always been friendly. His English is good.

His wife speaks some English.

74. Fakhri Shehab

Born about 1924. Educated at Oxford and has a Degree in Economics. Formerly an official in the Ministry of Finance, he held for a short time in 1957-58 the post of Director-General of Economic Affairs on the staff of the Council of Ministers. This post was abolished in March 1958. After the revolution Fakhri was employed as a censor and did his best to be helpful to foreign correspondents. He returned to the Ministry of Finance, but has now taken up a fellowship at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

Fakhri Shehab is highly intelligent and able. He holds moderate nationalist views but is friendly to the West and has an English wife. He hoped for changes in Iraq but the violence of the revolution upset and frightened him.

75. Fakhri Tabaqchali

Sunni. Born about 1900.

Began his official career as a judge. Mutasarrif of Amara, 1945, and Basra, 1948. Appointed to the Court of Cassation in December 1949 and made President of the Tribal Court of Cassation in 1950. Lord Mayor of Baghdad, April 1953. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari, April 1954, and Acting Minister of the Interior (June 1954).

He was a protégé of the late Hamdi al Pachachi. Pompous, a showman and said to be corrupt, he was unpopular with his subordinates. He speaks fair English.

76. Fuad al Rikabi

Born about 1930. Appointed Minister of Development on July 14, 1958, but when Arif and Jabr Umar were dismissed on September 30, 1958, was appointed Minister without Portfolio. He had been an official in the Development Board from 1950-54 but was dismissed for incompetence. In 1950, was arrested for Left-wing activities but released. He joined the Ba'ath in March 1953 and was an active member of the party until the time of the revolution, when he was its leader. He was arrested during the Suez crisis and spent three weeks in gaol.

Indications are that the post of Minister of Development was altogether too much for Rikabi. Development plans, which would in any case have been dislocated by the revolution, were seriously upset by Rikabi's inability to take decisions or understand what he was doing.

He was personally amiable but had clearly attained office too soon. His fortunes in the future will be tied up with those of the Ba'ath Party but at present his star is low.

Outspokenly critical of the present apparent drift towards Communism in Iraq. He considers that a much closer tie-up with the U.A.R. is the only way to arrest this drift.

77. Fuad Said Arif (Brigadier, Retired)

Born Sulimanyah 1912. A.D.C. to King Ghazi, 1936-38. Before the revolution was Commandant of the Reserve College. Appointed Mutasarrif of Kerkela after the revolution.

78. Gharbi al Haj Ahmad

A Mosul lawyer. In 1953 elected a member of the Higher Committee of the Istiqlal Party. In 1955 defended Qassim Mufti, one of the defendants in an anti-Nuri plot. In August 1957 one of the signatories of a telegram of protest to the Prime Minister. In September 1957 appealed against a sentence of a year under surveillance passed by Kirkuk Military Court.

Appointed Director-General of Guidance after the revolution. He does not appear to be either intelligent or co-operative. The Director of Broadcasting, Salim Fakhri, appears to have much more authority. Gharbi probably owes his post entirely to the support of Siddiq Shanshal.

79. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil al Daghestani, C.V.O. (Major-General)

Sunni born in Baghdad 1910. Son of Muhammad Pasha Daghestani, a Turkish General, and brother of the wives of Hikmat Sulaiman and Najib al Rawi.

Attended the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and the Staff Colleges at Quetta and Baghdad. Originally an engineer, he later transferred to the artillery. He quarrelled violently with the Regent over the despatch of Iraqi troops to Palestine in 1948 but his family influence and his strength of character enabled him to retain his position in the army and in society. Appointed Military Attaché in London in April 1952 and served as A.D.C. to the Duke of Gloucester at the accession of King Faisal II in May 1953. Later appointed Director of Military Operations and Acting Deputy Chief of General Staff (Operations), and as such played an active part in the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955. Promoted Major-General November 1955. Appointed Commander of the 3rd Division, autumn 1957.

He was arrested after the revolution and tried by the Military Court on a charge of plotting against Syria. He conducted himself throughout his trial with courage and dignity and this appears to have

had quite an effect on the country, particularly among thinking Iraqis.

He was nevertheless sentenced to death but at the time of writing there is still hope that the sentence will be commuted.

Ghazi Daghestani is the Turk first and foremost; he has no Arab blood in his veins and in foreign company is liable to refer to his compatriots as "these Arabs." He plans to send his son and daughter to Eton and Heathfield respectively and his appearance and manner are in keeping. He is pro-British and both he and his wealthy wife speak excellent English and French in addition to Turkish and Arabic. An intelligent, high-principled aristocrat and an able officer, he had ambitions to take a prominent part in politics, and if his sentence is commuted it is far from impossible that he might play an important part in the future.

80. Hafidh al Qadhi

Sunni. Born about 1900. A leading merchant who has built up a prosperous business from the humblest beginnings. Started life as a car-washer and chauffeur, established his firm in 1919 and is now reputed to be worth over £100,000. In 1956 he was presented with an income tax assessment for £90,000 which he succeeded in settling for £15,000.

An uncouth individual of bounding vitality, shrewd and ruthless in business matters, though he can be kind-hearted outside. He now leaves a good deal of the detail to his American lady secretary, with whom he lives openly.

A leading member of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, he is agent for H.M.V., but otherwise seems to prefer American products.

Still about in social life after the revolution.

81. Hashim Jawad

Sunni, born Baghdad 1911, the son of a small official. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and at London University, from which he graduated in Economics in 1936.

He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1936, joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1938 and was sent as Iraqi representative to the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and in 1942 became the first Acting Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs. He also acted as Secretary to a committee for the organisation of post-war affairs in Iraq. In his capacity of Director-General of Labour, he took part in the settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk in 1946. Later in the same year he was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari who regarded him as a fellow-traveller. From 1947 to 1956 he was employed in the International Labour Organisation. In 1956 was appointed Iraq's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations. Dismissed from his post of Iraqi Delegate to the United Nations for disobeying instructions from the Nuri Government in January 1958 on the question of Cyprus where he supported the Greek instead of the Turkish point of view. Reappointed Permanent Delegate after the revolution, July 1958.

A quiet and studious man with a clear head and a genuine interest in labour questions, he found the conditions in the Ministry of Social Affairs extremely frustrating. He is married to a Swiss and speaks excellent English.

82. Hassan al Talabani (Shaikh)

Kurd, born about 1911 of a well-known family of Kirkuk. His ancestors were heads of a Sufi brotherhood. He graduated from the Baghdad Law College in 1934 and joined the Ministry of Interior in 1935. He served as Qaimmaqam in various Kurdish districts and at Mandali. Appointed Mutasarrif of

Sulaimaniya early in 1947, transferred to Erbil later in the year, to Hilla in 1948, to Diyala early in 1950 and Dulaim in October 1950. A.H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, found him very helpful. Re-transferred to Diyala, August 1952. Made Mutasarrif of Kut 1953 and Director-General of Guidance and Broadcasting June 1954 by Arshad al Umari. In 1955 appointed Inspector-General, Ministry of Finance. Director-General of Mortgage Bank 1956 and member of Civil Service Commission, 1957.

He is intelligent, honest and capable. He is not a strong character, but as an administrator he makes up in some measure for his lack of strength by persistence and a good sense of diplomacy. Personally he is good company and enjoys the companionship of English people. He speaks Kurdish and Arabic, some Turkish and good English. He is unmarried.

83. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni, born 1886. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was Director of Education and Assistant Governor of Baghdad under the Turks, and was in Constantinople when the British forces occupied Baghdad in 1917.

Returning to Iraq in 1921 he became Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923 and was Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Sa'dun (1925-26) and again under Rashid Ali Gailani in 1933. He visited Turkey in 1935 and was much impressed with modern Turkish methods.

In 1936 he joined Bekr Sidqi in the *coup d'état* which overthrew Yasin al Hashimi's Government and became Prime Minister. He resigned in 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. As Prime Minister he disappointed expectations.

Although apparently reconciled with Nuri al Said in 1938, he was arrested and tried by court martial for treason under the latter's premiership in 1939. The death sentence passed on him was commuted to five years' imprisonment, and he was interned in Sulaimaniya. Released by Rashid Ali in April 1941, he was in Persia during Rashid Ali's rebellion.

When he returned to Iraq he devoted himself to farming and prospered. Unpopular with the Regent and Nuri al Said, he took little part in politics until 1947, when he was involved in the intrigues which culminated in the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. Since then he has often been reported to be making contact with discontented army officers and people of the Left, and was generally regarded as the "dark horse" of Iraqi politics; but this impression was probably coloured by his history and was an exaggeration. He had a heart attack in 1949. He was appointed a member of the Regency Council in April 1952 and in 1953 and 1954. Was the only member of the Regency Council in 1954 who opposed taking firm measures to deal with possible demonstrations against Iraqi acceptance of United States military aid, and, after this, used all his influence to further the candidature of Kamil al Chadirchi in the elections of June 1954. This attitude, which implied support for the Communists with whom Chadirchi was allied, was not dictated by any liking for Communism but partly from a sense of grievance at his own lack of political success (he undoubtedly thinks he might have been President of Iraq if the British had not imposed the Hashemite monarchy) and partly from a failure to understand the full impact of Communism. He is a friend of Chadirchi's family and lives in the past—as well he might since he is the youngest and last surviving son of a great family—his eldest brother having been born in 1834! He shows considerable friendship to Her Majesty's Embassy despite his inability to converse in any language but Turkish and Arabic. He and his circle of middle-class intellectual friends were all strongly

opposed to the Nuri régime. Hikmat himself said before the revolution that he was particularly concerned at the way feeling in the country was turning against the Royal Family and even the King himself. He was bitterly critical of Baghdad Radio anti-Egyptian broadcasts. He has lain low since the revolution and is reputed to be uneasy because of the trial of Ghazi Daghestani.

His wife, a Daghestani, is a sister of the wife of Najib al Rawi. She also is friendly but speaks Turkish only.

84. Hudaib al Haj Hamud

Born about 1918. He is a member of Kamil Chadirchi's National Democratic Party. Appointed Minister of Agriculture after the revolution and Acting Minister of Education in October 1958. He appears intelligent but with a strong Left-wing bias. Appears to have some influence in the Government. Personally cordial.

85. Husamuddin Jumaa

Born 1899. Sunni. Officer in the Turkish Army during the first World War. After the war entered the Police Department in Baghdad and was appointed Commandant of Police in 1932. Mutasarrif of Kirkuk in 1937, and later of Diwaniya. From 1939 to June 1941 he was Director-General of Police. Although he was much criticised for his behaviour during the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he was not punished and was appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul at the end of 1941. Between 1942 and December 1944 he held various appointments, including those of Director-General of Supplies and of Revenues. From December 1944 to 1946 he was Mayor of Baghdad, and was then transferred as Mutasarrif to Basra but resigned. Elected Deputy for Diyala in 1948. Appointed Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Just before the riots in November he became Acting Minister of the Interior. He resigned with Mustafa al Umari when the riots began. Elected Deputy for Diyala in January 1953. Minister of the Interior under Jamil Madfai in January 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad, September 1954. A wealthy man, he is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari. In appearance he is impressive but in performance undistinguished, and he finds difficulty in co-operating with his colleagues. He speaks no English.

His wife does not appear in public.

86. Hussain Jamil

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1906. A member of the Jamil family which has marriage connexions with the Suweidis. His father was a judge. Educated at Baghdad and graduated from the Law College in 1930.

From 1933 to 1946 he served as a judge in a number of provinces including Diyala, Diwaniya, Hilla and Baghdad.

He resigned from the Public Service in 1946 in order to become a founder member of the National Democratic Party; he went into private practice as a lawyer and acted as defence counsel in a number of cases concerned with political offences.

Deputy for Baghdad, 1948. He resigned with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950. Minister of Justice in Ali Jawdat's Cabinet of December 1949 to February 1950. Arrested after the disorders in November 1952. Elected president of the Bar Association, August 1953 to August 1957, and Secretary-General of the National Democratic Party in November 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad, unopposed, in June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954. Appointed Ambassador to India after the revolution of July 1958.

Hussain is a convinced Democrat and a sincere reformer who is generally respected though in recent years he has been accused of playing politics for material ends. Before the revolution, he expounded the policy of the Opposition with moderation, was less intransigent than most of the Opposition leaders and was not always in agreement with the leader of his party. In the autumn of 1953 he quite gratuitously telegraphed an offer to defend Dr. Musaddiq in the Persian courts and he persists in regarding him as a great democrat and patriot. He dislikes Americans. He speaks some English and his wife, who appears in mixed society, is fairly fluent. He claims not to be anti-British, and is personally friendly.

87. Ibrahim Kubba (Dr.)

Shia. Born about 1908. He is a nephew and son-in-law of Mohammad Mahdi Kubba. A Doctor of Political Economy, he is a graduate of Baghdad and Oxford Universities and of the Sorbonne. A teacher in the College of Commerce and Economics from which he was dismissed in 1954 for Left-wing leanings. He was a member of the Partisans of Peace but probably not of the Communist Party. He was in general sympathy with the aims of the National Democratic Party but not a member.

Appointed Minister of Economics after July 14, 1958. Dr. Kubba is pleasant enough to meet but his public pronouncements come very near the Communist line and some are violently anti-West. He has appointed Left-wing officials to his department. Although it is questionable whether he is a particularly competent Minister of Economics, he is an important figure both because he is probably the member of the Qasim Government furthest to the Left and because he is responsible for oil affairs. He has so far been shown to be a fairly competent negotiator in dealing with the I.P.C., but he is ignorant of the subject and inclined to be theoretical. He speaks good English and French.

88. Ihsan Rif'at

Born Baghdad, 1918. Sunni. A graduate of the American University at Beirut and Californian Universities at Los Angeles and Berkeley. He holds a B.Sc. in Petroleum Engineering. Joined Government service in 1939. Served as Engineer in the Ministry of Economics, where he became Director of Mineral Resources in 1951. Studied at the Royal School of Mines in London, 1947-48. Member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration Board since 1952. Appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in 1955. Visited the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in June 1957. He lost his job after the revolution but was not put under arrest.

Ihsan Rif'at combines ability and charm with a dry sense of humour which refuses to be discouraged by his country's shortcomings, which he readily admits. He is more interested in the practical needs of Iraq than in theoretical aspirations after Arab Unity. A personal friend of Nadim al Pachachi he advised him well on Oil Affairs. He and his wife, who qualified as a doctor in the United Kingdom, were active in entertaining and were members of Baghdad's smart set. Both speak good English.

89. Ihsan al Umari (Major-General, Retired)

Was Director of Ordnance at the Ministry of Defence before the revolution. Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut after the revolution. Shy, guarded and quiet and probably ineffective as an officer. Iraqi officers spoke kindly of him but without great respect.

90. Ismail Safwat

Sunni of Mosul, born 1894. In Turkish times he graduated from the Teachers' Training School, and

was a teacher in 1914. He was conscripted and served as a warrant officer in Eastern Anatolia during the first world war. In 1919 he joined the Arab army at Deir el Zor and took part in Jamil Madfai's advance on Tel 'Afar in 1920. After the collapse of Faisal's régime in Syria he went to Turkey.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and joined the Iraqi army. He was on Bekr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in 1936. From 1940 to 1943 he headed the Iraqi Military Mission to the Yemen. After his return to Iraq he held several brigade commands. Director of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence, 1944. Promoted major-general, 1946.

In October 1947 he presided over the Arab League Military Committee which sat at Aley, Lebanon. Appointed Deputy C.G.S. early in 1948, he was made Commander of the Irregular Arab Army of Liberation on the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in May 1948. He returned to Iraq and was appointed G.O.C., Second Division, Kirkuk, in 1949. In the autumn of 1950 he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff on the revival of that appointment. In June 1952 was appointed director-general of the Iraq State Railways. In the spring of 1953 he quarrelled with Abdul Wahab Murjan and went on leave but returned shortly after. Left the railways in June 1955 and was returned unopposed as Deputy for Mosul. Appointed Iraqi member of Arab League Commission to visit the Yemen in connexion with Yemeni protests against British interference from the Aden Protectorate, 1957. He allowed himself to be taken in by Yemeni and Egyptian propaganda.

He is a taciturn man with no sense of humour, but he has a reputation for efficiency and for being a good disciplinarian. He is a close friend and supporter of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jawdat who are also both from Mosul.

His wife does not appear in public.

91. Izzuddin Mulla

Born about 1910. Sunni Kurd from Erbil, son of the well-known divine Mulla effendi. Educated in Iraq. Was reputed a gay young man. Entered politics in the middle '40s as a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Deputy for Erbil 1948. Second Vice-President of Chamber of Deputies, December 1949. First Vice-President 1953. Re-elected for Erbil and as First Vice-President of the Chamber, September 1954. He has been an assiduous member of the Iraqi Inter-Parliamentary Group and has represented Iraq on the Executive Committee of the I.P.U.

Minister without Portfolio in the Murjan Government December 1957. He was imprisoned for a short while after the revolution and then released.

An amiable lightweight, who speaks good English. His wife is a striking looking young woman.

92. Jabr Umar (Dr.)

Appointed Minister of Education on July 14, 1958. Dismissed at the same time as Colonel Arif on September 30, 1958. Formerly a Director-General in Ministry of Education, Jabr Umar studied in Germany and has a German wife. He was the Voice of the Arabs announcer in Berlin during the war and consulted upon Iraqi affairs by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While at the Teachers College in Baghdad he led the Students Union in a strike in October 1956, and fled to Syria when threatened with arrest. He became leader of anti-Government Iraqi exiles in Syria, attended the preparatory committee meetings of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo in December 1957. He lectured at the Teachers College of the University of Syria and broadcast under U.A.R. aegis on "The Voice of Free Iraq."

After the revolution Jabr Umar became identified with the Ba'athist group in the Cabinet, which is presumably the reason why he was dismissed. An obvious attempt was made to blacken him by dragging him into the trials of members of the former régime, as a witness. He was violently attacked for having been a member of a committee in 1951, the object of which was to negotiate the union of Jordan and Iraq after the murder of King Abdullah. At the time of writing (mid-December 1958) Dr. Umar is under suspicion for complicity in the latest plot against the régime and has been arrested.

During his short tenure of office, Dr. Umar appeared to be intelligent and able. He was friendly in his dealings with the British Council. When he appeared before the Court he was lucid and courageous. Although temporarily in eclipse, his ability and nationalist background may well give him a political future if the political wheel should turn again.

93. Jalal al Awqati (Colonel)

Retired from the Iraqi Air Force several years ago and brought back from retirement to be appointed Commander of the Air Force after the revolution. It has been rumoured that he has Communist sympathies. His manner towards us is correct but not friendly.

He appears to be intelligent but not a forceful personality.

94. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family, born 1892. At first an extreme nationalist, he was deported in 1920 but released in 1921. Appointed Qaimmaqam in 1923 and later promoted to be Mutasarrif, he served in the Administration until 1932.

Minister of Economics and Communications under Naji Shaukat in 1932, of Defence under Rashid Ali in 1933, and of Education under Jamil Madfai in 1934. Director-General of Finance 1934-35 and 1936-37.

Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri al Said 1939-40 and under Jamil Madfai in 1941. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said in 1943. Senator 1937-43.

Again appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Mohammed al Sadr in January 1948, he managed to retain his portfolio in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi and Nuri al Said until November 1949. Deputy for Diyala in the 1948 elections. Resigned his seat on his appointment as a Member of the Development Board, from which he was removed together with the other members, after the revolution of July 14, 1958.

No man was better versed in the art of government as it used to be practised in Iraq. He was in his day an unusually competent and elusive Minister. He was undoubtedly corrupt and widely thought to be so. On the Development Board he was largely out of his depth and made little effective contribution. He speaks little English. His wife does not appear in society.

95. Jalal Khalid

Sunni. Born 1902. Joined Government service in 1925 and became Qaimmaqam in various parts of Iraq. Appointed Mutasarrif of Diwaniya 1939. As Mutasarrif of Baghdad in May 1941 at the time of Rashid Ali's movement, he went out to meet the Commander of the British forces approaching Baghdad in order to surrender the city, but was wounded in the hand by machine-gun fire. The attentions paid to him on that by Glubb Pasha made him a firm friend. He became Director-General of Awqaf in 1949 and Mutasarrif of Sulaimania in 1950, when he was responsible for the internment of Shaikh

Latif, son of Shaikh Mahmoud. He became Director-General of the Interior in 1953. He resigned later in the same year and was once more appointed Director-General of Awqaf, where he stayed until his appointment in 1954 as Director-General of Customs and Excise. Here he has concentrated his attention successfully on preventive measures against smuggling. In 1956 he visited the United Kingdom with a small party of senior officials as guests of Her Majesty's Government, showing particular interest in British Customs procedures. Retained his position after the revolution.

Not a robust personality, he is shy but has a lively sense of humour, a strong sense of loyalty to his friends and a generous disposition. He has shown himself progressively more friendly during recent years. His English is only fair.

96. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer of the Baban family, born 1890. After serving for some time as a judge in Northern Iraq he became Deputy for Erbil in 1928.

Minister of Justice under Nuri al Said 1930-32, under Jamil Madfai 1933-34, and under Ali Jawdat 1934-35. In 1935 he joined the party organised by Jamil Madfai to oppose Yasin al Hashimi.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said 1941-42 and of Justice under Saleh Jabr in 1947. Between his ministerial appointments he practised as a lawyer, and was often Deputy. Appointed Senator in July 1947 and again in 1955.

Minister of Justice under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. His lenient treatment of the Communists during the autumn of 1952 gravely weakened the Government's authority.

Like his relative Jalal Baban, he was during the 1930s and 40s almost a professional Kurdish Minister. As Minister under Saleh Jabr he was criticised for venality and for influencing judges. He was Acting Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty, and his handling of the situation caused by the demonstration was inept; but in his defence it must be said that Saleh Jabr had kept him in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Saleh Jabr himself gave up hope, and has not been active since. He is critical of the measures taken against Iraqi Jews in 1950 and 1951. He is champion of the cause of the emancipation of women. An attractive but weak man. His wife appears in society.

97. Jamal Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born in 1912. Son of Umar Nadhmi. Studied at the American University of Beirut.

After serving in the Northern Liwas and in Diyala he was appointed Mutasarrif of Basra in July 1949.

Deputy for Rania, January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Minister of Agriculture under Ali Jaudat 1957. Did not achieve anything as Minister of Agriculture and, after the fall of Ali Jaudat, he went into opposition. He made a number of speeches in Parliament criticising the Baghdad Pact and the general policy of the Murjan and Nuri Governments. He was outspoken and consequently was not returned in the elections of May 1958. Post-revolution is a member of the middle class political group which hopes to reintroduce parliamentary and democratic life into Iraq.

Energetic and respected by the local officials and fond of social life. He has a good name for honesty. Intelligent but easily excited and violently anti-Jewish.

He is personally friendly with British people and was exceedingly helpful during the Abadan crisis, when he gave every possible help and facility to our

evacuees. Under a bumbling exterior conceals unexpected ability.

He is an avid reader of British and American newspapers and periodicals. He speaks English. His wife is a daughter of Rauf al Kubaisi and speaks little English.

98. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1910 of a middle-class family. Educated at Baghdad Law College and practised for a short time.

Joined Iraqi Government service in 1933, and was appointed Assistant Magistrate, Baghdad. He was later transferred to Baquba.

Deputy for Diyala in 1939 and Baghdad in 1943 and 1947. He lost his seat in 1948, but became Deputy for Mahmudiyah in 1950. A member of the Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party from its foundation in 1949.

Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri al Said 1946, and under Saleh Jabr 1947. Appointed Minister of Justice in Nuri's Cabinet in July 1951. Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953. Deputy for Kut, 1954 and for Baghdad, September 1954. Deputed from Parliament as Ambassador to the Lebanon for a period of two years in June 1955. Resigned his seat in Parliament to retain his post. Appointed Minister of Justice in the Nuri Government of March 1958 and retained this post under the Baban Government of May 1958. Escaped from Iraq after July 14, 1958.

His marriage in 1933 to a niece of Nuri al Said was the main reason for his political advancement. In spite of this connexion, his attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous. He was a personal friend of the Crown Prince, and in April 1949 was selected as Iraqi Minister at Cairo. The Egyptian Government, however, refused the *agrément*. He is reported to have engaged in doubtful land transactions in Hilla-Iwja and he is said to be dissolute, ambitious and untrustworthy, but nevertheless makes a superficially pleasant impression. He speaks a little English. His wife does not appear in society.

99. Jamil al Urfali

Born about 1907, of a long-established Baghdad family. Sunni. Educated at Baghdad Law College, whence he graduated in 1930, and studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. On his return he edited a weekly legal journal. He joined the Iraqi Judicial Service 1933 and served as a Judge in Hilla, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and later as Chief Magistrate and President of the Execution Department, Baghdad.

Deputy for Diyala 1947, 1953 and again in 1954. Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies 1949 and 1953. Founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister without Portfolio in charge of Aqaf Affairs under Taufiq Suwaidi, 1950. Minister of Justice in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and Minister of Education in his second, March 1954. Minister of Agriculture in the Murian Government of December 1957 and the Baban Government of May 1958.

An amiable bumbler, he did not appear to have any ability and seemed to owe his appointments solely to his friendship with Baban. He has been aptly described as "an obedient ox." He speaks very little English. His wife does not appear in society.

100. Jussam Muhammad Shahir (Colonel)

Sunni Muslim, born about 1915. Has for many years been pilot to the Royal Family and, as such, has travelled extensively. Was appointed to the Command of the Tactical Air

Forces in November 1954, since when he has done much to improve the R.I.A.F. In this capacity he took an active part in negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955.

Appointed Director of Iraqi Airways after the revolution of July 14, 1958, in which appointment he seems to be largely at sea.

A lively and pleasant personality with excellent English.

His wife, who was a close friend of the Queen Mother, does not appear in public.

101. Kadhim Abadi (Brigadier)

A Shia Muslim of the Bani Lam. Born about 1910.

Entirely at home in a Western atmosphere, he has well assimilated an R.A.F. background. He commanded his squadron efficiently and, in November 1954, was appointed to the command of the R.I.A.F. In this capacity he took an active part in negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955. He was promoted brigadier in May 1955, despite the fact that he was not staff trained.

He was definitely most anxious to retain the British influence and system in the Iraqi Air Force. Although pleasant and co-operative, he tended to be ineffective in action and over-burdened with self-importance. Retired on July 14, 1958, but not imprisoned.

He speaks good English. His wife does not often appear in society.

102. Kamil al Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1901. Half-brother of Rauf al Chadirchi. His father was exiled in 1920 and he accompanied him to Istanbul where he studied medicine for a year.

On returning to Iraq he studied law and graduated from the Baghdad Law College in about 1925, when he was appointed to a minor position in the Ministry of Finance. Became Private Secretary to Yasin al Hashimi in 1929, and left official employment soon after to edit *Al Ikha al Watani*, the organ of Yasin Pasha's party of that name. In the early 30s he was associated with the Ahali group with Mohammed Hadid, Abdul Fettah Ibrahim and Abdul Qadir Ismail and started the newspaper *Saut al Ahali*, which continued with some interruption and changes of name until 1954. He was convicted under the Press law in 1934 and arrested in the same year for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi but released for lack of evidence.

The Ahali group was privy to the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'état* against Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 and Kamil became Minister of Economics and Commerce in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman. He resigned in June 1937 because of the increasing influence of the Army. He later formed the Democratic Party with Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman which had little success. He refused to enter Nuri al Said's Cabinet in 1943. In 1946 he formed the National Democratic Party, which voluntarily suspended activity in 1948, but resumed in 1950. Both in 1946 and 1947 he was prosecuted on Press Law charges. He was known to be in contact with the Soviet Legation in 1951-52. He took a leading part in the agitation which led to the 1952 riots. He was interned for six weeks. Elected Deputy for Baghdad June 1954 with the help of Hikmat Sulaiman and other friends of his family. He headed the "National Front," composed of the National Democratic Party, the Istiqlal Party and Peace Partisans with various fellow travellers. Despite the fact that they only secured some ten seats in the Chamber, the National Front achieved a resounding propaganda success, conducting their election campaign with a thoroughness and efficiency

which was a new feature in Iraqi politics. Arrested in November 1956 for being a signatory of a telegram the contents of which he knew to be untrue, with the object of provoking disorder. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment by Military Court. His imprisonment was used by the Left-wing politicians to embarrass the Government of Ali Jaudat in the late summer of 1957.

Kamil is a muddle-headed idealist who holds progressive social democratic views with complete sincerity, but he is incapable of translating these views into a consistent policy suitable to Iraqi conditions. The poor success of the National Democratic Party during the period was largely due to his lack of leadership and organising ability.

was released from prison a few weeks before the revolution. Since the revolution, he has been a focal point for the liberal middle-class supporters of the new Government, although he has not himself taken office. He is respected and liked by these people who take serious account of his views. He has been personally friendly and cordial to this Embassy, although denouncing in no uncertain terms British policy in the Middle East. He is still apprehensive of the influence of the military in Iraqi political life and hopes that it will be possible to establish democracy. He is friendly towards Egypt and President Nasser, but does not consider that Iraq should merge with the U.A.R., although he would accept a federal arrangement with common foreign policies. In international affairs, he claims to be neutral as between East and West and not to wish Iraq to be dominated by any imperialism, Western or Communist. However, his naive attitude towards the Communists suggests that he may allow himself to be used by them.

His newspaper, now called *Al Ahali*, started publication on November 30, 1958.

He admires the British Labour Party and reads *The New Statesman*. A likeable little old man. He speaks very little English.

103. Khaddouri Khaddouri

Christian. Born about 1918. A lawyer by training but also a business man by occupation. He was associated with Mohammed Hadid in certain commercial enterprises. A member of the National Democratic Party, he is a close friend and associate of Kamil Chaderchi and seems to be acting as his personal private secretary and manager. Khaddouri is Westernised, friendly and talkative. He is a typical liberal, middle-class nationalist and before the revolution was very keen to put the nationalist point of view across to the West. This he does quite well although he is a little verbose and woolly. His heart is in the right place and he hopes that Iraq, while remaining neutral, will have a Western orientation. It is doubtful whether he is very practical, but may have a political future in view of his consistent nationalism, if the N.D.P. continues to exert influence in the Iraq Government. Assists Kamil Chaderchi in running the N.D.P. daily *Al Ahali*.

Speaks excellent English.

104. Khalil Ibrahim

Born 1915. Sunni of Baghdad. Joined government service 1927 in the Directorate General of Civil Defence and later entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served at the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo. There noticed by Nuri al Said who used him for many years as his Personal and Confidential Secretary. Appointed Acting Director-General of Guidance and Broadcasting, May 1954, which appointment was confirmed December 1956. Left this post at the end of 1957 and returned to Foreign Ministry. Arrested after the revolution of July 1958.

Khalil Ibrahim is a tough, hard-working and not very brilliant Civil Servant. He was devoted to Nuri

Pasha and resented any Western influence which tended to harm Nuri's reputation with the Arabs. He is absolutely loyal to Iraq, but his unimaginative and negative approach and his irregular promotion brought him many enemies, particularly among the more talkative and liberal-minded Iraqi politicians and intellectuals.

He is a proud and touchy person, slightly anti-British but not unco-operative. Perfectly sure of himself in all societies, he was nevertheless often overworked and tired. He speaks good English; he has a charming wife who speaks fair English and who is headmistress of a girls' school in Baghdad.

105. Khalil Jamil (Major-General)

Born about 1905. Sunni Muslim from Mosul. An engineer officer who was trained at R.M.A., Woolwich, in 1935, and at Chatham. Was chief engineer for several years and was promoted major-general in December 1954. He played a major and successful role in the flood control operations of April-May 1954 in the Baghdad area. D.C.G.S. autumn 1957. Retired after the revolution.

Pro-British, energetic and essentially cheerful. Anxious to keep abreast of British engineering doctrine, though not well equipped to train sappers for their role in the field. Nevertheless he put on a good show when called upon to do so. Outside interests tended to detract from his value as chief engineer. Was popular with the Germans whose machinery he bought as it is cheaper than British. His wife does not appear in public.

He speaks good English.

106. Khalil Kanna

Sunni, born in Felluja about 1905. His family is of Turkoman origin. Educated at the American University of Beirut, and the Baghdad Law College. He entered Government service in 1933 and worked mainly in the Ministry of Communications and Works until 1941, when he supported Rashid Ali Gallani's *coup d'état* and was consequently interned.

In 1946 he was a founder-member of the Istiqlal Party, but he resigned from the Party with a flourish in 1947 and married a daughter of Ali Ridha al Askari, thus becoming a relative of Nuri al Said. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in 1947, he was not returned in the 1948 elections. Re-elected in a by-election in 1950 and again in 1954.

In January 1949 he started the newspaper *Al Ahd*, which was Nuri al Said's mouthpiece. In December 1949 he became a founder-member of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party and was elected to its Central Committee.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in Taufiq Suwaidi's Government in February 1950 to supervise Press and propaganda affairs.

Appointed Minister of Education under Nuri al Said in September 1950. His success in this post largely re-established his political reputation. Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953 and again under Nuri al Said, August 1954. Became Minister of Finance after December 1955, retaining the portfolio of Education in an acting capacity. Left the Cabinet with Nuri, June 1957.

Appointed President of the Majlis under the Murian Government in December 1957. It very quickly became clear that Murjan could not last and Kenna worked against him, apparently hoping that he himself would be the next Prime Minister. By February 1958, he had about him the aura of a heir apparent which did not make him loved nor further his aims. When Nuri became Prime Minister in March 1958, Kenna remained President of the Majlis. He received no appointment when the Union Government was formed in May 1958 and lost his post as President of the Majlis. From

March 1958, Kenna was opposed to Nuri and tried to build up an Opposition group. The reasons for his Opposition were logical enough but the Iraqis doubted his sincerity and thought he was motivated by personal pique because he had not been given a Ministerial post. In the event, his Opposition group in the May 1958 Parliament achieved nothing. Arrested after the revolution, and at the time of writing is awaiting trial.

As Minister of Education and leader of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party in the Chamber of Deputies during the Government of Dr. Jamali, earned the latter's undying hatred, added to which he is a fervent Sunni and deeply distrusted by the Shias.

He is a not very approachable personality but he has mellowed considerably and can on occasion be a pleasant and humorous conversationalist. He has a reputation for being very hard with his officials and quarrelsome with his colleagues.

Khalil Kanna was undoubtedly one of Iraq's most competent administrators. He co-operated well with the Embassy and British Council in matters of common interest. He speaks good English. His wife speaks some English.

107. Khalil Said Abdur Rahman (Brigadier)

An infantry officer and a graduate of the Iraqi Staff College. Has done a senior officer's course in the United Kingdom. Was Commander of the Third Brigade from 1957 until the revolution, when he was appointed Commander of the Third Division.

Not well known to us but in 1952 he was described as "ascetic and a fanatical Moslem. Thin, rather forbidding but with considerable personality and efficiency. Might well be a success in the Army."

108. Mahmud Baban

Born 1920. Sunni Kurd of Kifri. Formerly a judge, he was at one time a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Elected Deputy for Khanaqin in 1951, and for Kifri since 1953. Visited Turkey with a parliamentary delegation in 1955, and is active in the Iraqi Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He attended the London Conference of the I.P.U. in 1957. Minister of Health in the Murjan Government, December 1957; Minister without Portfolio under Nuri, March 1958, and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, May 1958. He could still play a part in the future of Iraq if he has not been too compromised by his association with the "old régime." He was not arrested after the revolution.

He is serious, intelligent and ambitious, greatly interested in the development of parliamentary institutions in Iraq and a moderate nationalist. He runs his tribe near Kifri with a benevolent but absolute dictatorship and urges political democracy for Iraq. He is a great advocate of village improvement by the Ministry of Development. He speaks English well and his wife a little.

109. Majid Mustafa

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1895. An officer in the Turkish Army during the First World War, he remained pro-Turkish for some time and later became an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud.

Appointed Mudir Nahiya, 1927; Qaimmaqan 1928-35; Mutasarrif, 1935-41; he was an able administrator.

His attitude during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 was equivocal, and he forfeited the trust of both sides. On the Regent's return to Baghdad he was suspended for four years for having complied with Rashid Ali's orders.

Nevertheless in December 1943 the Regent reluctantly agreed to his appointment as Minister

without Portfolio to advise on Kurdish affairs in Nuri al Said's Government. He achieved a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa Barzani in January 1944, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said in September 1950 and elected Deputy for Erbil in November 1950. Minister of Social Affairs under Mustafa al Umari in July 1952 and under Nuruddin Mahmud, November 1952. Resigned in December 1952. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, January 1953. Re-elected June 1954 largely through Government intervention in the elections, but not in September 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953.

Although he is a Kurd first and an Iraqi afterwards, Majid proved an able Minister. In the summer of 1951 he was given a tour of social services in the United Kingdom by the British Council and returned an enthusiastic admirer of Britain and with a much improved knowledge of English. Subsequently, however, the apathy of other members of the Cabinet to his ideas of social reform discouraged him, and, with the resignation of Jamil Madfai's Government, returned to his large and successful business interests which include a marble quarry in Rowanduz. He has had trouble with his sons, one at least of whom is a professing Communist. His wife does not go out in society.

110. Mar Shimun (His Beatitude)

Eshai Mar Shimun XXIIIrd, Patriarch of the Assyrians. Born about 1909, he succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury.

After his return to Iraq he inspired the mutiny of the Assyrian Levies in 1932 and the exodus of the Assyrians to Syria in 1933 which precipitated the massacres in Mosul liwa of that year. He was deported in 1933 and given asylum in Cyprus. He spent the next seven years in Europe, mostly in England and Geneva, trying to obtain assistance for his people. Granted British naturalisation in 1939 and went to Cyprus, but in 1940 he went to America and has since been living in Chicago, taking a full part in intrigues which split the Assyrians both inside and outside Iraq.

Mar Shimun's aim was to establish the whole Assyrian community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. His political inexperience and overweening ambitions caused his people much needless suffering.

111. Matti Aqrabi (Dr.)

Born 1901 of a prominent Assyrian Orthodox Christian family. Joined Government service in 1924 and has specialised in education. Dean of the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1939. Director-General of Higher Education, 1945. From 1950 to 1957 was Deputy Director in UNESCO of the Education Division responsible for school education and published in collaboration a work on schools which has been translated into Arabic. Appointed president of the new Baghdad University, 1957. His appointment was criticised on the grounds that he had been out of Iraq for some years and had no experience of a university other than as an undergraduate. His absence from Iraq, however, also meant that he was free from the intrigues and jealousies of the Ministry of Education and had acquired something of an international name, together with the reputation of a good administrator and educationalist. He is, therefore, popular. However he was dismissed from his post after July 14, 1958, before he had had time to accomplish much. He speaks excellent English and is well-disposed. He has an attractive Lebanese wife.

112. Muhammad Ali al Chalabi

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1910. Brother of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi. In 1933, after studying at the American University of Beirut, he went to London to study economics. In 1938 was given a post in the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1941 he was transferred to the newly-opened Rafidain Bank in Baghdad, of which he was appointed director in 1945. Is reported to have amassed a large personal fortune from his banking activities. Dismissed after July 14, 1958.

He speaks good English and is married to a Syrian who speaks good French. They were keen social climbers and showed a marked preference for the American community in Baghdad.

An able but unscrupulous banker with his eye firmly fixed on his own interests; somewhat unattractive character.

113. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1895. Educated Baghdad Law School and employed in the Ministry of Justice, in which he rose to become Director-General. He also held post of Director-General Tapu and in 1935 was a member of the Court of Cassation.

Deputy for Diyala in the Parliament of 1935 and for Erbil in those of 1936 and 1937. Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's re-formed Cabinet of 1937.

He was Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet of April 1941. On its collapse he fled to Persia but was handed over to the British in September 1941. He was interned in Rhodesia and sent back to Iraq in 1944, where he was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but released in 1947. He was elected Deputy for Koy Sanjaq in November 1950.

His daughter is married to Ziad, a son of Ja'far al Askari and probably because of this connexion he joined Nuri Pasha's constitutional party in 1949. Elected to the Central Committee of the party in November 1950. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai, May 1953. Appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and Minister of Justice in his second, March 1954. He was appointed a Senator in March 1954. Appointed Minister of Justice under Nuri in August 1954 and served as Acting Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence in Nuri's absence. Acting Minister of Development from May-December 1955 when, resenting Nuri's proposal to deprive him of the Ministry of Justice and make him substantive Minister of Development, he resigned.

A pleasant old man with moderate ability and drive, but his friends say that the iron entered his soul as a result of his internment. He is a nationalist and was a stubborn defender in negotiations of what he believed to be Iraqi interests. Speaks Turkish and more English than he admits to.

114. Muhammad Hassan Salman (Dr.)

Shia of Baghdad, born 1908. Was a teacher in Government primary schools. Entered the Iraqi Medical College, graduated as a doctor in 1934 and joined the Iraqi Medical Service. Member of the Muthanna Club. Appointed Chief Medical Officer of Health at the Ministry of Education in Rashid Ali's rebel Government, but after only one day in office he left for Turkey to undergo medical treatment. Returned to Baghdad after the war and re-joined the Iraqi Health Service as a Chief Medical Officer. Appointed Director of Amir Abdul Ilah Hospital for Chest Diseases at Tuwaitha in April 1951. Elected Deputy for Amara in January 1953 and again in June and September 1954. Became Minister of Health under Jamil al Madfai in January 1953. Remained Minister of Health on

re-formation of Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet in May 1953, and was again appointed Minister of Health under Nuri al Said in August 1954, but was dropped in favour of Abdul Amir Allawi in December 1955. When in office, he brought back many doctors who supported Rashid Ali. Arrested after the revolution but it seems unlikely that he will be tried. He has appeared as a witness in the trials and conducted himself well.

He is reported to be corrupt. He speaks quite good English. His wife speaks a little English.

115. Muhammad Hadid

Sunni, born 1906 of a merchant family of Mosul. Educated at American University, Beirut, 1924 to 1928, and London School of Economics, 1928 to 1931.

Employed in the Ministry of Finance, 1931 to 1937; Deputy for Mosul, 1937; Minister of Supply under Nuri Pasha in 1946, he resigned from this Government in protest against Government interference in the elections.

He was a prominent member of the so-called Abali Group in the first half of the 1930's. This group advocated a mild form of Socialism. Some of its members later became Communists. In the later '30s he was associated with Kamil al Chadirchi's Democratic Party and was one of the founder members of the National Democratic Party in 1946. He was Vice-President of this party which suspended activity in 1948 but resumed in 1950. He resigned his seat in the Chamber in 1950 with the rest of the Opposition Deputies in protest against the intolerance of the Government and of Nuri al Said's majority party. He was in London at the time of the 1952 disorders. Letters of his criticising the "Old Guard" at that time were published in *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*. Re-elected Vice-President of the National Democratic Party, November 1953. Elected Deputy for Mosul in the National Front, June 1954.

Not elected in September 1954 when the National Democratic Party boycotted the elections.

Before July 14, 1958, he was active in business and the director of the Vegetable Oil Extraction Company. Before the revolution he expounded a policy of neutrality and the maintenance of economic and cultural links with the West. He always assured us that he did not advocate the nationalisation of oil. On his appointment as Minister of Finance after the revolution, he tried to carry out the policies which he had advocated in the Opposition. He remained personally friendly towards us and has repeatedly and probably sincerely expressed the hope that friendly relationships will be established between Britain and the Iraqi Republic on a basis of mutual interests. One of the abler and more moderate members of the Republican Government and appears to work closely with the Prime Minister.

Muhammad Hadid is an intelligent and sincere democrat with strong Socialist views, an effective speaker and a persuasive writer. He speaks excellent English. His wife does not appear in society.

116. Muhammad Ja'far al Shabibi, C.B.E.

Born circa 1900. Shia. A merchant who has built up from small beginnings a leading textile import business. President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce since 1950. Awarded C.B.E. in 1955 for his collaboration in arrangements for the British Trade Fair. In business as in politics he maintains a narrow and biased nationalist outlook. Was noticeably unfriendly to the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis and was taken into custody for a few days for his attempts to organise a protest strike of the merchant community. Represents Iraq in the Permanent Bureau of Arab Chambers of Commerce

and at meetings of the Internal Chamber of Commerce where he pursues a strong anti-Israeli line. He has campaigned vigorously for legislation to enable Iraqi firms to have the monopoly of agencies for the sale of foreign goods. Retained his post as President of the Chamber of Commerce after July 14, 1958. A man of limited intelligence who speaks no English.

117. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri

A Shia born at Nejaf in 1901. Employed in Ministry of Education but dismissed in about 1936. He has won wide recognition in the Arab world as a poet. Jawahiri is a man of pronounced Leftish views and has been connected with the "Peace" movement in Iraq, attending World Peace Councils in Warsaw, 1950, and Vienna, 1951. He owned and published a succession of Left-wing newspapers, *Thabat*, *Jihad*, *Jadid* and *Al Rai al 'Am*, each of which in turn was suppressed by the Government. *Al Rai al 'Am* lasting from 1953 to November 1954. He was arrested after the riots of 1952. His early release and subsequent inactivity together with the fact that he has at times received subventions from the Ministry of Education for his poetry and been given a plot of land by the Jamali Government, led to his being regarded as lukewarm by thorough-paced Leftists. However, in favour after July 14, 1958, he revived *Al Rai al 'Am* which follows a Communist line.

118. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Baghdad Shia family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Nejaf in grammar, Persian and theology.

After the First World War he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Baghdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member, Dr. Jamali. He developed pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late 30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

He was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1946, probably owing to his Shia origin, well-known name, and clean record. His voice in its councils was less effective than those of Faiq Samarra and Siddiq Shanshal. Re-elected president of the Istiqlal Party in November 1950, he strongly supported the Persian Government in their efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections. However, he became Deputy for Baghdad in these elections, but resigned his seat in protest, in common with the rest of the Opposition, in March 1950. He was re-elected in the by-elections in June. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. He took a prominent part in the agitation which led to the riots in November 1952, after which he was interned.

In November 1953 re-elected president of Istiqlal Party, and in June 1954 was returned unopposed for Baghdad. He took his party into the National Front in the elections of June 1954, collaborating with the National Democratic Party and the Peace Partisans. Though this manoeuvre obtained a measure of success there were indications that he was not altogether happy with all the policies of his associates, particularly the Communist line on "Peace with Israel."

Elected again for Baghdad in September 1954 as an Independent, he later resigned his seat in favour of a nephew.

Before the revolution was manager of a cotton-ginning factory. He maintained his political contacts, was looked up to by the Nationalist Opposition and was prepared to talk to British diplomats. He expounded the standard nationalist line of opposition to Nuri Said and the Crown Prince and of neutrality, but professed himself friendly to the West provided relations could be based on equality and with the accent on commerce. After the revolution, he was appointed to the three-man Council of Sovereignty. He continues to be cordial towards us and his influence is probably in the direction of good sense and moderation. He had and still has a reputation for sobriety and honesty. He speaks Persian and some English. His wife does not appear in society.

119. Muhammad Nasir (Dr.)

Born Basrah, 1911. Educated at American University, Beirut, and Columbia University, New York.

Appointed Dean of Higher Teachers' Training College, Baghdad, 1957. Acting Director-General of Education for a short period after the revolution of July 14, 1958. At present with UNESCO. The Iraqi Government hope to get him appointed to the Executive Council.

Essentially an educationalist with moderate nationalist views. Friendly in his dealings with us.

120. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi (Saiyid)

Shia of Nejaf, born 1889. Educated in the religious schools of Nejaf. In 1908 he began to publish poetry in the Egyptian periodical Press and acquired a reputation as a literary man. He played some part in the nationalist disturbances in Nejaf during the occupation. In 1919 he was sent to the Hejaz by some Iraqi nationalists to offer the Iraqi throne to the Amir Abdullah; thence he went to Syria and did not return to Baghdad until 1921.

He was a member of the Constituent Assembly and was Deputy for Baghdad in most Iraqi Parliaments until 1935. Senator from 1935 to 1943 and President of the Senate for a few months in 1937. He returned to the Lower House in 1943 and was its President in 1943-44. He resigned from Parliament with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950. Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953.

Minister for Education under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924, he resigned from this Government with Rashid Ali Gailani over the Turkish Petroleum Company concession. Again Minister for Education in 1935 under Yasin al Hashimi, under Jamil Madfai in 1937 and 1941, and under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948.

In 1951 he played a prominent part in the formation of the United Popular Front and was elected Chairman of the Front's Political Committee. He was offered the Deputy Premiership by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. In November 1953 elected President, United Popular Front, succeeding Taha al Hashimi. Appointed Senator in February 1954.

He was the main Opposition spokesman in the Senate before the revolution. In this role, he was tolerated by the previous régime and allowed to express severe criticism on standard nationalist lines. His main targets were the Iraq Government's policy of alignment with the West in foreign affairs and internally their violation of the constitution. He particularly attacked the lack of political freedoms. It is reliably reported that after the revolution, he was offered the posts of Minister of Education and Ambassador to Tehran, both of which he turned down.

A frail, toothless, entertaining and charming old man. He is prepared to discuss anything and never becomes unpleasant in his criticisms. He is personally cordial to us although he disagrees with many aspects of British policy.

121. Mohammed Saleh Mahmud (Dr.)

Formerly Medical Officer in the Iraqi Army. Appointed Minister of Health after the revolution. Does not appear to be important politically. Seems to have avoided serious purges in his department and has made no difficulties about retaining or engaging British doctors. Large and amiable, he is a weak Minister who is content to rely on the advice of expert advisers.

122. Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal

Sunni, born in Mosul about 1908. Studied law at Baghdad and Damascus. He subsequently studied at the Sorbonne, returning to Iraq in 1939.

After serving as a Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he became Director of Propaganda under Rashid Ali in 1941. Although acquitted of the charges brought against him he was interned. In 1946 he took a leading part in the formation of the Istiqlal Party. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. Did not contest the 1953 elections. In November 1953 elected Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party and in June 1954 Deputy for Mosul. He was not re-elected in September 1954. Was exiled to Penjwin for his part in the disturbances following the Suez intervention, November 1956.

In spite of his reputation for being anti-British and anti-Western, Shanshal showed himself willing to talk to us before the revolution and expounded his standard nationalist views in a relatively moderate way. After the revolution, he was appointed Minister of Guidance and has acted for the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the latter's absences abroad. If his word can be relied upon, he is in favour of a moderate policy and of maintaining commercial and cultural links with the West but of a gradual approach towards union with the United Arab Republic. In dealing with the Press, he seems to have tried to exert influence in the direction of easing irksome censorship regulations, but his success has been limited since the military have the final say. He was opposed to Colonel Arif and it seems that his position in the Government was somewhat precarious. At the time of writing, there is still some doubt whether he will survive, particularly since the present trend is away from the U.A.R.; it is reliably reported that he has attempted to resign but without success. He has been at some pains since the revolution to show Western journalists and diplomats that he is reasonable and wishes to have friendly relations with them. He is apparently strongly anti-Communist.

He is excellent company and shows some signs of having a heart. He pretends to speak with great frankness, but is a little smooth and perhaps not entirely to be trusted. He has a daughter at school in England.

123. Muhyi ud-Din Abdul Hamid (Brigadier)

Graduate of the Iraqi Staff College and has done a senior officer's course in the United Kingdom. Has been GSO(1) of the 3rd Division, Military Attaché in Amman and Deputy Commandant of the Military College in Baghdad. Appointed Commander of the 4th Armoured Division after the revolution. Reported as being pleasant and friendly and violently anti-Israel. The British officer commanding the R.A.F., Habbaniya, has said that he is co-operative and seems to have a good grip of the situation.

124. Mulla Mustafa

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, born about 1898. Younger brother of Ahmad of Barzan. Mulla is a name *not* a title.

He was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32, surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad in 1933, and was banished to Sulaimaniya, where he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government.

In 1943 he escaped to Barzan, where he soon became involved in skirmishes with the Iraqi police. At first concerned only with his own position, he later began to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism and won much Kurdish sympathy and support. He resisted successfully the forces of police and troops sent against him. In January 1944, a settlement was arranged, and he visited Baghdad to make submission to the Regent. Returning to Barzan, he remained restless, but was formally pardoned in April 1945, when the Iraqi Government announced a programme for improving security and developing agriculture in the Barzan area.

Becoming impatient, he again took up arms against the Government in August 1945. Large Iraqi forces and clever bribery administered by Mustafa al Umari eventually defeated the Barzanis, and he and his brother Ahmad fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

After the collapse of the Persian Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, Mulla Mustafa and his brother retired before the Persian forces and entered Iraq in May 1947. Shaikh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi Government but Mulla Mustafa refused unconditional surrender and managed to escape with a few hundred men through Turkey and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union.

At first welcomed eagerly by the Russians Mulla Mustafa later went into obscurity. More recently a sustained effort was made to revive the glamour of his name. After July 14, 1958, he requested the Iraqi Prime Minister to allow him to return to Iraq. This wish was granted and his return in October 1958 was hailed with jubilation by the Kurds. He is viewed with apprehension by many moderate Iraqis who fear that he will try to bring Communism to Kurdistan and that he will revive pressure for an independent Kurdistan; so far he is lying low.

125. Mumtaz Akram al Umari

Born 1913. Sunni Muslim of Mosul. Educated Baghdad and American University of Beirut. Joined Government service in 1937 and was Assistant Director-General of the Interior in 1943, having previously held posts in the provinces. In 1950 was appointed Director-General of the Baghdad Municipal Passenger Transport Service and President of the Board of Administration of that Service. In that capacity he showed considerable drive and ability and, using British buses, organised a first-class bus service in Baghdad, together with maintenance workshops and social amenities for employees. In 1953 was chosen as Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior by Said Qazzaz under the Government of Dr. Jamali. In this capacity was invited on a sponsored tour of the United States for four months in 1955 and 1956. In 1957 visited India with a party of administrators to inspect rural administration there.

Mumtaz al Umari is a vigorous man sharing the administrative ability which characterises the Umari family. Before the revolution, he was outspokenly critical of certain aspects of Government policy. He held particularly strong views against feudalism and was apprehensive that the failure of the Government to tackle this problem could lead to trouble. In general, his views were those of an intelligent moderate nationalist and it is perhaps surprising that

he was dismissed from his post after the revolution. He was, however, said to be a very close friend of the Americans and there is little doubt that he preferred them to us. He could be discourteous and is probably not trustworthy. His wife, Suad, daughter of Arshad al-Umari, took a leading part in the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and other charitable activities. Both he and his wife can hold their own in society and speak good English. They are keeping quiet for the moment.

126. Musa Shabandar (Dr.)

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1899, the son of a wealthy landowner. His brother Ibrahim is a prominent Baghdad merchant. Educated in Baghdad and in Switzerland, he was in Europe from 1918 to 1932, mostly in Switzerland and Germany.

Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service, 1932; Secretary of Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations, 1933; First Secretary, Berlin, 1935. In 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain. He was recalled and arrested, but proceedings against him were dropped.

Deputy for Amara 1937 to 1939.

Reappointed to the Foreign Service 1939 and sent to Berlin as Chargé d'Affaires. Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali in April 1941. He fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse, but was caught and interned in Rhodesia and later sent back to Iraq for trial. He was sentenced in 1944 to five years' imprisonment and sequestration of property. Owing to ill-health he did not serve all his sentence.

He has been free since 1947 and in 1949 he joined Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party and was appointed Minister at Damascus. Appointed Ambassador in Washington in June 1953. In March 1954 was named as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamali's second Cabinet but succeeded in staying in Washington. Returned to Iraq in October 1954 as Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri, was again appointed Ambassador to Washington in May 1955, but was withdrawn in early 1958.

Musa Shabandar is not a strong personality. He is intelligent and accommodating, an official rather than a politician. He was not a success as Foreign Minister and his failure to take a clear-cut line got the Iraq Government into difficulties with the other Arab Governments on various occasions. He is married to a Lebanese and speaks English, French and German.

127. Mustafa Ali

Shia. Graduate of Baghdad University. He is a professor and author of works on Customs and Laws. He was a Judge at the Courts of Appeal in Baghdad and Basra and Recorder of Laws in the Ministry of Justice. He has a high reputation for legal ability. Appointed Minister of Justice after the revolution. He seems to be essentially a technical man and does not play a great part politically.

128. Mustafa Rifa'at al Haj Sirri (Colonel)

Was brought back from retirement after the revolution and appointed Director of Military Intelligence. His last post before retirement was at a recruiting centre at Qal'at Salih.

To meet at first, he is a gaunt figure and gives nothing away except the party line. However, he improves on acquaintance and has been as helpful as possible under the circumstances. He appears to be very tired and weighed down by the duties that have been thrust upon him.

129. Mustafa al Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born in 1893 and educated at the Baghdad Law School, he served as an officer in the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the first world war and was taken prisoner.

He entered Government service at the end of the war, served as Qaimmaqam and Mutasarrif in several districts and also held the posts of Accountant-General and Director-General of Interior.

He was Minister of Interior under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937; under Jamil Madfai, 1937-38 and in 1941; under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-46 and under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948. He has also been Minister of Justice under Madfai in late 1938, of Economics under Muhammed al Sadr, January-June 1948 (Acting Interior from March 1948 onwards) and without Portfolio under Muzahim at the end of 1948 and under Nuri al Said from December 1950. He was a Senator from 1937 onwards. Acting Prime Minister during Nuri al Said's absences from Iraq in the first half of 1952. In July he became Prime Minister. He resigned when rioting broke out in November. His term as a Senator expired in 1954 and despite his wire-pulling was not renewed until the end of 1955. He tried to organise a bloc of young Deputies critical of the Government in the 1953 Parliament, but it came to nothing.

Of all Iraqi politicians and officials Mustafa was probably the most notorious for corruption. He was also one of the most capable administrators in the country. He may be said to have exhibited the best and the worst features of the Ottoman idea of Government. His administration during 1945 and his conduct of the 1948 elections aroused severe criticism, but he served his country well during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery was of great assistance to the Iraqi forces operating against Mulla Mustafa. His term as Prime Minister was almost disastrous, however. His unimaginative handling of the Opposition parties' demand for direct elections was one of the causes of the riots in November 1952, and his resignation at the height of the disorders was almost criminally irresponsible. Unmolested since July 14, 1958, but unlikely to return to politics. He speaks only a little English. His wife does not appear in society.

130. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1888. Educated at the Law School in Baghdad. Before the 1914 war he was a strong Arab nationalist. He wrote for Arab nationalist papers and had to flee to Basra in 1913 to escape arrest. After the war he was employed as a magistrate by the occupation authorities in Basra and returned to Baghdad in 1922.

He joined Government service in March 1923 and became Minister of Communications and Works under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924. In 1927 he was sent to London as Iraqi Diplomatic Agent, returning in 1928. Minister of Economics and Communications under Nuri Pasha, January 1931, and almost immediately after Minister of Interior in the same Government. He resigned in October 1931 because of differences with his colleagues over his dismissal of the Amin al Asima, Mahmud Subhi Daftari. In May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous letters about the King. He was tried and acquitted in October 1932.

Iraqi Minister at Rome and Permanent Iraqi Delegate at Geneva, 1934; Minister at Paris, 1939; he remained there as Minister to the Vichy Government and did not return when Iraq broke off relations in November 1941 but went instead to Rome. In 1944 he went to Geneva and sought facilities to return to Iraq, which were refused. He eventually returned in November 1945.

Prime Minister, June 1948 to January 1949; deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

under Ali Jaudat, December 1949 to February 1950. He was appointed Senator in 1948 but the appointment was held to be constitutionally invalid by a High Court in 1950. He left Iraq for Egypt and Saudi Arabia just before the issue of this decision. He returned to Iraq in November 1950 and took a leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952.

Muzahim's character presents some contradiction. He is a strong nationalist and resents "imperialism" deeply, but he has been much influenced by the Social Democratic ideas which he has encountered during his prolonged residence in Western Europe. He is often reasonable, but can be stupidly obstinate. Politically courageous at times, at others he gives up without a struggle. His ideas on general policy are sensible, but as a political tactician he is inept. He hated Nuri Pasha and strongly resented his influence with the Crown Prince. This led him to criticise the latter indiscreetly on occasion, and to support the policies of King Saud, who is known to have made a monetary gift to him on at least one occasion. In particular he opposed the methods by which Nuri carried out his rapprochement with Turkey in 1954 and United Kingdom accession to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact in 1955 as policies contrary to Arab unity.

Muzahim al Pachachi is an impressive looking man and personally very cordial. He is extremely critical of British policy in the Middle East and particularly of what he considers our failure to come to terms with President Nasser. He is an advocate of neutrality, but gives the impression that he would like Arabia to be on good terms with the West. He spends much time in Egypt and was well thought of by the new régime immediately after July 14, 1958. He is, however, probably too old and deaf to play any significant political role in the future, and his pro-Egyptian sympathies make his position slightly uncertain at the time of writing. He speaks English.

131. Nadhir al Umari

Born 1917 of the well-known Sunni family of Mosul. Educated in Baghdad and at Liverpool University. Joined Government Service on January 16, 1945, having spent most of the war in the United Kingdom. Served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then as Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington. Transferred to Amman in December 1950. Concentrated on economic matters and was a delegate at successive General Assembly Sessions as well as at meetings of the Economic and Social Council. Returned to Iraq and appointed President of the Grain Board in 1956. Appointed as First Secretary to the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi after the revolution of July 14, 1958.

His many travels and many years in the United Kingdom and in America have given him a breadth of vision not widely found in Iraqis. Quiet-spoken and intelligent, he is nevertheless an ardent nationalist. He is somewhat overshadowed by his older brother, Mumtaz; like him, he is a good administrator. Has an artistic side and is good company. Speaks good English. Is married to a cousin who also speaks English. Both went about quite a lot.

132. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi (Dr.)

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1914. Nephew of the late Hamdi Pachachi and of Muzahim Pachachi. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and London University.

Returned to Baghdad in 1938 and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics in which he rose to be Director-General by 1944.

He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1946 and visited London and America in 1948 to try to obtain support for the

proposed Iraqi Oil Refinery at Baiji. Early in 1950 he quarrelled with his Minister, Dhia Jaafar, and tendered his resignation. His resignation was not accepted and he was appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in June 1950. In this capacity he was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the summer and autumn of 1950. In March 1951 he again became Director-General of Economics. He again visited the United Kingdom in connexion with tenders for the oil refinery and the Iraq Government's gold case against the Iraq Petroleum Company. Played a leading part in the negotiations of 1951.

In July 1952 he became Minister of Economics under Mustafa al Umari. Joined Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in the same capacity in December 1952. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai in May 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad in January 1953. In July 1953 was appointed Minister of Development in Jamil Madfai's Government. In June and September 1954 was re-elected Deputy for Baghdad running in double harness with Abdul Karim al Uzri. Minister of Economics under Nuri, August 1954 to June 1957. Minister of Economics and Acting Minister of Development under Ali Jaudat, June 1957. Minister of Finance under Abdul Wahhab Murjan, December 1957, did not serve in the Nuri Government of March 1958, returned as Minister of Finance under Ahmad Mukhtar Baban in May 1958. Arrested after the revolution but released on bail in October 1958. He may come to play a political role in the future. His views in fact differ little from those of the new régime, and he is supple enough to adjust himself if he gets a chance.

Nadim has not a very strong personality but is ambitious and pertinacious in pursuit of any idea he gets into his head. He was an exceptionally intelligent and competent official whose rapid rise was not entirely due to the influence of his family. He is friendly, co-operative and Western-minded, but took great care not to offend Arab nationalist opinion on any issue, since he feared that to do so would frustrate his political ambitions. He is a landowner and farmer on a large scale. He divorced his first wife (a Pachachi) in 1947 in order to marry a cabaret artiste. He divorced his second wife in 1950 and married an American girl in 1952. He speaks excellent English.

133. Nadhim al Tabaqchali (Brigadier)

Has done a senior officers course in the United Kingdom. He commanded 20th Brigade until late 1957, when he took over 5th Brigade. In 1951 was Commander of the Royal Body Guard. Appointed Commander of the 2nd Division after the revolution. The I.P.C. and consular officers in Kirkuk and Mosul have found him friendly and co-operative. Is said to be a close friend of Qasim.

134. Naji al Asil (Dr.)

Baghdad Sunni, born about 1895. A graduate of the Constantinople Medical School in Ottoman times, he first became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashemite representative in London. After Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz he became destitute and was deported to Iraq in 1925.

Employed in the Iraqi Military Medical Service from 1926, he was appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jidda in 1931 and transferred to Mohammerah in 1932. Acting Director-General of Foreign Affairs, 1933-34; Counsellor in Tehran, 1935; Master of Ceremonies at the Palace, 1936.

Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hikmat Sulaiman 1936-37, he went into retirement after that Cabinet's resignation until 1944, when he was appointed Director-General of Antiquities. Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to the United

Nations Organisation by the Sadr Cabinet in February 1948, he was recalled in June 1948 and returned to the Antiquities Department. Appointed an Active Member of the Iraq Academy in November 1949. He organised the Avicenna Festival in Iraq in March 1952. October 1953 was elected President of Iraq Academy, in addition to his post as Director-General of Antiquities. Dismissed after revolution.

A polished and intelligent but ponderous man, he is a close friend of Hikmat Sulaiman. He speaks English well.

135. Naji Talib (Brigadier)

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs on July 14, 1958. Born about 1918. 1949-50, Director of Military Intelligence. 1950-53, on the directing staff of the Staff College. 1954-55, Military Attaché, London. 1956, Commandant of the Senior Officers School. 1957, Director of Military Training. 1958-July—in command of the 15th Brigade at Basra. Naji is a strong and determined nationalist and consequently suspicious of the West, which he regards as having been consistently opposed to Arab nationalist aspirations. He does not, however, exclude co-operation with the West in the future if they are prepared to understand Arab nationalism.

He is anti-Communist and tackled his task as Minister of Social Affairs with energy and enthusiasm. He is said to be a little unbalanced, possibly as a result of a head injury received a few years ago.

Has recently suffered a slight heart attack and has not yet returned to duty.

136. Najib al Rawi

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1898; brother of Ahmed al Rawi (q.v.). Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he worked for a short time as a clerk in the Revenue Department under the British Administration. He has a large practice as a lawyer and was President of the Lawyers' Association in 1942 and again in 1947.

He entered politics as a protégé of Nuri al Said in 1930 and was Deputy for Dulaim in the Parliaments of 1930, 1934, 1937, 1943, 1947 and 1948. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Minister of Education under Taufiq Suwaidi, 1946; Minister of Justice under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948; Minister of Education in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi, Nuri al Said and Ali Jaudat, June 1948 to February 1950. He represented Iraq at the Paris Session of UNO in September 1948. Appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in August 1950, and Ambassador in November 1952. He got on well in Cairo with Her Majesty's Embassy and the Egyptian Government, but was not trusted by Nuri al Said, partly because of an old dislike and partly for his friendly relations with Nasser. Transferred to Paris in August 1956 and then to Ankara, December 1956, after the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Iraq and France. Was invited by Ali Jaudat to be Minister of Education in his Government in June 1957, but insisted on being Minister for Foreign Affairs. When this was refused he returned to his post at Ankara, somewhat disgruntled. Dismissed from his post in Ankara, October 1958.

Politically he was regarded as a trimmer with a foot in both camps and as primarily a Palace man before the revolution. He is married to one of the Daghestani sisters and speaks a little English.

137. Najib al Rubaii (Major-General)

A Sunni Muslim of the influential Rubaii family. Admitted Sandhurst in 1928. As Major-General commanded the 3rd Cadre Division. Appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, September 1957. This was an exile, since he was believed to have been

opposed to the policies of Nuri. We have heard that already well before the revolution, the Egyptians had picked him to be the Iraqi Naguib. After the revolution, appointed to be President of the three-man Council of State and as such the nearest equivalent to the President of the Republic.

It is not clear how much influence Rubaii wields under the new régime. On occasions when we have had dealings with him, he has given the impression of being friendly, moderate and wishing to maintain Iraqi connexion with the West. He is well educated with considerable academic leanings and is religious. He speaks good English. A mild fatherly figure.

138. Najib al Sayegh

Christian. Born about 1915. Lawyer and Secretary of the Lawyers' Association. Is said to have strong Left-wing sympathies, but this is not apparent in conversation with him. He gives the impression of being a conventional nationalist. Cordial before the revolution he has been cautious towards us recently. Has an attractive wife who goes out.

139. Nasrat al Farisi

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1890. Educated Baghdad Law School.

He was conscripted for the Turkish Army before he had graduated and served as a warrant officer during the 1914-18 war in which he saw service against the Russians at Hamadan and against the British at Kut.

After the war he completed his legal studies in Istanbul and returned to Baghdad about 1922.

He served for several years in the 'twenties as legal draughtsman in the Ministry of Justice.

First Deputy for Baghdad in 1926 and again in 1932, and in most of the Iraqi Parliaments since then. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1935. Iraqi delegate at Geneva 1937 to 1938. In 1945 he was a member of the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance under Naji Shaukat 1932 and again under Jamil Madfai 1933. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri al Said June to October 1943. In the Cabinet of Muhammad al Sadr of 1948 he was first Minister without Portfolio, then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was closely associated with the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952. Appointed a Senator in April 1953.

After the election in January 1953 he was asked to form a Cabinet. He first invited former members of the Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties to join but, when they refused, tried to form a coalition consisting of former members of the United Popular Front and the Constitutional Union Party and a few Independents. At the last moment Nuri's supporters withdrew and he abandoned his attempts to form a Government. In the intervals of his political career, he practises as a lawyer in which capacity he is held in universal respect and commands substantial fees.

Nasrat is more of a Turk than an Arab, although he was known as an Arab nationalist in the 'twenties when he was a member of the Sha'ab Party of Yasin al Hashimi. He is honest, intelligent and cautious. His approach to political questions is legalistic and theoretical. His friend Hikmat Sulaiman calls him "Confucius." When considering any course of action he sees the difficulties more clearly than the advantages and is inclined to be obstructive. This characteristic made him one of Iraq's worst Ministers of the Interior. He resigned from Nuri's Cabinet in 1943 as a protest against the Regent's

interference in the elections. The nationalist views of his younger days have been modified by experience, but he was a firm opponent of what he regarded as undue British influence exercised through Nuri and the Palace. Before the revolution he was a moderate Opposition speaker in the Senate. He was particularly opposed to the lack of democracy under the Nuri régime and spoke against this, but always without violence. He is unlikely to play any important political role in the future, but may be a sensible and moderating influence. His wife is prominent in Ladies' Red Crescent activities, and both speak good English. He is personally friendly to the British.

140. Nuroddin Mahmud

Kurd, born in Mosul in 1899. Educated in Ottoman military schools, he was commissioned in the Turkish Army in 1917 and in the Iraqi Army in 1921.

A graduate of Camberley and Quetta, he was Iraqi Military Attaché in London in 1935 and became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937. Promoted Colonel in 1939, he was appointed Ministry of Defence member of the Iraqi State Railways Board, and in 1940 he became Director of Military Operations.

In 1941 he opposed Rashid Ali's rebellion and after its collapse he took over command and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Commander 2nd Division (Kirkuk), 1941-43, Assistant C.G.S., 1943; promoted Major-General and appointed Commander 1st Division (Diwaniya), 1944. In 1948 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and commanded the Iraqi forces in Palestine, where he was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effective Arab High Command. In 1949 he returned to command the 1st Division. Appointed C.G.S. in July 1951. In November 1952 the Regent called on him to form a Government at the height of the riots. He quickly restored order and made a sincere attempt to improve the conditions of the lower classes. He held the portfolios of Defence and Interior in his own Cabinet. He resigned after conducting the elections in January 1953, and, to the disappointment of many officers, was prevented by the Regent from returning to the army. Promoted General in November 1952 and appointed to the Senate in January 1953. A member of the Iraqi delegation to United Nations General Assembly 1955 and 1956.

He was probably the best Iraqi general officer. Many Iraqis sympathised with him for the ungrateful treatment he received after saving the country. Before the revolution was opposed to the Nuri régime and expressed his views freely but moderately. He has been quiet since the revolution, but it is just possible that he might play some part in the future, since he is a sensible and balanced nationalist. He speaks English and Turkish well and his sympathies are steadily pro-British. His wife occasionally appears at small functions.

141. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi, K.B.E. (Lieutenant-General)

Sunni Kurd. Born 1907. An artillery officer who qualified at the Staff Colleges of Baghdad and Quetta. He was commandant of the former in 1947 and 1949. He also commanded the Mechanised Force in Palestine 1948-49, the Iraqi troops (strength two brigades), left in Jordan after the Iraqi evacuation of Palestine, and the 2nd Division from 1951 to 1953. Promoted to Major-General and appointed C.G.S. 1953. Lieutenant-General in 1957. After the revolution of July 14, 1958, was tried by the Military Court on charges of plotting against Syria and sentenced to death. At the time of writing there is still hope that the sentence will be commuted.

An outstanding personality with qualities of leadership and a special aptitude for picking other

people's brains. His chief characteristics are his energy and heartiness and considerable shrewdness. He is very pro-British and tried to keep the army on British lines. He has been decorated with the Order of Rafidain, the American Legion of Merit and in May 1955 was appointed an honorary K.B.E. for his part in the negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of April 1955. His wife occasionally appears in society, but speaks little English.

142. Rashid Ali al Gailani

Baghdad Sunni, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. A Waqf clerk in Ottoman times, he fled to Mosul with the Turks after the capture of Baghdad and practised as a lawyer after the fall of Mosul.

Appointed judge, 1921, he soon showed his ability. Minister of Justice under Yassin al Hashimi, 1924-25, he resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1925-26. Minister of Interior under Jafar al Askari, 1926-28.

Again elected Deputy in 1930, he resigned (with others) in 1931 in protest against the conduct of Nuri al Said's Government, and became a prominent member of the nationalist Hizb al Ikha al Watani. Chief Private Secretary to the King 1932-33.

Prime Minister from March to October 1933 he was appointed Senator in 1934. He helped to organise the Euphrates disturbances which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in spring 1935, and became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet then formed by Yasin al Hashimi.

In 1936 he fled to Istanbul after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état*. Returning to Iraq in 1937, he opposed Jamil Madfai's Government and was deported to Anah for a short time in 1938.

Prime Minister from March 1940 to January 1941, he moved steadily towards a closer understanding with the Axis. He kept close contact with the Italian Legation in Baghdad, supported the intrigues of the Mufti of Jerusalem, sponsored the overtures made by Naji Shaukat to the German Minister in Turkey, and encouraged the pro-Nazi Press. Forced to resign by British pressure in January 1941, he returned to office through a *coup d'état* in April, installed Sharif Sharaf in place of the Regent and, backed by the Iraqi Army, refused to allow more than one brigade of British troops in Iraq.

In May 1941, when hostilities broke out between the Iraqi Army and the British forces in Habbaniya, he tried to unite the country against Britain but failed to get substantial tribal support. After the defeat of the Iraqi forces he fled to Persia, Turkey, and finally to Germany.

He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in 1942. Recognised by the Axis as legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq, he conducted an anti-British campaign by radio throughout the war.

In 1945 he escaped through the German lines to Prague and thence, with a false passport and the unwitting assistance of Allied military transport, to Marseilles, from where he sailed to Beirut. He arrived at Riyadh in September 1945, declared himself to Ibn Saud and was granted asylum.

In about 1955 he took up residence in Cairo as a Saudi pensioner. Returned to Iraq after the revolution on September 1, 1958. He received a tumultuous welcome as a symbol of nationalism and for the first few weeks after his return his house was thronged with callers. He gave the impression that he was in favour of very close relations, possibly a merger, between Iraq and the U.A.R. He was also said to be close to Colonel Arif and it was rumoured that he wished to seize power with the latter's support.

After Arif's arrest he seemed to be lying low, but was arrested on December 8, 1958, on a charge of complicity in a plot against the Qasim Government.

143. Rashid Najib

Sunni. A Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1906. He joined Government service in 1925, entered the Press and Propaganda Department of the Ministry of the Interior in 1947 and became Assistant Director-General in the Ministry in 1949. In 1952 he was appointed Mutasarrif of Kirkuk, and in 1953 of Erbil, returning to Kirkuk in the same year, became Mutasarrif of Mosul in 1955 and Mutasarrif of Basra in September 1957. In 1951 he visited the United States and in 1955 the United Kingdom. In 1956 he spent three weeks in the United Kingdom as guest of Her Majesty's Government as one of a small party of senior officials. In 1957 he visited Pakistan and India as an official guest inspecting rural administration. Dismissed after July 14, 1958.

He is an able and conscientious administrator, taking a keen interest in local government, which he has studied abroad with intelligence and goodwill. A frank, friendly and kindly personality, he speaks English well. He is well disposed towards Britain and was helpful in restoring Anglo-Iraqi activities in Mosul after the blackout caused by the Suez intervention. His wife took a lead in going out in society in Mosul.

144. Rauf al Bahrani

Baghdad Shia, born 1897. Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance in 1922 and rose—it is said not entirely by merit—to be Director-General of Customs and Excise in 1935.

Minister of Finance under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Again Director General of Customs and Excise 1938-40. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said 1940; of Social Affairs under Rashid Ali 1940-41; and again of Social Affairs in Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April-May 1941.

After Rashid Ali's overthrow he fled to Persia, where he was arrested by British forces in autumn 1941 and sent for internment to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for trial in 1944, he was condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of his property.

After his release he engaged in business and gradually reinstated himself until in May 1950 he was appointed Director-General of Income Tax. In July 1952 he was appointed a member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration. The appointment was terminated in 1955.

Although he talks the conventional Arab nationalist language, he was a tool rather than an associate of Rashid Ali. Early in 1950 he made himself known to a member of this Embassy and thereafter regained his position in Baghdad society.

He speaks no English.

145. Rauf al Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1884. Educated at Istanbul and at Berlin and Geneva Universities. Before the war he was successively a clerk in the legal drafting department of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, a professor of law at the Turkish Law College, Qaimmaqam of Diyala, and adviser on foreign affairs to the Turkish Governor of Baghdad. Immediately before its fall he was the Mayor of Baghdad. He went to Berlin shortly before the occupation, and later to Switzerland. He was not permitted to return to Baghdad until 1920.

In Baghdad he practised as a lawyer and took no part in Nationalist agitation, but was asked to go with his father when the latter was deported to Istanbul in August 1920. He returned in 1921 and took up his law practice, obtaining much of the business of

foreign firms owing to his knowledge of languages. Professor at the Baghdad Law School 1922, Dean 1923.

Deputy for Hilla 1924, he opposed the 1922 Treaty. Minister of Finance under Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun, Minister of Justice under Jafar al Askari 1926. Iraqi Minister to Ankara 1929. He resigned in 1930 and returned to Baghdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Iraqi Minister in London from 1936 to 1939 when he resigned. He generally spends the summer months in England.

Rauf has a charming and kindly personality and looks on the intrigues and enthusiasms of Iraqi politics with an indulgent contempt. He is universally popular and consequently well informed, but will not often talk about politics. He speaks English, French, German and Turkish. Is badly crippled with arthritis. In April 1952 he surprised Baghdad society by marrying Majda, the stepdaughter of Daud al Haidari, who is at least thirty years younger than he is. He is a brother of Kamil al Chadirchi by a different mother but does not share his political views. Although a moderate nationalist Rauf has been shocked by certain aspects of the new régime particularly the trials by the military court. He attempted without success to see the Prime Minister to appeal for clemency for the condemned men.

146. Rushdi al Chalabi

Born about 1914, son of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi of a prominent and wealthy Shia family in Kadhimain.

Associated with his father in various commercial and industrial enterprises including large-scale grain exports, jute manufacture and vegetable oil extraction.

Politically a supporter of Nuri Pasha and in 1950 elected to the Central Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Elected as one of the Deputies for Kadhimain in 1948 and returned unopposed to the present Parliament in September 1954. Appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Government of Nuri al Said in August 1954. Subsequently appointed as Minister of Agriculture. Although he showed some signs of activity at the outset, it was soon apparent that he was too stupid, lazy and conceited to be a good Minister. His father's position kept him in office until Nuri al Said resigned in June 1957. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri in March 1958 and Minister of Economics under Ahmad Mukhtar Baban in May 1958. Achieved nothing other than to lower the reputation of the Governments in which he served. Imprisoned after the revolution but released in October 1958. Somewhat surly in manner and possessed of only fair knowledge of English. He is married to a member of the wealthy Agha Jaafar family of Basra who speaks a little English.

147. Sa'ad Umar

Born in Karbala in 1917. Shia. Son of Umar Haj Alwan, one of the Karbala representatives on the Constituent Assembly. Educated at Karbala and Baghdad. Graduated in the Law College about 1941. Thereafter he practised as a lawyer in Karbala until 1947, when he became Deputy for Karbala. He was not re-elected in 1948, but was put in in a by-election later in the year. Minister for Social Affairs in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949, and of Education in Taufik Suwaidi's Cabinet in February 1950. A member of Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party November 1949.

In the Chamber of Deputies after he had failed to substantiate allegations of corruption which he had made against four Cabinet Ministers, he was suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary session.

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Before the revolution was a moderate exponent of the standard Opposition line. After the revolution he showed a cautious and realistic assessment of the situation and was disturbed by the fact that the changes, most of which he thought were necessary, had taken place by violence. A member of the delegation which visited Communist China in September 1958. He is more intelligent than he appears and can usually be relied upon to give a balanced judgment. He was particularly disgusted at the conduct of the political trials after the revolution, which he considered a disgrace to his profession. He is personally very cordial and would like to see good relations between Iraq and the West, but without alliances or special positions.

148. Sabih Mumtaz al Daftari

Born 1910. Sunni of Baghdad and brother of Ali Mumtaz. In Iraq Government Service since 1928 in junior posts. Director-General of Justice 1948. Deputy for Baghdad 1950. He was among the Nationalist members who walked out of Parliament in February 1952. Re-appointed to the Civil Service October 1952 as Director-General of Communications and Works. Inspector-General in the Ministry of Agriculture 1954. Director-General of Justice 1955, in which capacity he also served on the Boards of the Rafidain Bank and the Tobacco Company. Appointed a member of the Public Service Board (Civil Service Commission) September 1957.

Sabih Mumtaz is a highly-strung individual with strong Nationalist sentiments and is thoroughly suspicious of Western policies. This has not prevented him being friendly with Europeans, though he is invariably very critical of their Governments. He speaks some English.

149. Sadiq al Bassam

Baghdad Shia, born about 1895. Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he practised as a lawyer for several years.

Elected Deputy for Kut in 1930, he supported Yasin al Hashimi and was a member of the Ikha al Watani Party. Minister of Education under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Minister of Economics under Nuri al Said 1939-40 and of Education under Rashid Ali in 1941.

Remaining inactive during the 1941 disturbances, he was Minister of Justice 1941-42 and of Communications and Works December 1943 to June 1944 under Nuri al Said; of Finance under Muhammed al Sadr, January to June 1948; and of Defence under Muzahim al Pachachi from June to October 1948. A Senator from 1941, his appointment was not renewed in 1949. A founder member of the United Popular Front, May 1951. He left the Front in June 1952 and was elected Deputy for Baghdad in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. He owned and edited the influential newspaper *al Difa* which was banned by Dr. Jamali's Government but reappeared under the title *al Hiyad*, only to be suppressed again by Nuri al Said in 1954.

Sadiq is a xenophobe with violent prejudices and ill-concealed fanaticism. As Minister of Defence in 1948 he was mainly responsible for the fierce sentences passed on Jews by the courts martial and for encouraging anti-Jewish feeling. He does not like the British and was the only Deputy to speak against the Special Agreement between Iraq and the United Kingdom when debated in the Chamber in March 1954. He speaks Arabic only. His private life is disreputable. He suffers badly from diabetes and from nerves which his addiction to whisky does nothing to improve. Despite all this, is an amusing, not unsympathetic personality and is tolerated if not liked by his political opponents.

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150. Said Qazzaz

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1903. Largely self-educated. He began his career as a clerk in the Mutasarrifiya in Sulaimaniya in 1924. Appointed Qaimmaqam of Halabja in 1934. Transferred in 1939 to Zakho and in 1941 to Kifri. From 1941 to 1944 he served in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944 he was appointed Mutasarrif at Kut. Transferred to Erbil in 1945 and to Kirkuk in 1947, after a short spell as an Administrative Inspector. Appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul in 1949. Was offered an appointment with the Basra Petroleum Company in the spring of 1952, but at Nuri al Said's request agreed to remain at Mosul until the general elections.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuruddin Mahmud, December 1952. Appointed Director-General of Iraqi Ports in February 1953 but resigned after a quarrel over the appointment of a Finance Officer with Abdul Wahab Murjan in March. Reappointed in June 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of the Interior in Dr. Jamali's Government and retained that post when Dr. Jamali re-formed the Government in March 1954. In October 1953 by agreement with the Talabani family was elected Deputy for Kirkuk at a by-election. In April 1954 was Minister of the Interior in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet and responsible for the conduct of elections. Although he did not escape the accusation of interference, especially from the Left, he conducted the elections well and did not allow a difficult security situation to get out of hand. He resigned directly the elections were over. Minister of Interior under Nuri al Said, August 1954 to June 1957. His participation in these Governments was not entirely in accordance with his desires, since he would much rather have retained the post of Director-General of Ports and he felt himself entitled to criticise Dr. Jamali's weaknesses, particularly the decision to allow students expelled for Communist tendencies to re-enter the Government schools and colleges. He therefore felt more at home in Nuri al Said's more authoritarian Government, though he complained of lack of access to the Prime Minister.

He succeeded in his terms of office in building up the morale of the police which had remained at a low ebb since the events of 1952.

Minister of the Interior again under Nuri in March 1958 and Baban in May 1958. Organised the elections of May 1958 with considerable efficiency. This earned him much criticism amongst the Opposition and liberal elements since these elections were generally considered to be even more rigged than was usual. Arrested after the revolution and said to be keeping up the morale of his fellow prisoners. At the time of writing is still awaiting trial.

He has visited England and in the summer of 1950 he toured America as a guest of the United States Government.

Hard-working, honest and fearless. Said Qazzaz was generally regarded as one of the best administrators in the country. He speaks good English.

151. Saleh Mahdi Haidar (Dr.)

Shia of Baghdad, born in 1914, went for a year to the American University of Beirut and from 1933-36 to the London School of Economics where he took a degree in economics. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1936-37. In 1937 he returned for a year to the London School of Economics for further study. On his return to Iraq he studied land problems and went back again to the London School of Economics from 1939-42. Ph.D. of London University, 1942. In 1943-46 he held various appointments in the Ministry of Supply, and in 1946-48 in the Ministry of Finance.

Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, 1945. Acting Director-

General of State Domains, 1948. In the same year he was seconded from the Ministry of Finance and made Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Iraq. In 1950 he went to Washington and London in connexion with the negotiations for the International Bank loan to Iraq and the Scarce Currency Agreements. His appointment as Deputy Governor of the National Bank was terminated in June 1952. Appointed Assistant Director-General of State Domains, August 1953, and Director-General of Revenues by Dr. Jamali in October 1953. As such was an Iraqi member of the Standing Committee set up to work out details of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955. Appointed Director-General of Budgets, 1955. Appointed a member of the Public Service Board in August 1957, but spent the next year at Columbia University, New York, with a fellowship. Returned to Baghdad after the revolution.

Saleh Haidar is honest, intelligent, but conceited, and he does not get on well with his colleagues. He is more of a theorist than a practical administrator. He speaks excellent English. His wife is the sister of the wife of Abdul Karim al Uzri; her English is poor.

152. Saleh Saib al Jubhuri

Sunni of the Jubur tribe of Mosul, born in 1898. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1916 and in the Iraqi army in 1921, he was appointed instructor in the newly-formed Small Arms School in Baghdad. During this appointment he attended a small arms course at Hythe, and later attended courses at the Iraqi Staff College and the Staff College, Camberley. A personal friend of Bekr Sidqi and a supporter of the 1936 *coup d'état*, he was retired after the assassination of Bekr Sidqi and appointed Assistant Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways. In 1941, after Rashid Ali's flight, he was invited to rejoin the army and was appointed G.O.C. Third Division. In 1944 he succeeded Ismail Namiq as Chief of the General Staff, the position he held during the Palestine war. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1945 and general in 1950. On handing over the office of Chief of General Staff in 1951 to General Nuruddin Mahmud, he became a Senator. He was offered the Ministry of Defence by Nasrat-al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri in August 1954-June 1957. Minister of Development under Abdul Wahab Murjan in December 1957 and Nuri in March 1958. He was Minister of Communications and Works under Baban in May 1958. In these ministerial appointments he achieved nothing at all and it was difficult to get him either to read or sign his papers. Unharmful, but lying low since July 14, 1958.

He neither drinks, smokes nor gambles, and is said to be just and honest; but he had neither the ability nor the personality to be a good Chief of General Staff or Minister, and his impotence as a leader was displayed in the 1948 Palestine campaign. He speaks some English. His wife does not appear in society.

153. Saleh Zakki Taufiq (Major-General)

Sunni Muslim, born in Baghdad in 1908 of mixed Turkish and Arab parents. Attended Senior Officers' School, Erlestoke Park, in 1948. He was appointed to command the Second Division as a Brigadier in June 1954, having held the command since October 1953. Dismissed from his post in December 1957 and placed on the retired list because he was too outspoken. Appointed Director-General of Railways after the revolution. He is tackling this job with his customary drive.

He is pro-British in outlook. His English is only fair. He was genuinely very interested in his profession. A live personality with drive and enthusiasm, who made his presence felt in the formations he commanded. His wife appears in public but does not speak English.

154. Salim Fakhri (Major)

Born about 1918. Appointed Director of Broadcasting after the revolution, in which post he seems to exercise considerable influence. He was dismissed from the army before the revolution as a political agitator but has now been reinstated. He claims to be a close associate of Brigadier Qasim. One of his duties seems to be that of Government spokesman, in which capacity he is prepared to see and talk at length to visiting journalists and notables. He speaks good English and is outwardly cordial, but has a Communist background. So far his actions have done nothing to disprove that he still holds Communist views, although he denies this is the case. Press and radio under his guidance follow a near Communist line and he appears to have more say in policy than his Minister, Siddiq Shanshal. It is difficult to know what he really thinks; he is slippery and usually plausible.

155. Sami Fattah

A native of Mosul of Kurdish origin, born in 1905. Educated at the Teachers' Training College in Baghdad, he taught in Iraqi schools from 1922 to 1925.

In 1925 he joined the Iraqi Army and was sent to Sandhurst in 1926. Commissioned in the Iraqi Army in 1928, he was attached to the newly-formed Royal Iraqi Air Force and returned to England for training with the R.A.F.

He graduated from the Iraqi Staff College in 1937 and in 1941, after the Rashid Ali rebellion, he was appointed Commander of the R.I.A.F. He held this appointment until 1954 (with the rank of Brigadier until 1952 when he was made a Major-General), except for a short interlude in 1948 when he was sent to Europe on a secret arms purchasing mission which was a complete failure. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1954 and placed on pension from that date. Transferred to the Ministry of Development, June 1954, and to the Director-General of Ports in August 1954. Minister of Interior under Ali Jaudat, June 1957, and under Abdul Wahab Murjan in December 1957. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri in March 1958. Minister of State for Defence in the Arab Union Government of May 1958. Injured during the disturbances of July 14, 1958, and arrested. He was put in prison but has since been released on bail.

He is an energetic and jovial man, a good disciplinarian, and was one of the Iraqi service's best leaders. He made every effort to improve the training and equipment of the R.I.A.F.

He tried to carry over into civil life the comparative efficiency of the armed forces, but had an uphill task faced with the incompetence of the Iraqi Civil Service. Nevertheless, both in the Port of Basra and during a brief interlude as Mutasarrif of Basra and again as Minister of Interior, showed that he was capable and firm.

He speaks English well and his sympathies are pro-British. Has latterly suffered from ill-health.

He is related by marriage to the influential Hazim Beg family of Zakho. His wife, who speaks fair English, goes out in society.

156. Shakir Maher

Born about 1915. A lawyer and prominent member of the Istiqlal Party until 1951, when he resigned. Elected as an Independent Deputy for

Baghdad (Samarra) in 1953 and again in 1954. He has spoken consistently against the Governments in office and was regarded as one of the younger and more ambitious Opposition Deputies. His ideas were still very much those of the Istiqlal Party, though he toed the line dutifully in Nuri's Parliament as the price of his election, but showed signs of breaking out again, largely because of the dismissal of one brother from the army and another from the post of Mutasarrif of Basra, as he considers, unjustly.

Was not re-elected in the May 1958 elections which hurt his feelings deeply. He was a supporter of Khalil Kenna and as such opposed to the pre-revolutionary Government. Not heard of since July 14, 1958. He speaks some English.

157. Shakir Mahmoud Shukri (Brigadier)

Sunni Moslem, born in Baghdad in 1916. An artillery officer and graduate of the Iraqi Staff College, Commander, 14th Brigade, 1954. Went to Libya as head of the Iraqi Military Mission in late 1956 and remained there until he returned to Baghdad in 1958 to take up his appointment as Deputy Chief of General Staff.

Well above the average in tactical ability, understanding and energy. Keen on training and practical about it. Was described by the head of the British Military Mission to Libya as the wisest head in the Libyan army. A pleasant personality.

158. Sheet Na'man

Born 1907. Christian. Educated American University, Beirut, and in the United States. Joined Government service, 1928. Appointed Director-General of Institute for Industrial Research, 1947, Director-General of Industries in Ministry of Economics, 1950, and a member of the Board of Administration of the Industrial Bank in the same year. Represented Iraq in the Economic Committee of the Arab League in Cairo, 1955. Visited the United Kingdom as Iraqi representative at the opening of Calder Hall, October 1956. Represented Iraq at the meeting of the Indian Atomic Energy Organisation, 1957.

He is an able administrator rather than a practising scientist. Until July 14, 1958, he was Iraq's representative on the Scientific Council of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre and a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee. After the revolution of July 14, 1958, appointed Professor at the Teachers' Training College.

Friendly towards the West and receptive of new ideas he is sometimes embarrassingly critical of Arab abilities and achievements. His wife, who speaks French, is a Syrian.

159. Siddiq Hassan (Brigadier)

Graduate of Iraqi Staff College, Commander, Artillery, 2nd Division, 1956-57. Then Garrison Commander at Habbaniya until the revolution, when he was appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff (Administration).

160. Taha al Hashimi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1888. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish Army in Arabia and the Yemen during the First World War. Appointed to the Turkish General Staff, 1920.

He returned to Baghdad in 1922, joined the Iraq Army and was given command of the troops in Mosul. C.G.S. 1923. He was on the staff of the High Commissioner for the frontier negotiations with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne, 1924. When the post of C.G.S. was abolished he became tutor to the then Crown Prince Ghazi, 1924; Chief of the Census Department, 1926; and Director of Education, 1928. In 1930 he again became C.G.S. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya and concluded the Iraq-Yemen Treaty of Friendship. He was in Turkey in

October 1936 when the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'état* forced the resignation of the Prime Minister (Taha's brother, the late Yasin al Hashimi), and he did not return to Iraq until September 1937, after the murder of Bekr Sidqi.

Elected Deputy for Baghdad, December 1937, and again in 1939. In December 1938, in collaboration with the C.G.S., Husain Fawzi, he organised the military demonstration which caused the resignation of Jamil Madfai and replaced him as Prime Minister by Nuri al Said. Taha became Minister of Defence in Nuri's Government and retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Rashid Ali in 1940. He resigned in January 1941 and himself became Prime Minister in February. He failed to break the influence of the pro-Axis military clique, who overthrew him and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali a month later. He then retired to Turkey, where he remained for the rest of the war, because Nuri al Said was unwilling to allow him to return.

He spent much of the time after the war in Syria, but in May 1951 he played the leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front. He was elected President of the Front's Supreme Committee, but in the spring of 1953 showed signs of losing interest in domestic politics and when in August 1953 he was appointed Vice-President of the Development Board he gave up all political activity. Dismissed from the Development Board after July 14, 1958.

He is no friend of the British, nor for that matter of the late Crown Prince with whom he engaged in a slanging match in 1952, before a gathering of ex-Prime Ministers. In the Development Board showed a distinct partiality for the Germans and collaborated closely with Abdul Rahman al Jalili.

His wife does not appear in public. He speaks French, but not English.

161. Tahir Yahya (Colonel)

At one time a member of the Permanent Military Court at Habbaniya. Brought back from retirement after the revolution and appointed Director-General of Police. A fat and friendly man, he appears to be able.

Transferred early December 1958 to be Commandant of Police Schools. Arrested shortly after in connexion with plot against the régime of December 8.

162. Tahsin Qadri, G.C.V.O., O.B.E.

Sunni of Damascus, born 1893. He was with King Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in 1920. Came to Baghdad with the King and was appointed A.D.C. in 1921.

Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1932, he accompanied King Faisal on his State Visit to England in 1933. He resigned in 1936 owing to Princess Azza's scandalous marriage. Counsellor to Iraqi Legation, Tehran, 1936. Consul-General, Bombay, 1937. Director of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February and Consul-General, Beirut, in July 1939. He became, in addition, Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government in 1943. Accredited as Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1944. Acting Director-General, Foreign Affairs, 1945. Minister at Paris, 1946. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace, 1947. In June 1949 he was temporarily appointed Minister at Tehran when the Regent visited Persia in that year, but returned to his post at the Palace a few months later. In June 1952 he accompanied the Amir Abdul Ilah to Amman. He was responsible for arranging King Faisal II's Accession celebrations in May 1953 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the

Coronation of Queen Elizabeth the following month. Accompanied His Majesty to Pakistan, March 1954, and to Jordan and Turkey in 1955, and on his State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1956, when he was made G.C.V.O. He was in London on July 14, 1958, and has remained abroad since then.

Tahsin is sociable and clever and made a not very efficient but agreeable Master of Ceremonies. He much enjoys his whisky and the company of European ladies. Politically he was a lightweight. He is married to the heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra, who speaks French and some English but of her own choice does not appear in society.

He speaks Turkish, French and English.

163. Talib Abdul Majid Jamil

Sunni of leading Baghdad family. Born 1919. Advocate, brother of Hussain Jamil. Joined Government Service 1953 and after service as Registrar of Companies and Assistant Director-General in Ministry of Development was appointed, in 1954, Director of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Economics, and in 1957 Director-General of Commerce. Director-General of Economics, October 1958.

Although an ardent Nationalist with pronounced leanings to the Left, he has made efforts to improve his connexion with Western diplomatic missions. Visited United Kingdom under Her Majesty's Government's auspices in 1956, but any beneficial results from this visit were largely nullified by the Suez crisis which occurred immediately after his return to Iraq. Is pleasant company and works hard to improve his recently acquired command of English and French. Continued to be friendly after July 14, 1958, and expressed himself well pleased with the revolution.

His wife also speaks some English and goes out in society.

164. Tariq al Askari

Sunni, born in Aleppo in 1914. Son of the late Jaafar Pasha al Askari. Nuri al Said was his uncle. Educated at King's College, Cambridge, from 1932-35 and took a degree in engineering. In 1936-37 worked as engineer with the Grampian Electricity Supply Company in Scotland. Engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1937-42. Deputy for Kut, 1943-48. From May to October 1948 served with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem and held the rank of captain. Appointed Director of the Agricultural Section of the Development Board in April 1952. He resigned in the autumn and was elected Deputy for Qalaat Salih in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Was chosen Second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, December 1953. Appointed Minister at the Embassy in London, June 1955. Dismissed from his post in London after July 14, 1958. The Iraqi Government tried without success to secure his extradition and he has not returned to Iraq.

Tariq was a member of the Higher Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Intelligent, wealthy, able and witty, he is one of the few younger Iraqis with a balanced judgment. Although a sincere Nationalist he regards the shortcomings of his own countrymen with amused cynicism which, as with many Iraqis educated in the West, has made of him a passive rather than a dynamic force in his own country.

He is a genuine friend and admirer of Britain and was a believer in the British connexion, though he has been known to criticise it publicly. He is no less friendly towards the United States.

Tariq speaks excellent English, Turkish and some French. His wife, a daughter of the late Jaafar al

Pachachi, also speaks good English and appears in mixed society. They entertained frequently and well.

165. Taufiq al Mukhtar

Born about 1900. A former officer of Iraqi army. Elected Deputy for Baghdad in 1950, 1953 and again in 1954. Chairman of Military Affairs Committee in the Chamber. Member of the so-called Nationalist bloc in the 1950 Parliament and always in opposition to the Government of the day. A vociferous critic of the British connexion. He stood for Parliament as an independent. Was not re-elected in the 1958 elections. Has kept quiet since July 14, 1958.

A voluble and entertaining character, prepared to be friendly. Speaks no English.

166. Tariq Said Fahmi (Major-General, Retired)

Sunni Moslem, born in Baghdad in 1909. Has commanded at Habbaniya and the 4th Armoured Division. Appointed Mutasarrif of Baghdad after the revolution. It is early to tell how effective he is but he seems to have made a reasonable start. He is cordial and speaks fair English.

167. Taufiq Suwaidi

Sunni, of a well-established Baghdad family, born about 1889. Educated at Baghdad, Istanbul and Paris, where he studied International Law, he was appointed interpreter to the Ministry of Education at Istanbul in 1913. In the same year he represented Iraq at the Arab Conference in Paris. During the First World War he was in Istanbul. After the armistice he joined the Arab Government in Syria and was appointed a judge at Damascus. He returned to Baghdad in 1921 and was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School.

Deputy from 1924. President of the Chamber 1929, he has held the following Cabinet posts: Education under Abdul Musin Sa'adun, 1928; Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in 1934; Justice in Jamil Madfai's twelve-day Cabinet of 1935; Foreign Affairs again under Madfai 1937; Foreign Affairs under Taha al Hashimi 1941. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Pasha for a short time in 1943 but resigned the following year when the constitutional validity of this office was called in question. He was Prime Minister in 1929, 1946 and 1950 and joined Nuri al Said's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1951. Resigned from the Cabinet in July 1951. Foreign Minister under Jamil Madfai in January 1953. Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri in March 1958 and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Arab Union Government of May 1958.

Taufiq was Iraqi Minister at Tehran in 1931 and has had considerable diplomatic experience. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he headed the Iraqi Delegation to Geneva in 1937, where he is said to have handled the Palestine and Assyrian questions with tact and moderation. He again represented Iraq at Geneva in 1938 and afterwards visited London to discuss the Palestine problem with the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and in 1948 he was one of the signatories of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. He was used by various Governments to represent Iraq on conferences and special missions, e.g., to the Arab League and Baghdad Pact. Chairman of the Arab League Economic Committee 1956.

His elder brother Naji Suwaidi was a prominent member of Rashid Ali's Government but Taufiq escaped implication.

Taufiq is intelligent, subtle and not altogether honest, either politically or financially. In Arab affairs he at one time followed the Egyptian lead and in Iraqi politics he often used to be opposed to Nuri al Said, but he co-operated with him on occasion, as he did over the Agreements with Turkey and the United Kingdom in the spring of 1955, and in the period leading up to July 14, 1958. It was he who permitted the operation of political parties in 1946 after they had been banned for many years, and for a short time in 1946 he was president of the Liberal Party. He is a rich man, a landed proprietor, who has also wide business interests. He is known to have used his political influence in favour of his business interests. His reputation for corruption did harm to the Governments to which he belonged. Tried after the revolution and sentenced to life imprisonment. He conducted himself courageously throughout the trials, both as witness and defendant. He has a keen sense of humour, is excellent company and speaks French and English fluently but incorrectly. His wife does not go out in society.

168. Taufiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1887. Graduating from the Turkish Military College in 1904, he served in European Turkey and was a regimental commander and later a staff officer in the Ottoman army during the 1914-18 war.

After the war he joined the Iraqi army and was appointed Military Adviser to Shaikh Mahmud in 1923. Leaving Shaikh Mahmud when the latter's conduct became impossible, he was appointed Commandant of the Baghdad Military College with the rank of Colonel. In 1929 he was sent on the Senior Officers' course in the United Kingdom.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya for a short time in 1930, he remained unemployed for several years afterwards but was ultimately appointed Director-General of Surveys. He resigned from Government service in 1941 and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor. Minister of Economics under Hamdi Pachachi 1944-46, of Education under Saleh Jabr in 1947, and of Social Affairs under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1950. Made a Senator in 1948. When his term expired in 1956, he was not reappointed.

Appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946. Elected second vice-president of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party in July 1951. Re-elected second vice-president in 1954. Although at first an enthusiastic supporter of Saleh Jabr, his faith in the party weakened and he was not upset when all political parties were abolished in November 1952. Again second vice-president in the revived party in 1953, but largely abandoned politics after breaking with Saleh Jabr and being expelled from his party in the summer of 1954, when he tried unsuccessfully to lead the party to co-operation with Nuri. He was then engaged in the publication of a Kurdish grammar book.

Was in London on July 14, 1958, and has remained abroad since then. His name was included in the list of those to be tried by the tribunal set up under the Corruption Law.

He is a kind man, frank, affable and an Anglophile and before July 14, 1958, was honorary vice-president of the British Institute Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the British Council-sponsored Preparatory School in Baghdad. His achievements in office fell short of his excellent intentions, and he is not a man to sway his colleagues. He speaks English, Persian and Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic. His wife, though a woman of little education, is very active in good works and ran the early stages of flood relief in 1954. She has established herself as the leading spirit in this field among the women of her generation. She speaks a little Turkish and some English.

169. Wasfi Taher (Colonel)

Was A.D.C. to the late Nuri es. Said before July 14, 1958. After that date, he became A.D.C. to Brigadier Qasim. He must have been privy to the plot to overthrow the old régime. Is now thought to be one of Qasim's closest advisers and said to be a card-holding member of the Communist Party. Something of a thug in appearance, he is prepared to make himself agreeable, and speaks a little English.

170. Yahya Qassim

Sunni of Mosul, born 1913. Educated Baghdad Law College.

He joined Government service in 1936. Was appointed Superintendent in the Council of Ministers' Office in 1937 and later transferred to the Iraqi State Railways.

He was at that time an active Left-winger, and was reported to have a hand in the publication of the clandestine newspaper *Al Sharara*. In 1943 he was arrested for the distribution of Leftish literature and was discharged from the Iraqi State Railways. In 1944 he started the newspaper *Al Sha'ab* as the organ of the now defunct Leftist party of that name. He now owns and edits this paper himself, and it is no longer connected with any party. By the middle of 1953 it had become the best and most popular newspaper in Baghdad. He visited England with a party of journalists in 1945 and became a convinced and outspoken admirer of the British people. In 1946 he joined the National Democratic Party, but soon resigned owing to personal differences. He was taken up by Saleh Jabr in 1947 and accompanied him to London in January for the signature of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. In addition to journalism he practises as a lawyer and is paid a retainer by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Elected for Telafar in June 1954, displacing the paramount Shaikh of the Shammar, but not re-elected in September 1954. He has visited England every summer since 1949. In 1954 he went for the second time as a member of a sponsored Press delegation. Visited Germany in 1955. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in May 1958. Arrested after July 14, 1958, presumably because, although he often spoke freely, he was known as being basically a Nuri man. Later released on bail.

Yahya is a clever man with a frank and friendly manner and a pronounced stammer. His newspaper was above the low level of the Baghdad Press, and he had the courage on occasion to express unpopular opinions. He has not abandoned his Socialist leanings and is a sincere advocate of reforms, but he is now no revolutionary. He is married to a niece of the late Amin Zaki Sulaiman and speaks good English.

171. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid)

Sunni, born 1907 of the family of the Naqibs of Baghdad. Educated at Baghdad and Balliol College, Oxford.

He returned to Iraq in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which he became Director of the Political Section in 1945. Director-General in 1949, Acting Under-Secretary in January 1951 and Under-Secretary in 1952. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to Arab League meetings in 1949 and 1950. Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Assembly in 1951. Suspended from the Foreign Service for five years after the revolution, but remained at liberty. He was frequently called as a witness in the political trials.

Yusuf is intelligent and friendly, cautious and a little shy. He takes not part in politics and is a firm believer in the alignment of Iraqi foreign policy with the West. Is a competent negotiator and conducted himself well at meetings of the Baghdad Pact

Council at Deputy level. He complained of the amateurish and emotional conduct of Iraq's foreign relations by his successive political chiefs, and was occasionally critical of the intervention of the Crown Prince in the detailed conduct of foreign affairs. He was, however, a loyal, discreet and competent official. He speaks excellent English, and his wife, who is also a Gailani, appears in mixed society and speaks good English. They have sent their sons to Haileybury.

Obituary

1. King Faisal II.
2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.
63. Hassan al Suhail (Sheikh).
77. Jamil Midfai.
112. Nuri al Said, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.

Numbers are those in the 1957 Personalities Report.